Xander Bogaerts‘ first season as a second baseman hasn’t gone as planned. He’s struggled mightily at the plate thus far, and while he’s fared better defensively, on Monday he suffered a fracture in his left shoulder while diving for a ball. He could miss a couple of months, leaving the Padres — who despite going just 27-26 thus far currently occupy the third NL Wild Card spot — to fend without him.

The injury occurred during the first game of Monday’s doubleheader in Atlanta. With the bases loaded in the third inning, Bogaerts ranged to his left to try to stop a Ronald Acuña Jr. grounder. He dove in time to get his glove on the ball, but he landed hard, and awkwardly. He immediately began writhing on the ground and could only wrist-flip the ball to shortstop Ha-Seong Kim, who saw the play to its conclusion — a run scored, though Bogaerts’ stop probably prevented a second one from doing so as well — and motioned for help.

“As soon as I caught the ball, I heard, like, cracks. Four cracks,” Bogaerts told reporters. “At that point, I was like, ‘Something’s wrong.’ I didn’t feel exactly like something shifted. I just felt, like, cracks.” Read the rest of this entry »

This is the year of the splitter. In 2024, 3.1% of all big league pitches thrown have been splitters compared to 2.2% in 2023, a year-over-year increase of 41%. Aficionados of the split-fingered fastball include former NPB stars like Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Shota Imanaga, longtime MLB users like Joe Ryan and Fernando Cruz, and an assorted collection of hurlers who’ve added a new splitter or featured one much more prominently in their arsenal this year. And few starters have scaled up their splitter usage more than the man atop the pitcher WAR leaderboard: Tanner Houck.

Houck has thrown a splitter his entire time in the majors, but he’s taken it to a new level this year by doubling its usage. Among qualified starters, Houck throws the sixth-highest percentage of splitters, while his splitter’s 110 Pitching+ ranks fifth, ahead of Ryan and Imanaga. The rise of Houck’s splitter, combined with the arsenal tweaks he’s made to throw it more, have transformed him from a mixed-role swingman to slam-dunk frontline starter.

Houck has spent most of his big league career straddling the line between starter and reliever. He pitched mainly as a starter during his 2021 rookie season, but never completed the sixth inning in any of his starts. His sophomore campaign saw him make multi-inning appearances out of the bullpen. Back in the rotation last year, he posted an ERA above five and struggled to get outs as his pitches lost their bite later in starts.

Aside from stamina, Houck’s delivery served as a hurdle to his abilities as a starter. While a handful of starters fire from low arm slots, Houck is one of the only true sidearmers currently in a big league rotation. He doesn’t have an outlier release point thanks to his tall stature and mechanics that carry him toward the first base side, but his arm angle is certainly the lowest among starters. Houck’s delivery provides a great viewing angle for left-handed hitters, who comprise the majority of his competition as opponents stack platoon bats against him.

In 2023, lefties slashed .271/.356/.502 against Houck, roughly the equivalent of having to face Rafael Devers for the entire season. But through his first 10 starts of this year, he’s held them to a line so poor I can’t find a qualified hitter whose numbers I can compare with it. Neutralizing the platoon advantage is a huge deal for a pitcher with his arm angle, and much of this impressive feat has to do with his splitter.

Let’s take a look at what Houck’s approach to pitching looked like before ramping up the use of his splitter. Like most low-slot pitchers, his two primary offerings are a sinker and slider, taking advantage of the east-west movement his arm action produces. Both these pitches are chart-topping in terms of movement, dropping more than average due to their lack of backspin, and his slider breaks to the left even more than most sweepers (though Statcast doesn’t classify it as one).

While these two pitches made right-handed hitters absolutely futile against Houck, sinkers and sweeping sliders tend to generate large platoon splits, compounding with the advantage lefties gain from seeing the ball clearly out of his hand. Houck’s slider drops so much that lefties can’t do much with it, but his sinker moves directly into the path of their barrels, eager to get hammered. In the past, Houck primarily used four-seamers and cutters as his hard offerings against lefty opponents, hoping the rising action would be enough to miss bats. But these pitches still had too much arm-side movement and didn’t generate upward Magnus force, instead staying on plane with lefty swings.

Houck’s approach to lefties wasn’t working, and he needed a change. In came the splitter. What was once a distant fourth offering became his offspeed weapon. He tinkered with its shape, adding nearly four inches of drop to make it more distinct from his sinker. He tightened up its command, finishing down in the zone more consistently and spiking fewer in the dirt. The end result of these adjustments is a lethal pitch that has been a key contributor to Houck’s success.

Houck’s splitter leads his arsenal in both swinging strike rate and putaway rate, indicating it’s already his go-to weapon in two-strike counts. And while it’s been successful at missing bats, the results it generates when batters put it in play may be even more impressive. His split has the lowest launch angle allowed of any individual pitch from a starter; it’s one of just a dozen with a negative average launch angle. After years of allowing lefties to crush the ball in the air, he’s inducing a higher groundball rate against lefties than righties in 2024. These underlying changes have manifested in big time results – lefties have just a .038 ISO against Houck this season and have yet to homer, and Statcast metrics like barrel rate confirm this is no fluke.

The emergence of Houck’s splitter has also cut down his walk rate significantly, as he’s jumped from the 42nd to the 88th percentile in avoiding free passes. Previously, Houck often nibbled around the zone against lefties, afraid of what they could do to his fastball and cutter. Now armed with a pitch that limits damage, he’s fearlessly attacking the strike zone, improving his splitter zone rate by 14 percentage points and his overall zone rate by nearly five.

The effectiveness of his splitter has also made Houck’s sinker a more effective strike stealer because hitters watch it go by expecting it to drop beneath the zone. Houck currently ranks second to Seth Lugo in called strike rate, getting ahead of hitters before disposing of them with the slider and splitter. His improved control of the count is a big reason why he ranks fourth in K-BB% increase relative to 2023.

What impresses me most about Houck’s splitter is the sheer frequency with which he deploys it against lefties, especially at the expense of his fastballs. He’s throwing significantly fewer cutters and has shelved the four-seamer entirely. After unsuccessfully throwing the kitchen sink against opposite-handed opponents, he’s essentially become a two-pitch pitcher against lefties, throwing either a slider or splitter nearly three-quarters of the time.

It’s not often that you see a pitcher use two different non-fastballs as their primary offerings, but this strategy has paid off – not just for Houck but also for the Red Sox as a whole. Last month, Chris Gilligan wrote about Boston’s staff leading the leaguewide shift away from the fastball, pointing out Houck’s four-seamer had a horizontal movement profile ripe for hitters to feast on. Just a couple decades ago, a starting pitcher who almost exclusively relied on sliders and splitters against left-handed hitters would have been unthinkable, but the secondaries-first approach is now a strategy that entire teams are embracing with tremendous results.

Houck’s run as the top-performing pitcher in the majors probably won’t last — he has an unsustainably low 2.6% HR/FB rate — but the excellence of his splitter has certainly put a massive up arrow on his future projection. Just a couple years ago, it would’ve been difficult to envision that the sidewinding swingman who couldn’t handle lefties would become an excellent starter who consistently works into the seventh inning. But with a surprisingly simple fix, Houck has made it happen.

As I write this before the start of play on May 23, we’re just about a third of the way through the season, and I don’t think we can avoid it anymore. Jurickson Profar is batting .339 with a 178 wRC+. Jurickson Profar ranks 10th in baseball with 2.2 WAR. Jurickson Profar, who signed a one-year, $1 million contract on February 24. Jurickson Profar, who until this season averaged 0.8 WAR per 162 games over 10 seasons, and last season put up -1.7 WAR, making him literally the least valuable player in baseball. Jurickson Profar leads all qualified National League players in on-base percentage (.431) and ranks in the top 10 in batting average, slugging percentage (.517), RBI (32), and strikeout rate (13.7%). Jurickson Profar.

(I say qualified because LaMonte Wade Jr. and his .481 OBP did not have enough plate appearances to be among the league leaders. Naturally, between the time I wrote this post and now, Wade crossed the qualification threshold, so Profar now ranks second.)

Here’s something I wrote a couple months ago:

“I imagine that everybody here at FanGraphs generates ideas for articles in different ways. Looking at leaderboards is certainly a common method. You click around, sorting by different stats until someone looks out of place. ‘How did you get all the way up here?’ is what the start of a FanGraphs article sounds like.”

Well, here we are. How the name of Bip Roberts did Jurickson Profar get all the way up here?

I honestly don’t know what the Padres were expecting when they brought Profar back, but this couldn’t have been it. Let’s quickly establish just how out of character this run has been. Not only has Profar never had a 52-game stretch like this, he’s never come close. He’s running a .949 OPS. Before this season, his best 52-game span in a single season came in 2018, when he ran an .882 OPS. That’s a 67-point difference. Profar is batting .339, but until this season he’d never once had a span this long where he hit above .300. Here’s his 52-game rolling wRC+ for his entire career. His previous high came on August 2, 2022. It was 31 points lower.

Right off the bat, this graph tells us that after a horrible 2023 season, Profar was due for some regression of the good kind. He came into this season with a career wRC+ of 92, and that figure is 97 if we limit it to his last six seasons. The smart bet was that he was going to bounce back at least part of the way from last year’s 76 wRC+ clunker.

There’s also another obvious gimme: Luck. Profar has never finished a season with a BABIP above .300, but he’s currently at .371, tied for fourth highest in baseball. His .416 wOBA is 38 points above his .378 xwOBA, a differential that puts him in the top 10 percent of all batters. The 2.3-homer difference between Profar’s 4.7 expected home runs and 7 actual home runs is the seventh-largest gap in baseball. Profar’s line drive rate, which had never risen above 27.7% in a season, is currently at 32%. It’s fantastic that Profar is squaring the ball up so much, but line drive rate is also notoriously fickle. We can and should expect all of these numbers to come back down.

Profar is running career bests in both walk rate, 13.2%, and strikeout rate, 13.7%. In order to get a handle on how that has come about, I compared his plate discipline numbers from this year to his average the four previous seasons.

As you can see, he’s seeing fewer strikes, and he’s being a bit more aggressive, especially in the zone. He’s also making more contact inside the zone, but not outside the zone. That last part is unsustainable. People don’t usually get better at making contact specifically on the pitches that they want to hit anyway. When it does correct itself, it will result in lower walk and strikeout rates, and more weakly hit balls in play. Still, the numbers aren’t shouting anything particularly clear. According to Statcast, Profar’s swing/take decisions have been worth 21 runs, just the second time in his career that it’s been a positive number. That’s the fifth-highest mark in baseball, and it slots him right between Mookie Betts and Juan Soto. However, according to SEAGER, Profar’s swing decisions put him in the 19th percentile. Right now, I just want to see a bigger sample size.

Profar has always been good at making contact, but so far this season, he’s doing so while hitting the ball harder. This is where things get real. Even though it’s propped up by a line drive rate that’s too good to be true, a .378 xwOBA is a huge jump for Profar, whose career best of .338 came during the short 2020 season, when he put up a 113 wRC+. The switch-hitting Profar is also succeeding from both sides of the plate, running a 181 wRC+ as a lefty and a 172 wRC+ as a righty.

This season, Profar’s average exit velocity is a career-high 90.4 mph. More importantly, he’s seen a big jump in his 90th percentile exit velocity, going from 101.8 mph in both 2022 and 2023 to 104.5 this season. That moved him from the 25th percentile to the 58th. His 40.8% hard-hit rate is not just a career best, but it’s the first time he’s ever touched the 50th percentile. None of this is enough to make him a power hitter or make a .517 slugging percentage sustainable, but it is a serious jump, and those kinds of numbers are hard to fake. Moreover, they’re coming after some changes to Profar’s swing. From the left side of the plate, Profar has changed up his stance significantly, starting out much more open, with a bigger bat waggle at a steeper angle. From both sides of the plate, he’s gone from almost no leg kick whatsoever last year to bringing his foot several inches off the ground this year.

Adding a leg kick is a common way for a player to try to increase power, and it certainly seems to be working for Profar so far. According to Statcast’s new bat tracking metrics, Profar is slightly above average in terms of squaring the ball up and slightly below average in terms of bat speed. There’s no way to know where he ranked in previous seasons, but based on all of this, I don’t think it would be crazy to give him the benefit of the doubt and expect some of this new exit velocity to stick.

There’s one last thing I’d like to consider. It’s possible that Profar is just very happy to be home, or that he happens to see the ball particularly well in San Diego. Profar has a career 123 wRC+ in Petco Park. Over his time with the Padres from 2020 to 2023 (excluding his time with Colorado in 2023), he’s run a 113 wRC+ at home, compared to 96 on the road. Even this season, he’s at 212 at home, compared to a (somehow) relatively pedestrian 149 on the road. I wouldn’t put a ton of stock in that theory, but there’s a possibility that Profar just feels comfortable at Petco.

So where does all of this leave us? It definitely doesn’t leave us thinking that Profar is now a true-talent .300/.400/.500 hitter. He’s due for some regression in terms of BABIP, in terms of line drive rate, and in terms of contact rate outside the zone. On the other hand, it does seem like he might have found a way to hit for a bit more power without sacrificing much in the way of contact ability. We’ll have to wait and see where exactly that leaves him.

It’s been a fun couple of weeks seeing all the work that has been done as a result of Statcast’s expanding into bat tracking. The great thing about this game is that there is always more to learn. With the addition of bat speed and swing length, we now have a better idea of telling the story of a player’s swing, but there is still so much more to tap into.

Back when I was using a Blast Motion bat sensor on a daily basis, I was exposed to every component of the swing that you could think of. Bat speed was one of them, but that only scratched the surface. There were pieces explaining my path at different points in the swing, how long it took my barrel to meet the plane of the ball, where in space that happened, and so much more. For a while, the public data available was focused on the outcome. What was the pitch? What was the result? What was the exit velocity and/or launch angle? With this new update, we’re progressing toward the how. How fast did the player swing? How long was their swing? We can now tie that in with the result, but there are additional details needed to understand the full scope of how results happened. That’ll be the focus of this piece.

First, it’s important to highlight the great work that has already been done explaining the new data we have and what the information tells (and doesn’t tell) us about the swing. Ben Clemens explained some applications of the new metrics and what their relationship with performance is on a macro scale. One thing Ben mentioned that resonated with me is thinking about the new (and old) information as inputs for us to use to understand performance rather than the answers themselves. Each piece works together to tell a story, whether that be league wide or player specific. Basically, these are pieces of information that need additional context.

Relatedly, Patrick Dubuque and Stephen Sutton-Brown from Baseball Prospectus, provided a great analysis of how to put bat speed into the context of pitch counts, from the perspective of both the hitter and pitcher. And there is more beyond just these two, including Noah Woodward’s Substack post about bat speed, swing length, and understanding what they mean and how they contribute to the swing.

Woodward touched on a few components of the swing that I’ve talked about in previous work that we still don’t have comprehensive data on from Statcast: contact point and attack angle. Swing variability, swing adjustability, having A and B swings, etc. are all extremely important to being successful at the big league level. If you have a hole in your swing, generally speaking, pitchers will expose you, so having multiple high-quality swings is going to set you up to have consistent success, just ask Triston Casas. Swing-by-swing data on attack angle, vertical and horizontal bat angle, and point of contact will all help the public understanding of swing variability, or when and how the swing changes in general.

Let’s start with attack angle. This is the angle of the bat path at contact, relative to the ground. As your bat travels through the zone, it creates a trajectory. To optimize your chances of hitting the ball in the air, the bat should be on an upward trajectory at contact, meaning you should have a positive attack angle. One component of swing variability is creating a positive attack angle at different heights, widths, and depths. You pretty much just want to be able to manipulate your barrel to move upward no matter where the pitch is. To get a better idea of what attack angle looks like, let’s look at a video from David Adler outlining a swing from Oneil Cruz:

Bat path tracking — Oneil Cruz 120.4 mph single (hardest-hit ball in MLB this year)

84.5 mph bat speed (75+ mph is the "fast swing" threshold) pic.twitter.com/FO9gA6fqva

— David Adler (@_dadler) May 21, 2024

While attack angle is officially measured as the angle of the path at contact, seeing the path leading up to contact can tell us what kind of depth the hitter creates. In this clip, the angle of the path changes as it moves from behind Cruz’s body to in front of it. This illuminates how attack angle is dependent on point of contact. In general, the farther in front of the plate your bat is, the easier it is to create a positive attack angle. However, this thread from Driveline’s Director of Hitting, Tanner Stokey, discusses the importance of creating bat speed deep in the zone. The best hitters create their peak speeds in tight windows. Like all facets of baseball, swinging is about striking a balance of creating high levels of bat speed and positive attack angles. You don’t want to have a one dimensional swing that is focused on high bat speed while ignoring the need to create ideal bat angles both deep in the zone and in front of the plate.

Depending on how you start your swing and enter the zone, it takes time to turn your barrel over into an upward slope. For many hitters, the bat needs to travel a greater distance to create the positive attack angle that leads to optimal contact. This, of course, takes more time. But, as Robert Orr pointed out last week in his piece on the relationship between pulled fly balls and swing length, a long swing isn’t necessarily a bad thing; it’s really just another data point. With access to attack angle, we could better tell the story of how a hitter like Isaac Paredes creates depth in his swing while often making ideal contact far out in front of the plate, versus a hitter who makes contact out in front without creating the necessary depth in their swing to avoid major holes.

At the same time, it’s still possible to create a positive attack angle deeper in the hitting zone. To get there, you need to make movements that aren’t easy to do while generating bat speed and controlling your body. Some hitters with great mobility use lateral torso bend — they lean toward their back leg right before contact — to get their barrel on an upward slope deep in the hitting zone. Think of Shohei Ohtani or Edouard Julien:

These two have unorthodox skills that allow them to launch pitches high in the air to the opposite field. With point of contact and attack angle, we’d be able to quantify how different they really are from their peers on top of the visual analysis.

Then there are hitters who create flatter (but still positive) attack angles with a path that stays on a similar plane throughout their swing. They get on plane with the ball early and don’t do much to change their path throughout the swing. It’s nearly impossible to do this with a steep swing. Juan Soto is a great example of this, even if he is more powerful than the other hitters with this swing style. Here is a great angle that illustrates what I’m referencing:

Bat path tracking — Juan Soto 112.0 mph line-drive single off Justin Verlander

Staying on top of a hanging curveball at the top of the zone pic.twitter.com/IRhdzHVMy8

— David Adler (@_dadler) May 8, 2024

Soto’s vertical entry angle (angle of the bat relative to the ground at the beginning of the downswing) isn’t far off from his attack angle. You can see how much this swing contrasts with that of Cruz, who is a big dude with a narrow stance. Because of that, his bat path is vertically oriented, and his bat needs to travel a greater distance to get on plane with the ball. With more detailed information of barrel angles at different points in the swing, we would know more about how hitters like Soto and Cruz vary from one another when it comes to getting and staying on plane.

This has been a ton of information all at once, so I’ll leave you with one last tidbit. Depending on the hitter, the angle of the path at contact can be very different from the angle of the barrel at contact (relative to the ground), known as vertical bat angle. While I’ve cited average vertical bat angle from SwingGraphs on several occasions, I’ve always focused on putting the metric into context because it varies based on several factors. Luis Arraez and Aaron Judge can have similar average vertical bat angles, but that doesn’t tell us anything about how different their swings are. We know the metric depends on pitch height, but even that alone isn’t enough to explain why Judge is a launcher and Arraez is a sprayer. As we learned earlier, each data point is an input and isn’t meant to be used alone.

There is no question teams have been using, monitoring, and applying these data to scout and develop players for years now, but despite all the metrics that we have, the information on the public side is still lagging. Ideally, in future years, we will gain access to more swing data so that we can better understand the game we love.

For years now, a simple message has been gaining traction in major league bullpens and pitching labs: Just throw it down the middle. As big league pitches have gotten speedier and bendier, the people who throw them have been increasingly advised to trust their stuff, stop nibbling around the edges, and attack the heart of the zone. Adam Berry wrote about the Rays adopting this approach in 2021. In 2022, Bryan Adams superfan Justin Choi looked into the numbers and noted, “In each season since 2015, when Statcast data became public, hitters have accumulated a negative run value against down-the-middle fastballs.” Last year, Stephanie Apstein documented the phenomenon in Baltimore, while Hannah Keyser and Zach Crizer did the same on a league-wide basis, describing the Rays model thusly:

Step 1: Develop unhittable stuff
Step 2: Let it rip down the middle
Step 3: Win

Just last week, Jeff Fletcher wrote that after trying and failing to get their pitchers to attack the zone more often, the Angels started putting their pitchers in the box to face their own arsenal, courtesy of a Trajekt pitching machine. “I knew my pitches were good,” said José Soriano through an interpreter, “but when I faced myself, I find out they’re really good. So I have more trust in my stuff now.” Pitches right down the middle are called meatballs for a reason, but if you’ve ever watched peak Max Scherzer demolish the heart of the other team’s lineup by simply pumping 97-mph fastballs across the heart of the plate, none of this comes as a galloping shock.

Still, I wondered whether I could find data to back up this shift in mindset. Are pitchers really attacking the zone more often? And are better pitching staffs (or staffs with better stuff) really attacking the middle of the plate more often? After all, the Angels rank 22nd in Stuff+ and 14th in PitchingBot Stuff, not to mention near the bottom in ERA, FIP, and xFIP. If they feel this good about their stuff, I’d imagine that every team does. Read the rest of this entry »

Since the dawn of time, there’s always been at least one elite major league closer who’s thrown the cutter almost exclusively. By “dawn of time” I mean the mid-1990s, of course, but I think we can all agree that civilization only truly began when humankind discovered frosted tips and cargo shorts. First there was Mariano Rivera, then Kenley Jansen, and now that everything from the ’90s is back in style, there’s Emmanuel Clase.

Clase has been a crucial part of Cleveland’s surprising run to first place in the AL Central; he’s recorded the win or the save in 18 of the Guardians’ 33 victories, and he’s fifth among relievers in WPA. Cleveland’s record in one-run games is 8-6, which isn’t particularly freakish, but the Guardians are 8-2 in one-run games when Clase pitches, and 0-4 when he doesn’t.

Here’s another fun one: Clase is on pace for the first 50-save season in MLB since Edwin Díaz in 2018, and 3.4 WAR, which would be the most by a Guardians reliever since 1988. WAR wasn’t even a stat back then! Read the rest of this entry »

I’m writing this article for selfish reasons. Every Monday, I chat with FanGraphs readers (come hang out with us! But not next Monday, because it’s a holiday). Four or five times per chat, someone asks a variation of the same question: “Should my team trade this reliever who has been better than expected to a contender for a huge haul?” Four or five times per chat, I say that they should, but that no one would trade with them. So now, I’m trying to put some numbers to it.

The first argument against doing this is fairly simple: Reliever performance doesn’t work that way. To measure this analytically, I took a bunch of recent seasons (2019, 2021, 2022, and 2023) and split them into two. I looked at the correlation between first-half numbers and second-half numbers for every reliever we listed as qualified in the first half of those seasons. I was looking for a simple question: How much can we infer about second-half numbers based on first-half numbers?

The answer, unsurprisingly, is “not very much.” There’s an obvious problem. Relievers simply don’t pitch very many innings. Last year, Jake Bird led all relievers in innings pitched at the All-Star break, with 53.1. Most relievers had meaningfully fewer innings. They didn’t pitch a ton of innings in the second half, either, because that’s just not how relief pitching works. Only 20 relievers threw 70 or more innings last year.
Read the rest of this entry »

NEW YORK — On Tuesday afternoon, Gerrit Cole donned the pinstripes and took the mound at Yankee Stadium, not for his long-awaited season debut, but for a key milestone in his rehab: his first live batting practice session since a bout of nerve inflammation in his right elbow sidelined him in mid-March. The reigning AL Cy Young winner is still at least a few weeks away from returning, but in his absence — and in the face of considerable uncertainty given last year’s performances — his fellow starters have stepped up to help the Yankees into the AL East lead and the American League’s best record.

In front of an empty ballpark but an audience of teammates, coaches, and media, Cole — who eschewed his batting practice jersey in favor of the real thing “because I miss it” — faced teammates Jahmai Jones (a righty) and Oswaldo Cabrera (a switch-hitter batting lefty) from behind an L-screen. He threw 22 pitches, working through his full five-pitch arsenal, and by his own admission, the adrenaline from the setting led him to push his velocity to 96 mph, a point where pitching coach Matt Blake told him to back off. “Matt yelled at me, so I had to throw it like 90 a few times to even it back out,” he quipped afterwards.

“To me, he looked very much in control, with easy velocity,” said manager Aaron Boone of Cole’s session. The ace is eligible to come off the 60-day injured list later this month, but his rehab isn’t far enough for that to be realistic. As for a return in June, Boone indicated that it was a possibility, “but I don’t want to get ahead of ourselves.” Assuming Cole’s recovery from the session goes as planned, he’ll probably throw a couple more BP sessions before heading out on a rehab assignment, which given the math of building up a pitch count points to a late June return. Read the rest of this entry »

Kevin Kelly is proving to be yet another diamond in the rough for the Tampa Bay Rays. Acquired from the Cleveland Guardians via the Colorado Rockies in the December 2022 Rule 5 draft, the 26-year-old right-hander has since logged a 3.14 ERA and a 3.24 FIP in 73 appearances out of the Rays bullpen. Attacking the strike zone from a low arm slot, Kelly has fanned 74 batters while allowing 70 hits and just 16 walks over 86 innings.

His prospect profile was modest at best. A 19th-round pick in the 2019 draft out of James Madison University, Kelly was unranked prior to changing organizations, and going into last year he was conservatively assigned a 40 FV and a no. 27 ranking on our Rays list. Which isn’t to say that Eric Longenhagen didn’t recognize Kelly’s potential. Pointing to the side-slinger’s east-west arsenal and ability to keep the ball out of the air, Longenhagen wrote that Kelly had a chance to stick on Tampa Bay’s roster and be “a great option out of the bullpen when you need a ground ball to get out of a jam.”

Inducing worm-killers is indeed one of Kelly’s greatest strengths. Per Statcast, his 48.2% ground ball rate ranked in the 78th percentile last season, and this year he’s currently in the 91st percentile at 55.6%. And it’s not as though he doesn’t miss a reasonable amount of bats. His strikeout rate might not be anything to write home about, but at 23.0% it dwells in middle of the pack of major league hurlers.

According to Tampa Bay pitching coach Kyle Snyder, the righty reliever’s success is based on multiple factors. Read the rest of this entry »

Writers frequently use threshold moments as a way to delineate a shift in the narrative from some prior homeostasis to an entirely new one. As author Jeannine Ouellette describes them, “These thresholds — the pause at the top of each breath, the space between the before and the after — can hold the entirety of our lives in a single second. Can hold everything we have been and everything we might become.”

Threshold moments exist in real life too. Sometimes we don’t notice them until years later, through the lens of hindsight. Other times, it’s as if an arrow-shaped neon sign is casting the scene with a vintage glow, reminding us that we’ll look back on this moment for years to come.

When Shohei Ohtani signed with the Los Angeles Angels in December of 2017, he experienced a threshold moment. Maybe not the day he officially signed, and maybe not for a singular instant, but as he met with teams and envisioned the different iterations of his future, everything he was in Japan and everything he might become in the U.S. likely began to clarify in his mind’s eye. Ohtani’s decision to sign with the Dodgers six years later represents another threshold moment, but again, one that didn’t happen on signing day. More likely, Ohtani underwent two transformational shifts: one where he stopped viewing himself as a Los Angeles Angel, and one where he started viewing himself as a Los Angeles Dodger. Read the rest of this entry »