12:01

Dan Szymborski: It is time.  A time for chats.

12:02

Dan Szymborski: I think there’s something to that…if not for Cleveland.

12:02

Dan Szymborski: I think if you go all-in, you at least want to have a really good shot at the division

12:03

Dan Szymborski: and the second best record

12:03

Dan Szymborski: It becomes trickier when you’re mostly chasing a wild card

Read the rest of this entry »

At this time last year, the Phillies faced a good deal of long-term uncertainty about their rotation. Aaron Nola was a free agent after the season, Zack Wheeler would follow a year later, and the only pitcher with a guaranteed contract past the 2024 season was Taijuan Walker. This time around, their rotation once again leads the league in WAR, but much of that future angst has been alleviated. The Phillies re-signed Nola and extended Wheeler during the offseason, and now they’ve locked up left-hander Cristopher Sánchez, a 2023 sensation who has remained one this season, for at least four more years, with two club options that could keep him around the through 2030 season.

The 27-year-old Sánchez, whom the Phillies acquired in a trade with the Tampa Bay Rays for Curtis Mead back in 2019, has a 2.67 ERA/2.49 FIP over 15 starts this season. That’s good for 2.6 WAR, fourth best among National League pitchers. Sánchez will receive a guaranteed $22.5 million over the next four seasons, buying out all of his possible years of arbitration, plus a $2 million signing bonus. Not bad for someone who had just one full year of service time entering 2024. The two club options come with a $1 million buyout each for 2029 and ’30, bringing the minimum value of the deal to $22.5 million. If the Phillies pick up those two options, for $14 million and $15 million, respectively, and if Sánchez secures top-10 finishes in the Cy Young voting during those option years, his salaries could increase to $16 million for 2029 and $19 million for ’30. That puts the maximum total value of the extension at $56.5 million over six years.

If you didn’t see Sánchez coming, you’re definitely not alone. Mead went on to become one of Tampa Bay’s top prospects – he was still ranked fourth in the Rays’ system and 32nd overall in our preseason prospects rankings – while Sánchez came back from the COVID layoff struggling against Triple-A hitters. Changeup pitchers with command issues generally aren’t highly regarded, and neither Sánchez’s cup of coffee in 2021 nor his larger carafe in 2022 suggested a pitcher who would become a key part of a top rotation a year later. The Phillies certainly weren’t confident in him entering 2023; he had lost weight over the offseason, and the team intended to give him only a single spot start in April after a White Sox doubleheader messed up the rotation’s rest days. From a story from last August by Matt Gelb of The Athletic:

Rob Thomson was transparent with Sánchez: This was one start, and one start only. Sánchez, who had missed most of spring training with various injuries, later said he appreciated the manager’s honesty. He knew where he stood.

Before the call ended, Brian Kaplan had a question. He is the team’s assistant pitching coach and director of pitching development. The Phillies had outlined an offseason plan for Sánchez, a lanky lefty from the Dominican Republic, and it went haywire. Sánchez was supposed to add bulk. But a long illness sapped him of strength. He lost more than 15 pounds. It compromised him in the spring when he failed to make an impression while the Phillies scrambled to fill the back of their rotation.

In truth, Sánchez didn’t dominate for Lehigh Valley last year, either, but he did accomplish one goal the team set out for him; by the summer, he had gained 25 pounds. That coincided with a small window of opportunity to grab the fifth spot in the rotation. The Phillies had used Matt Strahm in the role early in the season, but they were worried about his innings count. Dylan Covey had gotten a couple starts but was bombed by the Braves in his most recent one, and Bailey Falter, who had been in the rotation earlier, was in the minors and out with a neck injury. So Sánchez got the nod on June 17 against the A’s; he went four scoreless innings and allowed one hit. His tumbling changeup — which looks like the world’s least erratic forkball — clicked, and he never gave the Phillies a reason to boot him from the rotation. Even the acquisition of Michael Lorenzen didn’t cost him his job. The Phillies happily went with a six-man rotation rather than deprive themselves of Sánchez’s services.

Over the first half of this season, Sánchez has proven that his performance last year was no fluke. He’s now been up for a full calendar year, throwing 175 1/3 innings with 157 strikeouts with a 3.08 ERA across 31 starts. He surely won’t continue his rate of home run avoidance (just one allowed this season), but even if his home run rate were to regress heavily toward the mean and cause his ERA to jump to the low 3.00s, he’d still worthy of his rotation spot.

So, what’s the projection look like? Suffice it to say, ZiPS was not very excited about him coming into 2023.

That’s not disastrous; with those numbers, he would’ve been a competent spot starter/long reliever. But it wasn’t even a shadow of what he’s accomplished in the last year. So let’s spin up his current, much sunnier projection. How sunny? Let’s just say Tom Glavine pops up in the top 10 on his comps list and leave it at that.

Most teams would be ecstatic to have this projection from their no. 2 starter. From your no. 4, this is like waking up one morning and finding out that your garden hose somehow makes its own IPA. Based on these numbers, ZiPS projects Sánchez to be worth $27.3 million over the four-year extension, making this a decent value from the point of view of the Phils. The deal becomes even better for Philadelphia when you look at the option years; ZiPS projects Sánchez’s value for 2029 and ’30 to be worth a combined $41 million in free agency, $11 million more than the base value of those years if the Phillies pick up his options.

That leaves Ranger Suárez as the only key member of the rotation who might not be around long term. He’s set to hit free agency after the 2025 season, and considering his excellence this year, he probably won’t come cheap if the Phillies try to extend him; a six-year deal would cost them $135 million, according to ZiPS. Having Sánchez around until the end of the decade at such a generous rate could provide Philadelphia the flexibility to dole out more money to keep Suárez.

Before we go, I’ve been looking for an excuse to project the Phillies rotation, so I’m not letting this opportunity slip away! Using the innings allocation in our depth charts, ZiPS currently projects Phillies starting pitchers to accumulate 8.6 more WAR over the rest of the season, which would give their starters a combined 22.7 WAR for the entire 2024 campaign. Here’s how that compares to the best starting staffs in the five-man rotation era, which I’m somewhat arbitrarily starting in 1980:

That’s quite rarified air. Based on these projections, the Phillies would finish the season with baseball’s best rotation in more than a decade, since the 2013 Tigers. And with the Sánchez extension coming on the heels of the deals for Nola and Wheeler, Philadelphia has the chance to keep this party going for several more years.

These are the saddest of possible words,
Bryant to Báez to Rizzo.
Seeing projected WAR cut into thirds,
Bryant to Báez to Rizzo.
Quickly declining in other team’s hats,
by plate discipline or by powerless bats,
concussions and sore backs turn comebacks to splats,
Bryant to Báez to Rizzo.

The 2016 season was one of the greatest in the history of the Chicago Cubs, a franchise that dates back to 1870, before the National League even existed. After winning the World Series and ending a championship drought that dated back to 1908, there were a lot of reasons to think this team would continue to make deep playoff runs for another five or six years. Sure, they had a fairly old starting rotation, with only Kyle Hendricks expected to stick around for a while, but the lineup looked like it was equipped for a long stretch of dominance. Addison Russell was 22, Javier Báez and Kyle Schwarber were each 23, Kris Bryant, Jorge Soler, and Willson Contreras were all 24, and Anthony Rizzo was still just 26. The team’s big free agent signing from the previous winter, Jason Heyward, didn’t have a good first season in Chicago, but at 26, a bounce-back campaign wasn’t out of the question. Still, this version of the Chicago Cubs would turn out to only have four postseason wins and a single playoff series win (the 2017 NLDS) left in them. What’s more, the three brightest stars in that constellation, Bryant, Báez, and Rizzo, were all traded at the 2021 deadline ahead of reaching free agency. Now, years later, each faces a very uncertain future. Read the rest of this entry »

After a year of caressing hopes for a triumphant return of José Abreu’s salad days, the Astros released the veteran first baseman on Friday, ending his disappointing tenure in Houston. It would be an understatement to say the 37-year-old Abreu struggled this season; across 35 games, he batted .124/.167/.195 with two home runs, for an wRC+ of 2 and a WAR that I won’t repeat due to the possibility of children reading. The Astros still owe Abreu a hair under $31 million of the three-year deal he signed soon after the 2022 season, though they’ll be on the hook for slightly less than that if another team signs him for the pro-rated league minimum.

If David Ortiz’s magnificent final season represents the optimal scenario for a beloved veteran slugger to reach retirement, then Abreu’s time with the Astros exemplifies the other far end of the spectrum. During his nine years with the White Sox, from 2014-22, Abreu was one of the most consistent sluggers in baseball, batting .292/.354/.506 with 243 home runs, a 133 wRC+, and 28.3 WAR. He had five 30-homer seasons, and that doesn’t include the shortened 2020 campaign, when he smacked 19 longballs, a full-season pace of 51, en route to winning the AL MVP award. With Chicago, he also earned AL Rookie of the Year honors (2014), made three All-Star teams (’14, ’18, ’19), and won three Silver Sluggers (’14, ’18, ’20). When he became a free agent after his age-35 season and the White Sox didn’t show much interest in bringing him back, Abreu quickly signed with the Astros, who had won the World Series a few weeks earlier.

It seemed like the ideal destination for his three-year autumnal epilogue. Houston wasn’t counting on him to be the centerpiece of the lineup; rather, his role would be to shore up first base and/or designated hitter for a few years and support stars like Kyle Tucker, Yordan Alvarez, Jose Altuve, and Alex Bregman. With the Astros coming off a 106-win season and a World Series championship, with many of their core players returning, it certainly appeared that his new team would provide Abreu a better chance to win a ring than he would’ve had with the clearly fading White Sox. To get an idea of what the reasonable expectations were for Abreu when he signed with Houston, let’s look at his three-year ZiPS projections heading into the 2023 season:

While ZiPS was skeptical that Abreu would be an everyday starter for all three years in Houston, it broadly thought he would be an adequate average-ish option for a year or two. Abreu got off to a wretched start last year, hitting .214/.262/.253 with no home runs through May 14 while starting 39 of the team’s first 40 games. As I wrote last April, there wasn’t even a hint that his struggles were a fluke; his plate discipline had deteriorated and his power evaporated like a puddle after a July thunderstorm in Texas.

There are some highly concerning issues in Abreu’s early-season profile this year that weren’t present in other early starts. When he struggles, he still generally hits the ball extremely hard. This year, his exit velocity has averaged 86.6 mph with an overall hard-hit rate of 36.7% — extremely low numbers for him. He was lousy last April, hitting .217/.308/.348, but he was still crushing pitches he connected with, resulting in a 94.6 mph average EV and a hard-hit rate of 59.6%. He also struggled in April 2021, hitting .213/.296/.394, but with a 92.1 mph EV and a 53.7% hard-hit rate — not quite as good as 2022, but worlds better than where those numbers currently stand. He got off to good starts in 2018 and ’19, so they’re not particularly helpful, and he crushed the ball in August of 2020 (I did not include any 2020 seasons in the April numbers, as the year was just too weird).

Abreu played somewhat better over the rest of the 2023 campaign, hitting .246/.309/.435 with 18 homers across 102 games and capping things off with four homers in the postseason. Rather than taking Abreu’s early-season woes as a warning that the end was near, the Astros proceeded to do very little to pick up another bat over the offseason; their biggest move to add some boom to the lineup came when they acquired Trey Cabbage from the Los Angeles Angels. Given Houston’s ALCS elimination at the hands of its cross-state rivals, the Texas Rangers, and its 90-72 record being its weakest since 2016, it’s hard to guess why the Astros took such a lackadaisical approach to a possible issue. Whether it has to do with the front office overhaul after James Click left is a topic for another day.

This season started off even worse for Abreu. He hit .111/.161/.123 with no homers, for an OPS (.284) that was even lower than the career OPS of Hall of Fame pitcher/extremely awkward hitter Randy Johnson (.305). His exit velocity numbers looked a lot like they did the previous April, and he failed to hit a single barrel. Things were so rough that Abreu agreed to be optioned to the minors to figure things out, leading to the rather odd sight of a former MVP debuting in the minors at age 37; he went straight to the majors 10 years ago after the White Sox signed him as an international free agent out of Cuba, and he never even played in the minors on an injury rehab assignment. Abreu did get back to Houston after a stint in Rookie-ball and a couple games with Triple-A Sugar Land, and he even hit two homers this month. But the writing was on the wall, and with the Mariners finally putting some space between them and the rest of the AL West, the Astros clearly could not afford to wait endlessly for another revival that may never come.

Over the short term, Jon Singleton is likely to continue to get the majority of the playing time at first base with Abreu out of the picture, but saying Singleton improves the team is damning with faint praise; while it was cool to see him come back to the majors after a decade away, he’s not really a productive major league bat. Singleton turns 33 later this year and is a .183/.294/.322 career hitter in the majors, with projections that rank from terrible (.214/.327/.388 in Steamer, .215/.324/.376 in ZiPS) to even more terrible (THE BAT at .193/.289/.343). Rookie Joey Loperfido would seem to be the obvious in-house solution to replace Abreu, but he’s primarily been an outfielder to this point and the organization hasn’t given him many starts at first base in Triple-A, which seems inconsistent with the idea that the Astros will offer him the next crack at the job. A big improvement here likely would require a larger trade, and I’m frankly not sure the decision-makers in Houston right now are equipped to move swiftly and deftly.

What’s next for Abreu? While the natural inclination would be a return to the White Sox, I think that would be a dreadful idea. Mal Tiempo doesn’t bring bad weather to opposing pitchers anymore, and I can’t help but feel that everything good he’ll be remembered for in Chicago is in the past. The Sox need to use their losing season more productively than a farewell tour for Abreu, and a bench bat with the Pale Hose won’t get Abreu one last run in the playoffs. Perhaps the Dodgers will sign him in July and he’ll slug .700 in 100 at-bats in a part-time role, because they’re the Dodgers.

A fun player for a long time and a great leader for the team and his city, Abreu’s almost certainly going to fall short of the Hall of Fame, perhaps even dropping off the ballot after his first year of eligibility. It would be shocking if he added much to his career 263 homers or 26.3 WAR (which is actually two wins less than it was when he left the White Sox), and we’ve yet to see the Hall of Fame voters credit foreign play to get a borderline player over the top. Ichiro Suzuki will easily make the Hall of Fame when he debuts on the ballot in the upcoming election, but that would be the case even if he had never played in Japan. I wrote a little about the possibility of including Abreu’s time in Cuba to evaluate his Hall of Fame case back in 2021, but that was more of a theoretical exercise than a serious expectation he’ll get votes.

No, Abreu is not going out on his best, but the cruelty of time in baseball isn’t that different from life. At some point, all of us will lose our ability to do the things we’re great at, the things we love, and eventually, anything at all. It’s just that as a ballplayer, his transition comes at a relatively younger age under very public scrutiny. I’ve always been a fan of the Orson Welles quote on the subject, and it’s one I’ve said that I’d like to have on my eventual epitaph: “If you want a happy ending, that depends, of course, on where you stop your story.” If this is the melancholy final chapter of the story of Abreu’s baseball career, it was still a volume that was wonderful to read.

Among the panoply of stats created by Statcast and similar tracking tools in recent years are a whole class of stats sometimes called the “expected stats.” These types of numbers elicit decidedly mixed feelings among fans – especially when they suggest their favorite team’s best player is overachieving – but they serve an important purpose of linking between Statcast data and the events that happen on the field. Events in baseball, whether a single or a homer or strikeout or whatever, happen for reasons, and this type of data allows us to peer a little better into baseball on an elemental level.

While a lucky home run or a seeing-eye single still count on the scoreboard and in the box score, the expected stats assist us in projecting what comes next. Naturally, as the developer of the ZiPS projection tool for the last 20 (!) years, I have a great deal of interest in improving these prognostications. Statcast has its own methodology for estimating expected stats, which you’ll see all over the place with a little x preceding the stats (xBA, xSLG, xwOBA, etc). While these data don’t have the status of magic, they do help us predict the future slightly less inaccurately, even if they weren’t explicitly designed to optimize predictive value. What ZiPS uses is designed to be as predictive as I can make it. I’ve talked a lot about this for both hitters and for pitchers. The expected stats that ZiPS uses are called zStats; I’ll let you guess what the “z” stands for!

It’s important to remember that these aren’t predictions in themselves. ZiPS certainly doesn’t just look at a pitcher’s zSO from the last year and go, “Cool, brah, we’ll just go with that.” But the data contextualize how events come to pass, and are more stable for individual players than the actual stats. That allows the model to shade the projections in one direction or the other. And sometimes it’s extremely important, such as in the case of homers allowed for pitchers. Of the fielding-neutral stats, homers are easily the most volatile, and home run estimators for pitchers are much more predictive of future homers than are actual homers allowed. Also, the longer a pitcher “underachieves” or “overachieves” in a specific stat, the more ZiPS believes the actual performance rather than the expected one.

One example of the last point is Tyler Anderson. He has a history of greatly underperforming what ZiPS expects, to the extent that ZiPS barely believes the zStats at this point (more on Anderson below). Expected stats give us useful information; they don’t conjure up magic.

What’s also interesting to me is that zHR is quite surprised by this year’s decline in homers. There have been 2,076 home runs hit in 2024 as I type this, yet before making the league-wide adjustment for environment, zHR thinks there “should have been” 2,375 home runs hit, a difference of 299. That’s a massive divergence; zHR has never been off by more than 150 home runs league-wide across a whole season, and it is aware that these home runs were mostly hit in April/May and the summer has yet to come. That does make me wonder about the sudden drop in offense this year. It’s not a methodology change either, as I re-ran 2023 with the current model (with any training data from 2023 removed) and there were 5,822 zHR last year compared to the actual total of 5,868 homers.

Let’s start the pitchers off with the summary data. Read the rest of this entry »

12:01

Dan Szymborski: It’s a chat!

12:02

Dan Szymborski: Well, a number of hitters are underperforming! Olson, the injured Acuña, and Riley all had prominent spots in the zstats update I posted yesterday

12:03

Dan Szymborski: Oh geez, I’m not sure

12:04

Dan Szymborski: Mercutio’s kind of Fernando Rodney-y. Constantine’s kind of moody

Read the rest of this entry »

Among the panoply of stats created by Statcast and similar tracking tools in recent years are a whole class of stats sometimes called the “expected stats.” These types of numbers elicit decidedly mixed feelings among fans – especially when they suggest their favorite team’s best player is overachieving – but they serve an important purpose of linking between Statcast data and the events that happen on the field. Events in baseball, whether a single or a homer or strikeout or whatever, happen for reasons, and this type of data allows us to peer a little better into baseball on an elemental level.

While a lucky home run or a seeing-eye single still count on the scoreboard and in the box score, the expected stats assist us in projecting what comes next. Naturally, as the developer of the ZiPS projection tool for the last 20 (!) years, I have a great deal of interest in improving these prognostications. Statcast has its own methodology for estimating expected stats, which you’ll see all over the place with a little x preceding the stats (xBA, xSLG, xwOBA, etc). While these data don’t have the status of magic, they do help us predict the future slightly less inaccurately, even if they weren’t explicitly designed to optimize predictive value. What ZiPS uses is designed to be as predictive as I can make it. I’ve talked a lot about this for both hitters and for pitchers. The expected stats that ZiPS uses are called zStats; I’ll let you guess what the “z” stands for!

It’s important to remember that these aren’t predictions in themselves. ZiPS certainly doesn’t just look at a hitter’s zBABIP from the last year and go, “Hey, sounds good, that’s the projection.” But the data contextualize how events come to pass, and are more stable for individual players than the actual stats. That allows the model to shade the projections in one direction or the other. And sometimes it’s extremely important, such as in the case of homers allowed for pitchers. Of the fielding-neutral stats, homers are easily the most volatile, and home run estimators for pitchers are much more predictive of future homers than actual homers allowed are. Also, the longer a hitter “underachieves” or “overachieves” in a specific stat, the more ZiPS believes the actual performance rather than the expected one.

A good example of this last point is Isaac Paredes. There was a real disconnect between his expected and actual performances in 2023 and that’s continued into 2024. But despite some really confounding Statcast data, ZiPS now projects Parades to be a considerably more productive hitter moving forward than it did back in March. Expected stats give us additional information; they don’t give us readings from the Oracle at Delphi.

One thing to note is that bat speed is not part of the model. The data availability is just too recent to gauge how including it would improve the predictive value of these numbers. It’s also likely that even without the explicit bat speed data, the model is already indirectly capturing a lot of the information bat speed data provides.

What’s also interesting to me is that zHR is quite surprised by this year’s decline in homers. There have been 2,076 home runs hit in 2024 as I type this, yet before making the league-wide adjustment for environment, zHR thinks there “should have been” 2,375 home runs hit, a difference of 299. That’s a massive divergence; zHR has never been off by more than 150 home runs league-wide across a whole season, and it is aware that these home runs were mostly hit in April/May and the summer has yet to come. That does make me wonder about the sudden drop in offense this year. It’s not a methodology change either, as I re-ran 2023 with the current model (with any training data from 2023 removed) and there were 5,822 zHR last year compared to the actual total of 5,868 homers. Read the rest of this entry »

Chris Sale is a serious Cy Young contender. This was once a fairly common combination of words to put together, but after five years of injuries and/or ineffectiveness, it seems like a very weird thing to say today. That’s where we are, though, with Sale striking out 82 batters against 10 walks over his 11 starts and 67 2/3 innings. He leads all NL starters in FIP (2.48), walks per nine innings (1.33), and strikeout-to-walk ratio (8.20); he ranks fourth in strikeouts per nine (10.91), sixth in pitcher WAR (1.9), and 12th in ERA (3.06), though both his excellent FIP and xERA (2.73, third in NL) suggest his actual mark could improve as the season goes on. And for subscribers to the old school, he’s posted an 8-1 record for the Braves, a top contender who lost their ace for the season. Indeed, Atlanta’s offseason gamble to trade for Sale is paying off well so far, and his resurgence have been paramount in preventing the Braves from falling even farther behind the Phillies in the NL East standings.

But what hasn’t been revived yet is any talk about Sale’s chances of making a run at Cooperstown immortality in another decade or so. That’s not surprising, given he lost a good chunk of his mid-career years and stands at only 128 wins and 1,848 1/3 innings — volume that wouldn’t get it done for even the most dominant of starters on a per-inning basis. We’ve long accepted that 300-game winners were going to be increasingly unlikely, but what if 200 becomes the new standard? If Sale truly has reemerged from five years in the injury wasteland, suddenly his Hall of Fame case looks at least plausible.

The 300-win standard never actually was a standard for Hall of Fame voting until relatively recently. Barely a quarter of Hall of Fame pitchers are 300-game winners and a quarter of them (six of 24) exclusively played in the 19th century, when baseball was as much a carnival show as professional sport. From 1917 to 1965, nearly a half-century that included baseball’s peak in the context of American culture, there were never more than three future 300-win pitchers active at any point. In most of those years, baseball had only one or two active pitchers who would eventually hit that threshold, typically a combination of Lefty Grove, Early Wynn, and Warren Spahn. It’s not as if this was an era in baseball history that lacked for Hall of Fame pitchers; slightly more than half of AL/NL Hall of Famers had the majority of their careers within that span of years.

To get a clearer picture, I took all starting pitchers (at least 50% of games as starters) and tracked how many per year got at least 10% support on the BBWAA’s Hall of Fame ballot. It’s not completely an apples-to-apples comparison because the rules have changed at times, but it’s not apples-to-grenades either, as the BBWAA rules have been more stable than the various Veterans Committee schemes.

The stinginess trend toward pitchers is clear. Without a lot of 300-win pitchers to vote on, voters didn’t simply shrug and decide that no pitchers were good enough; they were quite happy to vote for lots of pitchers who failed to get 300 wins, or even 250. From 1936 to 1975, the 10-election rolling average of pitchers with fewer than 200 wins to reach that 10% threshold was 2.5. A pitcher with fewer than 200 wins hasn’t received 10% of the vote since Don Newcombe in 1980. This is despite early voters having the deepest pools of players to vote for; even as Hall of Fame voting started in 1936 and players hung on ballots for 15 years instead of the current 10-year window, voters found room for these pitchers with less impressive win totals.

The 90s cluster of pitching greats are either in the Hall of Fame or off the ballot, so unless voting patterns become more like they were before the 1970s, we may have a real lack of pitchers inducted into the Hall of Fame in the coming years. That process has already started, with only 17 different pitchers ever getting 10% of the vote in 21st-century balloting. There are three active pitchers with 200 wins: Justin Verlander, Max Scherzer, and Clayton Kershaw. There’s also Zack Greinke, who at age 40 has probably thrown his last big league inning, even though he has not yet officially retired and remains unsigned. It seems very likely that all four will get into the Hall of Fame. But then what? Pitcher usage has changed considerably since that quartet debuted. Right now, there are only 11 other active pitchers with 100 (!) career wins, and none between 150 and 200.

Aside from the previously mentioned quartet, only Sale and Gerrit Cole have ever really come up in future Hall of Fame conversations, though Yu Darvish has an interesting-but-tricky case if voters give consideration to his seven years pitching in Japan. For the first time in ZiPS history, ZiPS doesn’t project a single pitcher who hasn’t already eclipsed 200 wins to have at least a 50% shot of reaching the milestone. Considering this, Sale has an fascinating path to the Hall of Fame. For the most part, the writers still aren’t voting for pitchers without lofty win totals, but it has become clear that the fixation on pitcher wins has decreased in Cy Young voting. This could provide an interesting preview of where Hall of Fame voting is going to be over the next 5-10 years, because year-end voters don’t have the same 10-year requirement for BBWAA membership that Hall of Fame voting does. As a result, you tend to get a younger demographic participating in year-end awards voting, and at least some of those writers will be gaining their Hall of Fame vote between now and when Sale hits the ballot. Additionally, some of the most veteran writers aren’t as active in the year-end voting, as some of them are in a state of semi or full retirement but have maintained their Hall vote. In a contrast the younger writers, some of these senior BBWAA members will lose their vote over the next 5-10 years. Call it the Baseball Writing Circle of Life.

Considering this, let’s crank up ZiPS (Hey, you had to know I was going to do this at some point!) and look at Sale’s up-to-date projections. As discussed at the top of this post, Sale has been excellent in 2024 and, just as importantly, he’s been healthy.

Even with ZiPS projecting Sale to be only healthy-ish rather than to have a late-career renaissance like Verlander, that’s another 50 wins and 10 WAR, and with the rest of 2024 added in, 58 wins and 12 WAR. That would bring his total career projection to 186 wins and 62 WAR. Excluding the quartet of Verlander, Scherzer, Kershaw, and Greinke, that’d place Sale second among active pitchers in both wins and WAR, behind only Cole. As far 200 wins go, ZiPS projects Sale to have a 45% chance to reach that milestone, and if 200 becomes the new 300, then he’s got a 45% shot at making it to Cooperstown. Obviously, it’s not that simple, but Sale might not need to get to 200 wins to get elected. When voters look at Sale’s Hall of Fame case, they’ll consider his utter dominance during his best seasons — an eight-season peak from 2012-19 — and, should his health hold up at least to the level that ZiPS projects, he’ll likely go down as one of the very best pitchers during the two-decade era from 2010-2030. That would probably be enough to get him over the hump even if he falls short of 200. This chart tells the story.

It’s not as if Sale’s career is missing those non-statistical highlights. While his postseason performances have been short of cromulence, he does have a World Series ring, six All-Star selections so far, and is already 27th all-time in Cy Young career shares.

Will Sale actually end up in the Hall of Fame? We’ll have to wait until he finishes writing the last handful of chapters, which is sometimes a difficult task. But I think the final story may be better than many people think.

Baseball is big business and no team is infinitely patient with players who are struggling. While teams won’t generally describe it in such blunt terms, at the beginning of the season, every player has some unknown, invisible amount of leeway when it comes to poor performance. Established role players and fringe starters who just squeezed their way onto the big league roster in March may find themselves in the Pacific Coast or International League come late April or early May as they feel the heat of a poor start. As summer approaches, the names facing demotion become bigger, especially when those players are younger guys who still have minor league options remaining. On Sunday night, two of those bigger names ran out of rope, at least for now: Spencer Torkelson and Edouard Julien are headed to Triple-A to play for smaller crowds in smaller towns.

Before we examine what this pair of demotions means, I thought I’d put some numbers to the broader phenomena. I looked at the preseason ZiPS projections for players optioned during the season over the last 10 years. In nine of the 10 seasons, June was the month in which the players with the most combined projected WAR were sent to the minors. That holds true on a rate basis as well, with 0.75 projected WAR per June demoted player the highest monthly average. Naturally, demoted players tend to be worse performers than those who keep their jobs. To use last year as an example, of the 1,091 demotions, only 19 involved players projected for at least 2 WAR. Just one such player, Brayan Bello, was optioned in April, but starting on May 10 with Jose Miranda, bigger demotions started populating the list, with Miranda, David Villar, Oswald Peraza, Brandon Pfaadt, Alek Manoah, Josh Rojas, and Luis Urías all hitting the minors from mid-May through the end of June. Only four two-win players were demoted in July, with Manoah’s second demotion on August 11 the final one. Read the rest of this entry »

12:01

Dan Szymborski: It’s a chat!

12:02

Dan Szymborski: I keep a bit of a list of things to bring up when we talk stuff at staff meetings, I could add it

12:02

Dan Szymborski: I’m pretty sure from the raw data we have, we at least have the ability

12:02

Dan Szymborski: I’ve tinkered a little, but nothing substantive

Read the rest of this entry »