Dating back to August 31, 2023, the Padres have the best record in baseball. They have the second-highest run differential in that time, trailing only the Brewers, against whom they just took two out of three on the road. To be clear, these are fun facts for the jumbotron rather than meaningful or predictive metrics. After all, the Padres of late 2023 look quite a bit different from the Padres of early 2024, and their performance from last September is doing most of the heavy lifting. Even so, it’s enough to make you stop and think, “Hey, these Padres are still pretty good!”

That’s not to say the Padres ever looked like a bad team. However, it would have been easy to write them off, at least subconsciously, after last year’s disappointing performance and the offseason that followed. The Padres ranked second in the NL in pitching WAR and third in position player WAR last season, yet they finished just 82-80. And although they were able to secure a winning record on the final day of the regular season, they certainly lost more than they gained over the winter. As their three biggest competitors in the NL West added six of our top nine free agents (and 10 of our top 21), the Padres lost their best hitter (Juan Soto), their closer (Josh Hader), their ace (Blake Snell), and three more capable arms from the rotation (Seth Lugo, Michael Wacha, and Nick Martinez), all while slashing payroll by nearly $90 million. Read the rest of this entry »

Up until now, the Rockies had made very little noise this offseason. After agreeing to extensions with Germán Márquez and Charlie Blackmon just before the 2023 season wrapped up, Colorado spent a mere $3.5 million on major league free agent deals in the six months since, the fewest of any team in the majors. Yet, at the tail end of a long, quiet winter, the Rockies finally made headlines, when on Sunday they signed 22-year-old Ezequiel Tovar to a long-term contract extension. The deal, which begins right away, will pay Tovar $63.5 million over the next seven years. After that, the Rockies have a $20.5 million team option for 2031, the shortstop’s age-29 season.

Across three offseasons at the helm for Colorado, general manager Bill Schmidt has largely avoided multi-year free agent deals, with one notable exception: Kris Bryant and the seven-year, $182 million pact he signed before the 2022 season. Over the past two winters, the Rockies are one of only three teams not to have signed a single multi-year free agent deal; the other two clubs, the Pirates and Orioles, have outspent Colorado by totals of $37.71 million and $10.13 million, respectively. However, free agency isn’t the only way for teams to keep players around for longer periods of time. Under Schmidt, the Rockies have signed eight players to multi-year extensions; only the Braves have extended more players on multi-year deals in that span. Atlanta has gotten far more extension attention, but this is how Colorado operates, too.

Even so, the Tovar deal represents a different approach for the Rockies because it is the first time that Schmidt has extended a player with fewer than four years of service. It’s also the longest extension the Rockies have awarded since February 2019, when they signed Nolan Arenado to an eight-year, $260 million deal that began in 2020. Moreover, while we have started to see more and more pre-arb players signing long-term extensions around the majors, many of those players either are stars or have star potential. Perhaps the only good comp for Tovar’s extension is the eight-year, $50 million deal Keibert Ruiz signed with the Nationals after putting up a 91 wRC+ and 1.8 WAR in 2022, his first full season. Then again, even Ruiz arguably had a higher ceiling at the time. Tovar might be in a class of his own when it comes to low-ceiling, high-floor youngsters signing lucrative long-term deals.

Entering the 2023 season, Eric Longenhagen and Tess Taruskin ranked Tovar no. 41 on our Top 100 Prospects list, describing him as “a fantastic defensive shortstop” with “poor plate discipline” that “somewhat undermines his excellent bat-to-ball skill.” One year later, Tovar is no longer a prospect, but that remains the prevailing report. He finished his debut season with the lowest walk rate and the second-highest O-Swing% among qualified NL batters. He also finished with 16 OAA and 13 DRS; the only shortstop to outpace him in both metrics was Dansby Swanson. Despite his 70 wRC+, worst among qualified NL hitters, Tovar finished his rookie season with 1.6 WAR. That’s hardly star-level performance, but a 1.6-WAR player is still a big league regular.

Let’s get the bad stuff out of the way first: Tovar’s offensive numbers last season were pitiful. One of the only areas in which he was above average was batting average, and Coors Field likely inflated that number. His plate discipline was dreadful, as expected, but so were his contact skills, which came as something of a surprise. Tovar ranked 66th out of 72 qualified NL hitters in contact rate, and he wasn’t just whiffing on pitches outside the zone. While his O-Contact% was poor, his Z-Contact% also came in below league average.

On the bright side, when he did manage to put the ball in play, Tovar showed flashes of his promising hit tool. His .378 xwOBAcon was a few ticks above league average, thanks to his line drive tendencies. He ranked in the 71st percentile in Baseball Savant’s Sweet-Spot% and finished seventh among qualified NL players in line drive rate. If he can make more contact, especially on pitches in the strike zone, his offensive numbers will improve even if he never adds a lick of discipline to his game. If he can improve his plate discipline, then all the better. For what it’s worth, he significantly improved his walk rate during his final season in the minor leagues, prompting his Double-A manager, Chris Denorfia, to rave about Tovar’s growth. “He’s made this developmental jump,” Denorfia told David Laurila in 2022. “Something clicked to where he’s recognizing situations where pitchers are going to try to get him to chase.” Plate discipline is a different animal in the majors than in the minors, but still, it’s worth acknowledging that this is a skill he has successfully improved in the past.

Tovar also showed off 69th-percentile sprint speed in 2023. He won’t ever be a weapon on the basepaths, but with speed like that, he should be a better base runner than his numbers last year would suggest; he went 11-for-16 on stolen base attempts and was worth -0.6 BsR. Long story short, this is a player with much more offensive potential than we saw last season, and he has a strong enough glove to allow him to nurse his growing pains at the highest level while still contributing positive value to his club.

Courtesy of Dan Szymborski, here is what the ZiPS projections envision for Tovar over the next eight years:

With projections like that, ZiPS would give Tovar $92 million over seven years. That’s more than he’ll make even if the Rockies pick up his team option for an eighth year.

With all that in mind, it’s easy to see why the Rockies offered Tovar a long-term extension. We’ve already seen his floor, and it’s rather sturdy — he can be a valuable player even if he’s the worst hitter in the league. The Rockies could do a heck of a lot worse than pay $9 million per year for seven seasons of a 1.5-win shortstop. What’s more, it won’t take much for this deal to pay dividends in Colorado. If Tovar’s hit tool progresses against big league pitching, he would blossom into an above-average shortstop throughout his twenties.

As for Tovar, his youth has gifted him the rare opportunity to cash in now without giving up the chance to sign another long-term deal. His $63.5 million guarantee is more than the vast majority of players will earn in their careers, yet he can still reach free agency before his 30th birthday. If Colorado picks up its club option, Tovar will have to wait another year to test the open market. Yet, if the Rockies are comfortable paying $20.5 million for his services (even the Rockies, and even in 2031 dollars), that suggests Tovar will be playing well enough to cash in on the free agent market at 30 years old. The two or three free agent years he is losing aren’t nothing, especially for a glove-first player. Still, Tovar had to sacrifice something for lifelong financial security, and it’s not difficult to understand why he made that choice.

Ultimately, this is a rock solid move for both sides. The Rockies are betting they secured three additional years with an excellent shortstop at price tag well below market value. If that doesn’t work out, they’re only slightly overpaying one of the better defensive players in baseball. Meanwhile, Tovar gets to work out his kinks at the MLB level without ever having to worry about money, and if everything goes according to plan, he can still sign a lucrative free agent deal in the 2030s. Now, both sides can get to work on what they need to do next: Tovar will try to improve his plate discipline, while the Rockies will look to acquire, develop, and yes, extend the stars who can help them escape the NL West basement.

Yesterday, we wrapped up our analysis of the league’s infielders with third base and shortstop. Today, we shift our attention to the outfield, starting in left field.

Left field has been one of the weaker positions in the game for several years, but the outlook for 2024 is especially bleak. For the first time since 2017 (excluding 2020), we don’t have a single team projected to surpass four wins. The Astros’ 3.7 WAR projection is the lowest total for the top team at any non-pitching position on the power rankings this year. In fact, it’s the lowest total for the top team at any non-pitching position since 2019, when we projected Red Sox designated hitters for a mere 3.4 WAR. Read the rest of this entry »

In his recent piece about umpire accuracy, Davy Andrews noted that plate umpires correctly called 99.26% of heart zone pitches in 2023. When I first read that number, I didn’t think missed calls in the heart zone warranted any closer investigation. For most of us, ninety-nine point anything is as good as 100; you don’t spend much time worrying about the 0.01% of germs Purell can’t kill. Then again, if you were to consider the sheer amount of bacteria on your hands at any given moment, you might opt for a second squirt of sanitizer. A tiny percentage of a tremendous number is still going to be a pretty big number. The same is true for missed calls in the heart zone. There aren’t quite as many pitches in an MLB season as there are germs on your phone screen, but there are enough that a few tenths of percent of heart zone offerings still represents a pretty hefty figure. In 2023, plate umpires watched 381 pitches sail over the heart of the plate without signaling a strike. When you frame it that way (pun absolutely intended), it actually sounds pretty bad.

I wasn’t nearly as surprised to learn that plate umpires missed 428 calls in the chase zone last season. Offerings in the chase zone are designed to look hittable out of the pitcher’s hand. An especially talented catcher can make them look hittable as they reach his glove, too. Meanwhile, a batter might like to earn a few extra balls inside the zone, but he doesn’t have the same influence over calls as do his opponents. Besides, if a hitter recognizes that a pitch is coming for the heart zone, he’s not going to wriggle and contort his body in hopes of inducing a missed call – he’s going to swing. To that end, batters are much more likely to swing in the heart zone than the chase zone, which means that on a rate basis, umpires miss significantly more calls over the heart of the plate because there are fewer total pitches there that need to be called. While 381 and 428 are similar figures, batters took 2.4 times as many pitches in the chase zone as in the heart zone. Apparently, it’s harder than I thought to call strikes what they are. Read the rest of this entry »

While many of my colleagues here at FanGraphs have spent the last two weeks discussing prospects, I’ve been thinking about veteran starting pitchers. I usually do. Perhaps it’s because I’m just young enough that there are still a couple of starters left from the earliest days of my fandom. Technically, the last starting pitcher to debut before I was born retired this past September… although the last one before him retired a full decade earlier. Still, I can’t really remember the days before Zack Greinke was a big league hurler, and Justin Verlander was already one of the best in the game by the time I started following baseball closely. This is the first year that I’m older than every prospect on our Top 100 list, but as long as Greinke and Verlander are still in the league, I can convince myself that I’m still a kid.

There’s no easy way to decide the age at which a “pitcher” becomes an “older pitcher.” There is evidence that certain skills start dropping off as early as age 26, while the average MLB player retires before his 30th birthday. On the other hand, in almost any other industry, some of baseball’s elder statesmen would still be considered young. Clayton Kershaw is barely old enough to run for president, while Jacob deGrom could probably still get cast as a teenager on The CW. Personally, I think of 36 as the age when a player enters “older” territory. There isn’t anything scientific about it (and believe me, I tried to find a more scientific answer – there’s just no magic number), but 36 is the entry point into the late 30s. It’s an age at which no one is too surprised to see a player retire, nor is anyone overly shocked to see a talented player sign a lucrative, multi-year deal.

In 2022, pitchers age 36 and older were amazing. Relievers in that age range did well (especially Daniel Bard, Chris Martin, and Adam Ottavino), but it was the starters who did most of the heavy lifting. They combined for a 3.53 ERA, 3.66 FIP, and 23.8 WAR (1.77 WAR per 100 IP). The last time starters age 36 and older produced more than 23 WAR was 2007, when John Smoltz, then 40, Tom Glavine, then 41, and Greg Maddux, then 41, helped older starters throw nearly twice as many innings as they did in 2022. The last time older starters were so valuable on a per-inning basis was all the way back in 2001, when Randy Johnson, then 37, and Roger Clemens, then 38, took home their fourth and sixth Cy Young awards, respectively.

For comparison, the average starter under 36 had a 4.07 ERA, 4.06 FIP, and was worth just 1.24 WAR per 100 IP in 2022. The older cohort will always benefit from survivorship bias, but even so, it’s rare to see older starters perform so much better (if better at all) than their younger counterparts. The last time older starters were this much better than the younger ones, in terms of FIP and WAR/IP, was 2003; if you go by ERA, 2002 was the last time.

To be sure, the top two arms in the cohort, Verlander and Max Scherzer, deserve the lion’s share of the credit. Verlander won the AL Cy Young with one of the best age-39 seasons in recent memory, while Scherzer, then 37, could have seriously challenged Sandy Alcantara for the NL award were it not for a couple of stints on the injured list. However, six more veteran starters threw over 120 innings with at least 1.5 WAR: Greinke, Corey Kluber, Adam Wainwright, Johnny Cueto, Rich Hill, and Charlie Morton.

While the strong performance of older starters in 2022 was unexpected, that’s not to say it came out of nowhere. Every year since the start of the 2019 season, pitchers age 36 and older have thrown a higher percentage of all starter innings than they did the year before. Their collective ERA and WAR/IP were better than those of their younger counterparts in every season from 2019–22. Older starters were getting more opportunities and making the most of them.

Then the 2023 season happened. Heading into the year, there were plenty of reasons to believe older starters would continue to thrive. All eight of the aforementioned veterans were set to return. At least some decline was expected from the Elder Eight — especially from Verlander and his 1.75 ERA — but reinforcements were on the way, with five younger talents aging into the group. Joining the fold were three recent All-Stars and Cy Young vote-getters, Lance Lynn, Yu Darvish, and Hyun Jin Ryu, as well as two lesser but typically dependable pitchers, Wade Miley and Carlos Carrasco. Those were some top prospects! Unfortunately, even as the workloads for older pitchers continued to rise, their collective performance did not.

Morton was the only member of the Elder Eight who improved in 2023. After finishing 2022 with a 3.10 ERA and 4.1 WAR, Darvish posted a 4.56 ERA last year, though that was still enough for a respectable 2.4 WAR, and missed the final 37 days of the season with an elbow injury. Carrasco was below replacement level last season, as his ERA ballooned to 6.80, and had two IL stints that cost him a combined 60 days. And then there was Lynn, whose decline was perhaps the most astonishing of the older pitchers. Last year, he gave up 44 home runs, the most by any pitcher in a season since Bronson Arroyo (46 homers) in 2011; after averaging 0.9 HR/9 over his first 11 big league seasons, Lynn allowed 2.16 HR/9 last year, the second-worst rate ever for a qualified starter in a single season, behind only Jose Lima and his 2.2 rate in 2000.

Meanwhile, Miley had a sweet-as-pie 3.14 ERA, but his 4.69 FIP wasn’t so nice, and although Ryu pitched well (3.46 ERA), he made only 11 starts because he missed the first four months of the season as he rehabbed from Tommy John surgery.

Ultimately, the biggest problem was how poorly the worst members of the age group performed, but it also hurt that the guys at the top (Verlander and Scherzer) took a step back, and no new aces emerged in their place. It’s worth mentioning that the table below includes only what these pitchers did as starters last season, though four of them (Kluber, Hill, Cueto, and Greinke) pitched in relief, as well.

Overall, starters age 36 and older saw their WAR nearly slashed in half. Their ERA- rose from 89 to 111, while their FIP- climbed from 93 to 111. Only twice in the last 50 years have older starters had a worse FIP compared to league average; similarly, only four times have they produced less WAR/IP. On the bright side, older starters made an additional 49 starts and threw nearly 200 more innings than they did the year before. Thus, they continued the trend of older starters taking on heavier workloads for the fifth consecutive season. We haven’t quite reached the levels of the early 2000s, when older starters were throwing 9-10% of all starter innings, but we have returned from the dark days of the mid-2010s when it looked like older starting pitchers were becoming an endangered species. However, if this trend is to continue, older starters will need to provide better results.

So, what are the prospects for older starters in 2024? Once again, there is reason for optimism. A couple of last season’s worst performers, Wainwright and Kluber, have retired. A few more, such as Cueto and Carrasco, are unlikely to make many starts unless they earn the opportunity. Moreover, while it would be fair to assume that some of the top performers from last year will take a step back, some bounceback candidates can make up the difference. Darvish had much better peripherals last year (3.74 xERA, 4.03 FIP) than his 4.56 ERA would suggest, while Lynn projects to have a large positive regression after his uncharacteristically bad season; his 2.2 projected Depth Charts WAR would be a tremendous improvement upon his 0.5 WAR in 2023.

Even better, several (relatively) young guns are entering their age-36 season. Joining the club are Kershaw, deGrom, Alex Cobb, Kenta Maeda, and Kyle Gibson (and, uh, Dallas Keuchel). Gibson is quite reliable, though his ceiling is not as high as the others in this group, and the same is true for Maeda if he can stay healthy. Both should help raise the cohort’s floor. Meanwhile, Keuchel probably won’t pitch enough to have a strong effect either way. Kershaw, deGrom, and Cobb will all start the season on the injured list, but perhaps between the three of them, they could provide a full season’s worth of starts. If they do, the three-headed monster of deCobbshaw might be the best pitcher in the whole age group. Our Depth Charts projections have deCobbshaw making 34 starts with a 3.60 ERA and 3.8 WAR. Could Verlander or Darvish match that level of production? It’s possible, but I wouldn’t call it likely, and the projections seem to agree. Here is what our Depth Charts have to say:

That 22.1 WAR figure is awfully close to the 23.8 WAR older starters produced in 2022, and the 1,766 IP projection would make 2024 the sixth straight season in which older starters took on a heavier workload. I’d take the playing time estimates with a grain of salt for the pitchers who haven’t signed yet, but still, the projections are enough to get me excited about an old guy revival. They may not quite reach the heights of the 2022 season, but this group features future Hall of Famers padding their résumés, pitchers who could be All-Stars this year, and beloved journeymen still chugging along. After several disappointing seasons for older starters in the 2010s, we’re lucky to be watching so many talented pitchers prolong their careers in 2024. And I’m happy to feel like a kid for at least one more year.

A month after Rowdy Tellez was non-tendered by the Brewers, the first baseman signed with the Pirates to little fanfare. It’s not hard to see why that particular transaction flew under the radar. Back in the good old days of December, the offseason was at its peak. There were more pressing concerns than a player with exactly 0.0 career WAR joining a rebuilding club. Yet two months later, amidst the dullest stretch of the winter (and perhaps a bout of offseason-induced delirium), I have realized we made a dreadful mistake. FanGraphs has cursed Rowdy Tellez, and now it falls on my shoulders to reverse the spell. Let me explain. Read the rest of this entry »

In the second half of the 2023 season, three players shared designated hitting duties for the Arizona Diamondbacks: Lourdes Gurriel Jr., Tommy Pham, and Evan Longoria. Three more started multiple games at DH: Dominic Canzone, Kyle Lewis, and Buddy Kennedy. By mid-November, none of those players remained with the organization. The D-backs quickly replaced Longoria, trading for veteran third baseman Eugenio Suárez in November. A few weeks later, they re-signed Gurriel. However, neither move fully addressed the hole at DH; Suárez will slot in at the hot corner, while Gurriel should start most days in left field. The Diamondbacks still needed a regular designated hitter, and late last week, they finally found their guy in Joc Pederson.

Pederson will earn $9.5 million in 2024, with a $14 million mutual option ($3 million buyout) for 2025. If both sides pick up their end of the option, the deal will max out at $23.5 million over two years, quite similar to our crowdsourced estimate of two years and $24 million. In the more likely scenario where one side or the other declines the option, Pederson will earn $12.5 million for a single year of work, almost perfectly in line with Ben Clemens’ prediction of one year and $12 million. That is to say, nothing about this contract comes as much of a shock. Read the rest of this entry »

The other day, my friend asked me a simple baseball question with no easy answer: What does a four-seam fastball look like? Not what is a four-seam fastball, or what does a four-seam fastball accomplish, or any number of fastball-related questions with more straightforward answers. He wanted me to conjure up an image of the most common pitch in baseball. I didn’t quite know what to tell him; strangely enough, the more ordinary something is, the harder it can be to describe.

My friend is merely a rhetorical device, but I’ve already grown attached to him, so let’s call him Tony. Tony is a casual observer of baseball. He hears terms like “fastball” and “curveball” and “the Dodgers are ruining the game” every now and then, but he doesn’t have the requisite context to understand what any of it really means. How do I show Tony what a four-seam fastball looks like in 2023? After all, every pitcher works differently. The velocity gap between Jhoan Duran’s and Rich Hill’s four-seam fastballs is the difference between a speeding ticket and losing your license. Explaining to Tony that those two offerings are technically the same pitch would be like trying to convince an alien that a Bergamasco Shepherd and a Xoloitzcuintli are the same species. It’s factually correct, yet without hyper-specific evidence – and the background knowledge necessary to interpret that evidence – it’s all but impossible to believe.

I could show Tony some video of Félix Bautista to illustrate the ideal four-seam fastball. Alternatively, I could show him Andrew Heaney as an example of a perfectly average four-seamer instead:

Yet Tony didn’t ask about results, be they average or exceptional. He wants a visual point of reference, and simply put, neither of those two throws a visually conventional heater. Reaching triple-digits on the radar gun remains a rarity, and Bautista does it more often than most. Meanwhile, Heaney throws his fastball with over 15 inches of arm-side run; that’s 70% more horizontal movement than the average four-seamer of a similar speed and release point. On the graph below, Heaney sits way over on the right, and only two dots (min. 500 pitches) can be found farther in that direction:

What Tony really wants to see is the prototypical four-seam fastball, the pitch that most closely resembles the norm in as many material ways as possible. Identifying the man who throws such a pitch won’t serve a practical purpose; it won’t help teams win ballgames, fans win their roto league, or Harold Ramírez lay off all those four-seamers outside the zone. Still, it’s nice to have a baseline for the most important pitch in baseball – or any pitch for that matter. Thus, I set out to find the pitchers who throw the pitches that best exemplify what each pitch looks like in the game today.

A project like this requires a good deal of subjective decision making. No one throws a pitch perfectly identical to league average in every measurable way. Heck, even if someone did, who’s to say that average is the same as normal. The league average four-seam fastball last year clocked in at 94.2 mph, but the average reliever threw nearly a full mile per hour faster than the average starter. With that in mind, would it be incorrect to say that a starter who boasts a 94.2 mph heater is throwing with typical velocity? On top of that, pitchers who throw harder fastballs tend to throw better fastballs, which means they get to throw more fastballs. Therefore, they influence the league average to a greater extent than their less prolific peers. The average velocity of the 43 starters who threw at least 1,000 four-seam fastballs last season was 1.2 mph faster than the average velocity of the 216 starters who threw between 50 and 999 of the same pitch. Should those fewer, faster pitchers have such an outsized influence on the overall numbers? With all that said, I’m sticking with league average as my baseline (for lack of a perfect alternative, if nothing else), and I hope you’ll stick with me as I explain the rest of my decisions.

Next, I had to figure out how to narrow down the list of possible candidates. Seven-hundred and thirty-one players threw a four-seam fastball in the major leagues last year, and I wasn’t going to get anywhere if I gave each of them a close look. (Sorry Tony, even I have my limits.) Thus, I set 100 four-seam fastballs as my arbitrary minimum requirement, and I chose to prioritize one attribute above all else: velocity. It’s called a fastball, after all.

Seven pitchers (min. 100 pitches) averaged exactly 94.2 mph on their four-seam fastball. Another 18 sat at 94.1 or 94.3 mph, and I included those arms in my search to allow for candidates who might be a rounding error away from league average. That gave me 25 pitchers to work with, 19 right-handers and 6 southpaws. I hemmed and hawed over whether to include lefties at all, and ultimately I put off making a decision in hopes I wouldn’t have to. Thankfully, that proved to be the case, as none of the top candidates were left-handed.

Armed with 25 contenders and a Google spreadsheet, I hopped on Baseball Savant, looking for as many physical pitch characteristics as I could find and manipulate. I settled on nine: vertical release point, horizontal release point, extension, perceived velocity, vertical movement, horizontal movement, spin rate, total movement, and active spin. After calculating the standard deviation of each metric, I returned to my 25 candidates. Did anyone fall within one standard deviation of league average in every category?

Well Tony, today is your lucky day. One pitcher, and only one pitcher, fit the bill. One pitcher was within a single standard deviation of league average in all nine of the aforementioned metrics. That same pitcher came within half a standard deviation in seven categories, within a quarter of a standard deviation in five categories, and within an eighth of a standard deviation in four. No one else came closer at any step along the way. The owner of the most ordinary four-seam fastball in baseball is José Berríos.

Wow… Let’s take a minute to marvel at the regularity. Here’s how Berríos threw his four-seamer in 2023:

And here is how he stacks up to Alec Marsh, the next closest competitor and, as I discovered, a player for the Royals, not the title of a Phillies day care fan fiction. I’ve also included league average numbers in the table for additional context:

I considered making a case for Marsh on the basis of speed alone. At the beginning of my search, I said I would prioritize velocity, and his 94.2 mph average was right on the money. However, Berríos’s 94.3 mph average velocity was actually rounded up from 94.25 mph. In other words, if he had thrown just one additional fastball at 92.3 mph or slower (he threw 27 such pitches last year), his season average would have fallen to 94.2. It’s simply too close to take the title away from him.

Interestingly, Berríos’s four-seam fastball wasn’t quite so ordinary until this past season. For most of his career, he threw the pitch with less rise and more run than the typical four-seamer. However, in 2023, his four-seamer had more vertical movement and less horizontal movement than it had since his breakout campaign in 2018:

My quest for the platonic ideal of a four-seam fastball was so fruitful that I decided to perform a similar search for sinkers and cutters. I still prioritized velocity, but for this investigation, I also took movement into account to narrow down the contenders. Call me a literalist, but I say the typical sinker needs to sink, and the typical cutter needs to cut.

Starting with sinkers, I picked out the 12 pitchers who came within one-quarter of a standard deviation of league average in velocity and within half a standard deviation in both vertical and horizontal movement. Next, I compared them all to league average in each of the additional categories I previously identified. Unfortunately, there wasn’t quite as clear of a winner this time around.

Only one pitcher, Colin Rea, finished within one standard deviation of league average in every metric (including mph). However, eight others finished within one standard deviation in nine out of 10. When I narrowed the criteria to half a standard deviation, Rea remained in the lead, meeting the criteria in nine of the 10 metrics, but he was tied with three other pitchers: Mitch Keller, Miles Mikolas, and Bryse Wilson. Meanwhile, at a quarter of a standard deviation, Rea reclaimed sole position of first place (eight out of 10), but three more arms were right on his tail with seven: Mikolas, Pedro Avila, and Brandon Pfaadt. What’s more, one of the metrics in which Rea wasn’t particularly close to league average was vertical movement, and that seems pretty important for a sinker. Among the quartet of Rea, Mikolas, Avila, and Pfaadt, only Avila came within a quarter of a standard deviation of league average in vertical movement. Finally, when I went down to an eighth of a standard deviation away from league average, Rea lost his crown to Avila, who came that close to league average in six different metrics. Rea and Noah Davis finished right behind him with five each.

The names that came up most often in the previous paragraph were Rea, Avila, and Mikolas. However, only one of those three threw his sinker with precisely league-average velocity. Indeed, only one of those three came within half a mile per hour of average. What’s more, that same pitcher was the only candidate out of 12 who came within an eighth of a standard deviation of league average in both vertical and horizontal movement, and one of only two who came within a quarter: Pedro Avila.

Likewise with the cutter, there were no exact matches. I picked out the 14 contenders who came within half a standard deviation of league average in velocity and both planes of movement, but none of those 14 came within one standard deviation of league average in every other metric. Nonetheless, there was still a clear winner. Only one pitcher came within half a standard deviation of average in nine categories, within a quarter in six categories, and within an eighth in five. He was one of only four pitchers within half a standard deviation of league average in both vertical and horizontal movement and within a rounding error of league average in velocity. And out of those four, he was easily the closest to league average in release point and extension. It’s Javier Assad.

Here at FanGraphs, we pay a ton of attention to average performance. The concept of “league average” informs some of our most foundational stats. We even have a tab on the leaderboards page (+ Stats) dedicated to precisely that. It’s not hard to see why; a good sense of average performance, whether for a team, a player, or an individual skill, has all sorts of practical applications. Sometimes, however, it’s just as interesting to take a step back from results and focus on the process instead. We talk a whole lot about four-seamers, sinkers, and cutters, and it’s helpful to visualize those concepts as best we can. In 2023, it was Berríos, Avila, and Assad who made that possible.

So, there you have it, Tony. It’s been fun! Let’s grab a coffee sometime soon.

One million dollars. It’s the prize money on Survivor. It’s Dr. Evil’s ransom. Apparently it’s a song by 100 gecs, a band my little brother claims I should know. It’s also the price of Zach Plesac’s services in 2024. Read the rest of this entry »

The best defense is a good offense. As much as the pacifist in me hates to admit it, the old platitude is true. Many have tried to flip this popular saying in a sports context, suggesting instead that the best offense is a good defense, but that’s just patently false. No matter how terrific a team’s run prevention abilities may be, they can’t win a ballgame without scoring at least once. Conversely, it doesn’t matter how many runs a team concedes as long as their offense can score even more. As such, I’d embrace the strategic offensive principle of war (or should I say WAR) more readily than I’d accept its antimetabole.

Nevertheless, Kevin Kiermaier and Isiah Kiner-Falefa are the kinds of players who make the patently false seem true. Kiermaier is the greatest center fielder of the modern statistical era; no other outfielder comes within 10 points of him in either DRS or OAA. His defense makes a convincing argument that players should earn bonus points for impossible catches and spectacular throws.

Kiner-Falefa, meanwhile, is the consummate picture of defensive versatility. He’s the first player since the turn of the 20th century to play at least 50 career games at catcher, shortstop, and in the outfield – not to mention 154 games at third base, 21 appearances at second, and four innings pitched as the cherry on top. In 2018, a then-23-year-old Kiner-Falefa became the first player to start multiple games at catcher and shortstop in the same season since Dave Roberts (not that Dave Roberts) and Derrel Thomas in 1980. Add in the fact that he also started multiple games at second and third base the same year, and he’s the first player to have done all that since Marty Martinez in 1968. Read the rest of this entry »