Late Friday, news broke that San Francisco Giants Chief Executive Officer Larry Baer had engaged in a physical altercation with his wife, Pam, during a public argument, which was caught on video.

Giants CEO Larry Baer pulled his wife out of a chair and caused her to fall to the ground in a San Francisco plaza on Friday morning, an incident captured on video by a witness and under investigation by city police.

The video shows Baer stepping over his wife, Pam, as she sits in a chair in the plaza in Hayes Valley before noon. She screams, “Oh, my God, no, help!” as Baer appears to try to grab a phone out of her right hand.

You can see that video here; we’re not going to embed it due to its disturbing nature. Not long after the incident was initially reported, Baer released a statement purporting to clarify the events shown on video.

Larry Baer told The Chronicle in an interview, “My wife and I had an unfortunate public argument related to a family member and she had an injured foot and she fell off her chair in the course of the argument. The matter is resolved. It was a squabble over a cell phone. Obviously, it’s embarrassing.”

Later Friday, the pair issued a joint statement through the Giants: “Regrettably, today we had a heated argument in public over a family matter. We are deeply embarrassed by the situation and have resolved the issue.”

After a public backlash, however, Baer issued an additional statement apologizing for his conduct.

Pam Baer issued a statement of her own.

It is worth noting that Pam’s description of events does not fully match those depicted in the video; she does not, for instance, mention yelling for help.

Today, the Giants’ Board of Directors released a statement noting that Baer has asked to take away from the team.

Ordinarily, these events, unfortunate though they are, wouldn’t be the province of FanGraphs. However, Baer’s status as Chief Executive Officer of the Giants means that there could be real repercussions for him and the team as a result of his conduct. Baer was appointed by the team’s owners to oversee its operations; he actually helped to constitute the team’s current ownership group, and owns a small stake himself. He is also the Giants’ designated “control person,” and attends league ownership meetings on their behalf. The control person is the face of the franchise to Major League Baseball; they’re “accountable to MLB for the operation of the team and for its compliance with the rules of baseball.” In other words, they’re the member of the ownership group the team designates as the person in charge of its operations.

As a result, Baer is subject to a policy substantially similar to the Joint Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, and Child Abuse policy found in the Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement, which requires parallel prohibitions under a separate policy for non-player employees.. Article X of the Joint Policy (you can find it on page 325) says this (emphasis mine):

The Parties agree that Major League Baseball, its affiliated businesses, every Club and the Players Association shall institute Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Policies that are comparable both in terms of scope and discipline for their respective employees, managers, executives, and owners. The cost of implementing and administering these comparable policies will be the responsibility of the individual organization.

In other words, we can reasonably expect that Baer is covered by a policy that contains approximately the same prohibitions, and approximately the same discipline, as the Joint Policy. And we can also expect that this policy is administered at least in part by Major League Baseball, which has already begun an investigation. Indeed, Baer appears to have the ignominious distinction of being the first non-player investigated under the league’s domestic violence policy.

So what can we expect in terms of discipline for Baer? Craig Calcaterra took a look at this, but his analysis was performed in the context of discipline for owners. The problem is that while Baer does own a small stake in the team, he also works for the team in an employee capacity as a representative of the owners. So the relevant question is what power Commissioner Rob Manfred has to discipline Baer and the Giants for this sort of conduct, not just as an owner, but as an employee as well.

As far as disciplining team employees goes, things are actually fairly straightforward. The Major League Rules leave little ambiguity that teams, and those they employ, are subject to the Commissioner’s disciplinary power. Rule 22, for instance, states:

All Clubs and players shall submit themselves to the discipline of the Commissioner as provided in the Major League Constitution and accept the Commissioner’s decisions rendered in accordance with the Major League Constitution and these Rules.

And Rule 24 goes one step farther:

Both the Commissioner and a Club are entitled to discipline any manager, trainer, coach, scout, or other personnel who is not a player, in case of a violation of contract, the Major League Constitution, the Major League Rules, the Commissioner’s regulations, or other rules, policies and guidelines. Such discipline may include fining, dismissing, releasing, suspending or expelling the offender. Any Club dismissing, releasing, suspending or expelling any such person shall at once notify the Commissioner’s Office in writing stating the cause of such action. . . . Unless prior approval of the Commissioner is granted, no person who has been suspended or otherwise declared ineligible shall perform any function for any Club or any other entity related to the Clubs during the duration of the suspension or period of ineligibility.

So what does the Major League Baseball Constitution say about the commissioner’s disciplinary power?

In the case of conduct by Major League Clubs, owners, officers, employees or players that is deemed by the Commissioner not to be in the best interests of Baseball, punitive action by the Commissioner for each offense may include any one or more of the following:

(a) a reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of representation in Major League Meetings; (c) suspension or removal of any owner, officer or employee of a Major League Club; (d) temporary or permanent ineligibility of a player; (e) a fine, not to exceed $2,000,000 in the case of a Major League Club, not to exceed $500,000 in the case of an owner, officer or employee, and in an amount consistent with the then-current Basic Agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association, in the case of a player; (f) loss of the benefit of any or all of the Major League Rules, including but not limited to the denial or transfer of player selection rights provided by Major League Rules 4 and 5; and (g) such other actions as the Commissioner may deem appropriate.

In other words, the Commissioner can exercise a tremendous amount of discretion when it comes to determining punishments in cases like this. This kind of blanket authority is known as plenary power: “Power that is wide-ranging, broadly construed, and often limitless for all practical purposes.” If the Commissioner decides that you’ve behaved in a manner which violates a Rule, he has complete authority to punish you for doing so. We saw this when Major League Baseball suspended Padres General Manager A.J. Preller for 30 days for failing to disclose that southpaw Drew Pomeranz was injured prior to trading him to the Boston Red Sox. Preller agreed to accept that discipline under Rule 22 with no recourse even before it was issued: that’s how plenary authority works. Similarly, then-Commissioner Fay Vincent suspended late Yankees owner George Steinbrenner for life back in 1990; he was later reinstated. So Manfred could strip Baer of his role as CEO, but allow him to keep his ownership stake – or both, or vice versa.

Now, you might ask why the Commissioner’s authority is greater here than it is concerning players. That’s because the players have collectively bargained for greater protections, such as appeal rights. In fact, as you can see above, the MLB Constitution defers to the CBA as to player discipline – but contains very different limits as to non-players. Front office personnel, who aren’t unionized, are essentially subject to the Commissioner’s plenary authority. And the “such other actions” catchall essentially means that the Commissioner can do what he wants. The Commissioner is limited by the expressly included fine restrictions, but a person fined $500,000 would, in theory, have no appeal rights to anyone other than the Commissioner himself.

You might also wonder why the Commissioner has more power to discipline an executive under the Joint Policy than he does a player. That’s because of that “scope” and “discipline” language we mentioned before – the appeal rights (i.e., the players’ safeguards) don’t apply here. In other words, the employees of a team are subject to a policy that is required to cover the same conduct, but doesn’t need to follow the same procedures for meting out discipline.

So what can Manfred do to punish Baer? He can reprimand him. He can fine him up to $500,000 with no appeal. He can suspend him for any period of time, ranging from one day to forever, barring any involvement with the Giants during that period. He can order him replaced as the Giants’ control person. He can bar him from owners’ meetings for any period of time. Baer’s role as an owner makes the situation more complicated — Manfred could strip Baer of his role as CEO, but allow him to keep his ownership stake – or both, or vice versa, though given the circumstances under which owners have been removed historically, Baer being forced out seems unlikely here. And it’s worth noting that the Giants as an organization have the authority to punish Baer, though it’s unclear whether that option is even on the table beyond the personal leave the Giants indicate he voluntarily requested; also unclear is who will assume the position of control person in his absence.

The problem is that, as we mentioned before, no front office employee or executive has ever been investigated or disciplined under the domestic violence policy before, so there’s no real precedent here. Further, Pam Baer’s statement downplaying the incident means that she may be unwilling to cooperate with MLB investigators, making any discipline more complicated. As a result, we really have no idea how Manfred will respond to this. If he uses player suspensions as precedent, we may be looking at a lengthy one. But it’s also worth noting that Manfred may be unwilling or unable to harshly discipline a team’s control person, given that the 30 control agents are, in essence, Manfred’s bosses. On the other hand, the Players’ Association would justifiably be irked if Baer went undisciplined, with the message being sent that front office executives aren’t subject to the same standards of conduct that players are.

Whatever Manfred decides is going to set a pretty significant precedent moving forward. It remains to be seen what message he and Major League Baseball want to send – and who they want the recipients of that message to be.

On the heels of a 104-loss 2018 season, the Royals’ 2019 campaign was already heading nowhere in particular; projected for a mere 69 wins by our Depth Chart projections, only the Tigers (68 wins), Orioles (63), and Marlins (62) are expected to be worse. But on Friday, things went from bad to worse with the announcement that catcher Salvador Perez has damage to the ulnar collateral ligament of his throwing (right) arm. The 28-year-old backstop could miss the season due to Tommy John surgery, a procedure that’s relatively rare among catchers, without any resounding success stories on the level of other position players. Gulp.

A six-time All-Star and five-time Gold Glove winner who was the MVP of the 2015 World Series, Perez is a big (6-foot-4, 240 pound) free-swinging slugger with a powerful arm and a strong reputation for handling pitching staffs. He’s not without shortcomings — he hasn’t posted an on-base percentage of .300 or better since 2013, and has been about 10 runs below average as a pitch framer in each of the past three seasons according to Baseball Prospectus — but he’s immensely popular, a fan favorite who’s been elected to start the All-Star Game in each of the past five seasons. Last year, after missing the first 20 games of the season due to an MCL sprain in his left knee (a freak injury suffered while carrying a suitcase upstairs), he hit .235/.274/.439 with 27 homers, an 89 wRC+, and 1.7 WAR in 544 PA; by BP’s framing-inclusive stats, he was worth 1.3 WARP. For his career, he owns a 92 wRC+ and a total of 17.7 WAR.

Manager Ned Yost said that Perez began experiencing elbow soreness in January, at which time an MRI revealed that he had suffered a flexor strain, which resulted in the team shutting down his throwing program for four weeks. He was cleared to start throwing once he reached the Royals’ camp in Tempe, Arizona in mid-February, but soreness after live batting practice led to another MRI that revealed ligament damage. MLB Network’s Jon Heyman reported that surgery has been recommended for Perez, who will get a second opinion from Dr. Neal ElAtrache on Tuesday before a final decision is made. If he’s out, the team will likely turn to Cam Gallagher, a 26-year-old former second-round pick who has just 35 games of major league experience and figured to back up Perez.

As is the case with all position players, Tommy John surgery for catchers is much more rare than it is for pitchers, though because of the volume and intensity of throwing involved with the job, it’s more common for them than it is for any non-pitching position besides outfielders. Still, the limited number of such surgeries is striking. According to the Tommy John Surgery List kept by Jon Roegele, which now includes 1,669 surgeries, just 44 have been done on professional catchers, six of which occurred while they were still amateurs. As best I can tell, a total of 20 catchers who have had the surgery have played in the majors, eight of whom are still active:

So far, the returns haven’t been great, to say the least. We don’t have any information on the relative severity of these players’ injuries (Perez included) and, the further back we go, less information about players’ defense. But while it’s not hard to find examples of TJS recipients at other positions besides pitcher who have recovered to enjoy productive multi-year stretches or careers afterwards — Jose Canseco, Matt Carpenter, Shin-Soo Choo, Mike Greenwell, Kelly Johnson, Paul Molitor, Luke Scott, and Randy Velarde come to mind, and hopefully we’ll count Didi Gregorius and Corey Seager among them some day (Gleyber Torres too, though his surgery was on his non-throwing arm) — the best that can be said about the catchers is that some of them were able to slog onward with their careers.

Perhaps Knapp or Casali will eventually prove me wrong, but none of the eight catchers who underwent TJS in college or the minors have gone on to have substantial major league careers; Casali is the only one of that group who even reached 1.0 WAR post-surgery. It’s not like those guys were supposed to be stiffs, either. Teagarden was a third-round pick who made two Baseball America Top 100 Prospects Lists post-surgery, and the rest were all drafted in the first 10 rounds, too: Knapp (second, 2013), Tatum (third, 2004), House (fifth, 1999, and a two-time Top 100 prospect pre-surgery), Kieboom (fifth, 2012), Higashioka (seventh, 2008), Jimenez (ninth, 2008), and Casali (10th, 2011). Sure, many picks from the first 10 rounds don’t even reach the majors even without undergoing TJS, or fail to produce in their limited opportunities. Nonetheless, the extent to which the catchers in this subset failed to blossom in the aftermath of surgery is not encouraging.

Leaving those players aside, of the 10 who had major league experience prior to TJS, four (Christmas, Coste, Davis, and Wilson) never played in the majors again. That count doesn’t include d’Arnaud, who is in camp with the Mets and, his ongoing penchant for injury notwithstanding, seems likely to stumble into a game at some point. Of the other five, none has equaled his pre-surgical offensive potency or made a particularly large impact post-surgery. To be fair, the jury is still out on d’Arnaud and Vazquez, though the latter has never even come close to the solid offensive contributions he made at Single-A and Double-A levels.

The biggest name among this group besides Hundley — a two-time All-Star whose pre-surgical performance is clouded by his later appearance in the Mitchell Report, and whose post-surgery peformance featured back and hand woes — is Wieters, a player whose post-surgical plight had been on my mind even before the news about Perez was announced. When I began writing about the Nationals’ post-Bryce Harper era last week, Wieters — Washington’s regular catcher for the past two seasons, at least during the two-plus months of 2018 that he wasn’t sidelined by injuries — was still jobless. By the time that piece was published, the 32-year-old switch-hitting catcher had agreed to a minor-league deal with the Cardinals, still a rather humbling outcome for a player who made nearly $37 million over the past three seasons, and whose career was supposed to be so much more.

A former top-five pick (2007) and number one overall prospect (2009, according to both Baseball America and Baseball Prospectus), Wieters made a pair of All-Star teams in 2011-12, winning a pair of Gold Gloves and helping the Orioles emerge from a decade and a half of playoff-free futility along the way. Circa 2013, he was a candidate for a major contract extension, though at the time, agent Scott Boras reportedly countered with a request for something in the range of Joe Mauer’s eight-year, $184 million extension with the Twins, despite the fact that Wieters hadn’t racked up anything close to the accolades that Mauer, an MVP and three-time batting champion, had at the time he signed. Needless to say, Wieters didn’t get that kind of money; the Orioles explored trading him in the winter of 2013-14, and then the following season, he tore his UCL after playing just 26 games. While there was initial optimism he would avoid TJS, he ultimately went under the knife in June 2014, at which time I noted the dearth of positive outcomes from among the group above.

Since then, Wieters’ career has been spotty at best. He returned to major league action on June 5, 2015, 12 days shy of a year after surgery, made a solid half-season showing (.267/.319/.422, 102 wRC+, 1.1 WAR in 282 PA), and then, after making a combined $16 million in 2014-15, became just the second player to accept a qualifying offer, after the Astros’ Colby Rasmus. Playing for a $15.8 million salary, he made the AL All-Star team — to this date, he’s the only post-TJS catcher to garner such status — and finished 2016 with a modest 90 wRC+ (.243/.302/.409) and 1.8 WAR.

He’s been considerably less productive since. In February 2017, he signed a one-year, $10.5 million deal with the Nationals, which included a same-sized player option for 2018 (not to mention $5 million worth of deferred money), then stumbled to a 62 wRC+ with -0.3 WAR in the first year and, after exercising that option, something closer to his post-surgical level last year (.238/.330/.374 ,89 wRC+, 0.9 WAR) while making just 271 PA; he missed nearly 10 weeks due to an oblique strain and a left hamstring strain, the latter of which required in-season surgery. Unable to secure a major league deal this winter, he settled for a minor league one, with a base salary of $1.5 million assuming he’s in the majors, another half-million dollars worth of performance incentives ($100,000 apiece for reaching 40, 50, 60, 70 and 80 games), and a March 22 opt-out.

Admittedly, once the above catchers are broken into subgroups, we have rather small sample sizes, and as far as the performance outcomes are concerned, we see correlation with surgery but not necessarily causation. Wieters hasn’t made any trips to the DL for elbow problems since returning from surgery, and has continued to throw out would-be base stealers at a more-or-less league-average clip. His decline as a defender — using BP’s FRAA, from 47.9 from 2009-14 to -10.2 from 2015-18 — really began in 2013 and has been driven by subpar pitch framing (-15.8 runs from 2015-18), which depends primarily on his non-throwing arm anyway. Vazquez is still a well above average defender in all facets of the game, averaging nearly 11 FRAA in the past three seasons despite receiving only 798 PA in that span. From among the other active catchers who aren’t on the fringes of jobs, Casali has been solid on both sides of the ball but has only once topped 156 PA in a season, while Knapp has been a rather woeful defender (-15.6 FRAA while making just 419 PA), struggling both with throwing (19% caught stealing) and framing (-9.6 runs).

All of which is a roundabout way of saying that while I don’t think we can draw strong conclusions from the group of catchers who have preceded Perez in TJS, their history doesn’t offer him and the Royals a particularly great roadmap for success. He’s relatively young, and under contract for a total of $36 million through 2021, so it’s unlikely he’ll fade into oblivion like some of the aforementioned recipients, but if his post-surgical success approaches his pre-surgical performance, he’ll be breaking new ground.

The Padres announced Friday that they have signed 31-year-old Adam Warren, lately of Seattle, originally of North Carolina, and most notably of New York, to a one-year, $2 million deal, with a $2.5 million club option (and $500,000 buy-out) for 2020. In San Diego, Warren will join Kirby Yates, Craig Stammen, and Matt Strahm at the head of what should be a reasonably effective relief corps; the Padres’ 3.2 WAR projection is sixth-best in the NL and matches precisely that of division rivals Los Angeles and San Francisco. Warren might also, in the event the somewhat-less-impressive San Diego rotation does not perform at its best, throw a few innings at the beginning of games, either as a traditional starter or as an “opener.”

It is this mostly-theoretical capacity — to pitch relatively effectively both as a spot starter/long reliever and in more traditional relief roles — that has long tantalized the various clubs that have sought Warren out since his debut for the Yankees in 2012, though this appeal has dulled somewhat since a poor turn as a swing-man for the Cubs in the early part of 2016 (his 5.83 FIP during that half-season was his worst mark since 2.1 poor innings in his debut season by more than half a run). The Mariners, for whom Warren pitched from late July of last year to the season’s close, were unique among his three clubs in only using Warren out of the ‘pen, and he rewarded them somewhat poorly by posting his worst performance (4.82 FIP, 1.88 K/BB ratio) since that half-season in Chicago in 21.2 innings of work. He has not started a game since 2016, or more than one game a season since 2015. Read the rest of this entry »

Brock Burke was a relatively obscure pitcher in the Tampa Bay Rays organization when I first wrote about him in 2017. He was performing well at the time — a 1.23 ERA through nine starts — but context was a mitigating factor. A blip on most prospect radar, he was facing Midwest League hitters in his third full professional season.

He’s no longer quite so obscure. Nor is he Tampa Bay property. In December, the Texas Rangers acquired the 22-year-old southpaw in the three-team trade that sent former top prospect Jurickson Profar to Oakland. His appeal to the AL West cellar dwellers was understandable. Burke fashioned a 1.95 ERA, and fanned 71 batters in 55-and-a-third innings, after earning a second-half promotion to Double-A Montgomery.

I recently asked Texas GM Jon Daniels about the deal that brought Burke to the Lone Star State.

“We’ve had a lot of conversations about Profar over the years,” Daniels told me. “This winter, after a number of talks, we defined what we were looking for. Our priority was to get a young starter who was at the upper levels, and [Burke’s] had a lot of things we liked. His trajectory is really interesting — from Colorado, not a ton of development at a young age. Sometimes guys from those cold-weather states need a little time to lay a foundation.”

Daniels brought up Tyler Phillips — “He really burst onto the scene with us last year” — as another close-to-home example. A 21-year-old right-hander from New Jersey, Phillips emerged as one of the Rangers’ better pitching prospects with a stellar season in the South Atlantic League.

Where Burke’s professional development has taken place worked in his favor. Read the rest of this entry »

This winter’s two biggest free agent names signed the two biggest free agent deals in history over the last week. Manny Machado will receive $300 million over 10 years if he doesn’t exercise his opt-out after 2023, while Bryce Harper will take in $330 million over the next 13 seasons. For Harper and his agent, Scott Boras, waiting for Machado to sign was likely part of a plan to secure a higher payout. That plan appears to have worked as Harper received $30 million more in guaranteed money. But because those dollars will be paid out over more years and the contract has no opt-out, it’s not entirely clear whether Harper signed the best financial package. Let’s take a closer look.

Before getting to the contract breakdown, here is a reminder of how biggest doesn’t necessarily equal best. Back in December, I took all the major league contracts of at least $100 million and adjusted those amounts to 2019 MLB dollars. As we now have a few more entrants, here is the updated version of the chart from that post.

Read the rest of this entry »

And the winner for the hallowed title of the second-most impactful free agent signing of February 28, 2019 goes to … the Toronto Blue Jays, who inked Clay Buchholz to a one-year, $3 million deal that could include another $3 million in incentives. Yes, the move — which won’t become official until he passes a physical, no small matter given his injury history — is a fair bit behind that of the Phillies’ record-setting agreement with Bryce Harper in terms of both money and impact, but it could easily pay off, as the 34-year-old righty showed flashes of brilliance during his stint with the Diamondbacks last season.

Buchholz, who was limited to just two starts in 2017 — with the Phillies, before they were a twinkle in Harper’s eye — due to a partially torn flexor pronator mass that required surgery, began last year working on a minor league deal in the Royals’ camp. He made three starts for the team’s top two affiliates at the outset of the season, then exercised a May 1 opt-out clause and landed with the Diamondbacks, whom he helped to keep in contention for a playoff spot. In 16 starts spanning from May 20 to September 8, he threw 98.1 innings with a 20.6% strikeout rate, 5.6% walk rate, 2.01 ERA, 3.47 FIP, and 1.9 WAR — calling to mind similarly tantalizing partial-season performances with the Red Sox in 2013 and ’15. Alas, his performance was interrupted for a month (from late June to late July) by an oblique strain; he then suffered another flexor strain in mid-September, and was shut down for the year after receiving a platelet-rich plasma injection. Read the rest of this entry »

Scott Oberg had a breakout season in 2018. The 28-year-old right-hander came out of the Colorado bullpen 56 times and put up a 2.45 ERA and a 2.87 FIP. Working primarily in a set-up role — 45 of his appearances were in the seventh or eighth inning — he was on the winning side of all but one of his nine decisions.

His signature pitch is a slider. Oberg threw the late-breaker 37.4% of the time last year, often flummoxing opposing hitters who mistakenly read fastball out of his hand. According to the University of Connecticut product, that has been the key to his success. Oberg’s slider has emerged as a lethal weapon not just because he’s learned to manipulate it better — he’s also improved his fastball command.

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Oberg on learning his slider: “I was introduced to a slider in 2014, when I was in Double-A. I’d always been more of a curveball guy. At an earlier age, I guess it was easier to spin the ball that way, versus being very fine with a slider. It took a few years of maturing to get it to the point where it is now.

“As it was progressing, I started realizing that my slider and curveball were kind of morphing into each other a little bit. As a result, we ended up putting the curveball on the shelf and focusing solely on the slider. This was two seasons ago.

“In theory, you throw [sliders and curveballs] differently. There are different arm motions, different hand placements on the ball. With different finger placements, there isn’t as much confusion. That’s a problem I was having. The grips on my slider and my curveball were very similar. There wasn’t enough distinction between the two pitches in my hand. Read the rest of this entry »

The Nationals are now officially in the post-Bryce Harper era. With the news of his completion of a 13-year, $330 million contract with the Philadelphia Phillies, Washington will no longer employ the brash prodigy whose presence has more or less defined the franchise since his arrival as a 19-year-old on April 28, 2012. It’s clear that the Nationals have been bracing for this moment since the six-time All-Star slugger spurned a 10-year, $300 million offer that — as we’ve only learned recently — reportedly included roughly $100 million in deferred money. Save for a little less star power, and perhaps a little less swagger, the team does not appear to be that worse for wear.

In fact, the Nationals are currently projected to win the NL East, though Harper’s signing has shrunk the gap between them and the Phillies, who we now project for 86 wins to the Nationals’ 90. That a similar forecast last spring went awry was of a piece with Harper’s D.C. tenure, a period defined as much by what they did not accomplish as what they did. They were also the preseason favorites going into the two other seasons in which they missed the playoffs with Harper in tow, and while they did win four division titles in Harper’s seven seasons — including the first for the franchise since relocating from Montreal prior to the 2005 season — the Nationals failed to win a single playoff series. They went an excruciating 0-for-4 in the NL Division Series, losing to lower-seeded teams each time. Three of the four series went the distance; the Nationals squandered early leads and lost those decisive games on their home field by a total of four runs.

Lest you think that I’m attempting to hang the Nationals’ failures upon Harper himself, I’m not. While his overall playoff numbers are pretty unremarkable (.211/.315/.487), he went 7-for-15 with 17 total bases in those four elimination games. He won his MVP award in 2015, when the team missed the playoffs, and by WAR, he was more valuable in the other two seasons in which they fizzled (2013 and ’18), than in ’14 or ’16, when they won the NL East. Regardless, that era is history, and perhaps not the happiest one if you’re a Nationals fan, though it had its moments. Read the rest of this entry »

Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the Oakland Athletics. Scouting reports are compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as from our own (both Eric Longenhagen’s and Kiley McDaniel’s) observations. For more information on the 20-80 scouting scale by which all of our prospect content is governed you can click here. For further explanation of the merits and drawbacks of Future Value, read this.

All of the numbered prospects here also appear on The Board, a new feature at the site that offers sortable scouting information for every organization. That can be found here.

Other Prospects of Note

Grouped by type and listed in order of preference within each category.

Kyler Murray
Kyler Murray, CF

Murray is a supreme athlete who was a top-10 draft talent after having not played baseball full-time for several years. He has 70 speed, 55 raw power, and plus bat speed that played surprisingly well in games given the layoff. Last fall, the whole sport-watching world got to see how good of an athlete he is on the football field, and it now looks unlikely that Murray will have a baseball career of any consequence due to his preference for football. We had a 45 FV on Murray before the draft, and he’d be fourth or fifth on this list if he’d have stuck with baseball. But part of what we think about when we FV someone is their trade value, and because it doesn’t seem likely that he returns to baseball (and if he does his chances of success are low due, again, to the layoff), that trade value is akin to other 35 FVs at this point. Murray had a good chance to turn into a 50 FV by midseason if he had shown some progress with pitch selection in a hypothetical 2019 Hi-A campaign.

Exciting Longshot Arms
Eric Marinez, RHP
Wandisson Charles, RHP
Ismael Aquino, RHP

Marinez is a converted third baseman who threw just two innings last year but was pumping mid-90s gas with ease in those two innings (and during instructs), and he has nascent breaking ball feel. He’s a sleeper to develop into a good two-pitch reliever. Charles is a 6-foot-6, 220 pound beast with elite arm strength (95-98, touching at least 99) but zero feel for pitching. He’ll snap off the occasional plus slider in the 86-90 mph range, but he’s relatively undercooked for 22. Aquino is 20 and sits 93-96, but it’s a relief-only delivery.

Possible Role Players
Cobie Vance, UTIL
Tyler Ramirez, LF
Dairon Blanco, CF
Luke Persico, 1B/OF

Vance is an athletic multi-positional player with max-effort 55 bat speed. He made several highlight reel defensive plays in the fall. Ramirez has performed at Double-A for multiple years but we think he’s limited to left field and lacks the bat to profile there. He might hit enough to prove us wrong but we think it’s more likely he becomes a star in NPB or the KBO one day. Blanco is an 80 runner and potential fifth outfielder. Persico has good feel for the zone and some contact skills. He’s not a great fit at third base but has played there and might be a righty bench bat who can play the corner positions.

Young Latin American Talent
Danny Bautista, Jr., OF
Yerdel Vargas, SS
Kevin Richards, CF
George Bell, Jr., OF

Bautista is the most well-rounded of this group but doesn’t have any plus tools and might max out as a bench outfielder. Vargas was once a strong 40 FV on here but hasn’t developed as hoped, in part due to injury. Richards is carpaccio raw but is a 70 runner with a good frame. He might fill out and suddenly have some pop. Bell is similar to Richards but has less speed.

Pitching Inventory
Brady Feigl, RHP
Kyle Finnegan, RHP
James Naile, RHP
Norge Ruiz, RHP
Clark Cota, RHP

Feigl has solid average stuff and some feel, and is likely a long relief type but has some chance to be a backend starter. Finnegan throws in the mid-90s and has an above-average split and could be a middle reliever. Fastball and curveball spin rates are usually correlated with one another but Naile has a low-spinning, sinking heater and a 2800 rpm curveball, so who knows what going on there. He could be a middle reliever. Ruiz is a kitchen sink righty with average stuff, sometimes cruises in the high-80s, works backwards, and is generally a bit of an enigma but could be an inventory multi-inning piece. Cota has a Mark Melancon looking delivery, a fastball/curveball/changeup pupu platter repertoire, and surprising feel that could lead to him being a solid middle reliever.

System Overview

In the Moneyball days, Oakland pressed a market inefficiency in the draft, generally scooping up under-tooled college prospects with higher probabilities of success and lower upside. Over time, they’ve slowly shifted to favoring upside with their biggest amateur expenditures. They took prep righty Trevor Cahill in the second round in 2006 and signed Michael Ynoa, a 16-year-old righty, for a then-record $4.25 million bonus in 2008. One could argue that they should value upside as much as any club, as their small payroll means that a couple of stars emerging at once could open a window that causes them to push their chips in for a multi-year run, whereas one or two stars doesn’t change the Yankees’ team-building calculus as dramatically.

Their 2017 first rounder, sixth overall pick Austin Beck, was arguably the highest risk/upside proposition yet, a prep hitter with the shortest track record of any of his peers, taken at a pick where anything short of a multi-year regular is a failure. Oakland is also tied to top players in the 2019 and 2020 July 2nd classes, in Dominican shortstop Robert Puason and Dominican center fielder Pedro Pineda, respectively. Even in the universe of 15- and 16-year-olds, these two are seen as top-of-the-market talents because of their upside, with more risk and upside than other elite peers according to most scouts. Lefties A.J. Puk and Jesus Luzardo are elite prospects who are close to the big leagues right now, but also came with their own risk factors, as Puk, the sixth overall pick in 2016, was maddeningly inconsistent and appeared headed in the wrong direction as the draft approached before needing Tommy John early last season, while Luzardo is a shorter lefty with a Tommy John surgery as a high schooler. Two of the three pieces in the Sonny Gray haul — Jorge Mateo (consistency, makeup) and James Kaprielian (injuries) — were also seen as upside/risk types and haven’t returned value yet, but 2019 will go a long way to defining that trade. It has been a slow but interesting shift for the club most closely associated with one extreme of the acquisition spectrum to have moved almost as far to the other end.

This offseason, Bryce Harper failed to reach an agreement with 29 teams on a long term contract that will pay him more millions in any one deal than any baseball player has ever received before. Fortunately for Harper, there are 30 teams in major league baseball, and after a winter (and arguably, a life time) of waiting, the 26-year-old and the Philadelphia Phillies have agreed to a contract that will pay Harper $330 million dollars over 13 years, with a no-trade clause and no deferrals or opt-outs, per Jon Heyman and Jeff Passan. In exchange for that large guarantee, the Phillies get a star player, both in reputation and performance. His five-win 2019 projection is one of the very best in the game, and he greatly improves the Phillies’ chances of a playoff spot in a tough division.

Prior to adding Harper, the Phillies had already made several big moves, adding J.T. Realmuto, Andrew McCutchen, Jean Segura, and David Robertson. Despite those additions, the Phillies were still projected for a win total in the low 80s, and found themselves in a real fight with the Braves and Mets for second place in the division. Harper jumps into a corner outfield spot with the Phillies and improves the team by around four wins over what Nick Williams would’ve provided, vaulting the Phillies past the Mets and Braves and into a conversation with the Nationals for best team in the division and potentially the National League. Harper gets his record-breaking contract, topping Machado’s free agent deal and Giancarlo Stanton’s $325 million extension. The money is more spread out, with a roughly $25 million average annual value that could benefit the Phillies as they navigate the competitive balance tax in the future, so go ahead and start (or continue) the rumor that Mike Trout will make his way to Philly after the 2020 season.

While the wait this winter has been a long one, as free agency drags into spring training, this deal has been an even longer time coming for the former teen phenom. Ten years ago, a 16-year-old Harper was asked what he wanted from baseball, and he responded with all the bravado of a teenager, mentioning the Hall of Fame, pinstripes, and becoming “the greatest baseball player who ever lived.” As for the criticism that came with the comparisons to LeBron James and seeming hubris of a wunderkind gracing the cover of Sports Illustrated when he could barely drive, Harper embraced it, saying “I love the way people talk crap. I hear it all the time. Overrated. You suck. I’ll just do something to shut them up, like, I’ll show you.”

A decade later, he’s still on track for the Hall of Fame, though New York’s trade for Giancarlo Stanton made pinstripes unlikely, and Mike Trout’s existence all but ensures that Harper won’t even be the greatest player of his generation. That Harper might have to settle for Cooperstown speaks to the great expectations placed on the former number one overall pick and NL Rookie of the Year. As for those trying to cut him down, a decade has likely wisened Harper to the reality that nothing he can do will ever stop the naysayers or the perception that he hasn’t done enough. After putting up consecutive four-win seasons at 19 and 20 years old, Harper was rewarded by his peers by being voted the most overrated player in the game two years in a row. While multiple All-Star-level campaigns should have been enough to draw positive attention, Harper wasn’t satisfied; he got better. At 22 years of age, he put up one of the greatest single hitting seasons of all-time and won the NL MVP award unanimously. Just two seasons later, he was again considered the most overrated player in the game by his peers.

The expectations placed upon Harper by the media, his agent Scott Boras, and by Harper himself have shaped the way he is viewed by players and fans. The Commissioner opted to single Harper out for daring to think a $400 million contract was a reasonable ask. When greatness is the standard, slumps, team failures in the playoffs, injuries that have shortened seasons, and one season’s worth of poor defensive metrics garner more attention than a Hall of Fame pace. With this contract, those expectations aren’t going away, but if his track record, projections, and comps are any indication, some of the boasts of a 16-year-old might well become reality, as Harper continues to put up Hall of Fame caliber numbers.

Comparisons help frame our understanding of players, but in free agency, historical comparisons can often do a disservice to a player like Harper. Most free agents are older than he is. Andrew McCutchen became a free agent for the first time this winter at age 32. When Harper reaches McCutchen’s age, he will be in the seventh year of his contract. Comparing Harper’s contract to 10-year deals is nearly meaningless when those deals miss on multiple prime years at the beginning and instead mostly contain multiple years in the late-30s when age decimates nearly all players. Perpetuating the owner’s message that 10-year deals don’t work out is an exercise without utility.

Since Jackie Robinson joined the majors in 1947, only 13 players have put up a WAR within five of Harper’s 30.7 and within 20% of his 3957 plate appearances through their age-25 seasons, including Manny Machado. The 11 players who preceded this year’s free agent pair averaged 39 WAR from age 26 through age-35, and eight of the 11 players are in the Hall of Fame. Even ignoring Harper’s MVP season, his comps create an incredibly high floor. According to my colleague Dan Szymborski, ZiPS, which uses some fairly conservative playing time estimates due to the length of the deal, still has Harper worth more than 30 wins over the life of the contract even with the last few seasons projected to be below replacement-level.

In the past two decades, the only players at Harper’s age or younger to reach free agency with a similarly high level of play are Alex Rodriguez, whose 140 wRC+ through age-25 is identical to Harper, and Manny Machado. The latter just received his own $300 million deal, while the former signed for $252 million nearly two decades ago. Those dollar figures can also deceive in free agency, as Rodriguez’s deal is worth close to $600 million in today’s payroll dollars. Machado’s contact might be the first free agent contact to reach $300 million, but it’s the 10th MLB contract to reach that amount in today’s dollars, while 22 deals have been worth $252 million or more adjusting for MLB payroll inflation.

It’s possible that Harper’s defense has taken a more lasting turn for the worse, and will limit his value going forward. It’s possible Harper gets hurt. He might age poorly. There is inherent risk in making any decade-long-plus commitment when you only get to see a single outcome. It’s important to bake that risk and that downside into future expectations. When we factor that risk with the very good player Harper has mostly been, the great player he’s sometimes been, and the upside associated with a star’s late-20s–make no mistake, even at this high cost, there is still substantial upside–this is an objectively good deal. Adding Harper for 2019 is always going to look good. Every single team in baseball would love to have had Harper for this season. The reason those 29 other teams don’t is their unwillingness to make the substantial commitment that comes after this season. Those teams undoubtedly have their reasons for not making that outlay, but based on everything we know, the Phillies did a very good job in securing a likely Hall of Famer fairly early on his career while paying a reasonable price to do so. For both sides, it has been a long time coming.