Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the San Diego Padres. Scouting reports were compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as my own observations. This is the sixth year we’re delineating between two anticipated relief roles, the abbreviations for which you’ll see in the “position” column below: MIRP for multi-inning relief pitchers, and SIRP for single-inning relief pitchers. The ETAs listed generally correspond to the year a player has to be added to the 40-man roster to avoid being made eligible for the Rule 5 draft. Manual adjustments are made where they seem appropriate, but we use that as a rule of thumb.

A quick overview of what FV (Future Value) means can be found here. A much deeper overview can be found here.

All of the ranked prospects below also appear on The Board, a resource the site offers featuring sortable scouting information for every organization. It has more details (and updated TrackMan data from various sources) than this article and integrates every team’s list so readers can compare prospects across farm systems. It can be found here. Read the rest of this entry »

A major league debut is always an exciting occasion; it represents hope for the team and its fans, and the culmination of a lifetime of hard work for the player. I’m a cynical old crank, but I never tire of watching proud parents gush about their beloved son in a mid-inning interview with a sideline reporter.

It’s not remarkable that, in the fourth inning of the Guardians’ 1-0 loss against the Rays, that Gary Bazzana flushed red and got choked up when telling Andre Knott about his son. What’s remarkable is that he talked about his son in an Australian accent.

See, Tuesday marked the long-awaited debut of the no. 1 pick in the 2024 draft, second baseman Travis Bazzana. Read the rest of this entry »

I’ve been fascinated by Caleb Kilian for quite a while. Since 2021, to be precise, when he put together a dazzling 80 innings of minor league work for the Giants and then got traded to the Cubs in a deal for Kris Bryant. At the time, Kilian was essentially a lottery ticket, an eighth-round pick in 2019 who was old for his level. But man, those 80 innings were just the kind of innings I like – great command fueling both a pristine walk rate and a ton of strikeouts. I filed a mental note to keep my eye on him: Low-stuff high-command guys sometimes pop with a change of scenery, at least in my head.

That didn’t transpire in Chicago. Kilian got a cup of coffee in 2022 and another one in 2023, but his walk rate ballooned as he reached back for more velo against tougher competition, both at Triple-A and in the majors. And then a shoulder strain cost him half of the 2024 season. He returned for 2025 and found himself in minor league limbo as he transitioned to the bullpen; the Cubs released and then re-signed him due to roster considerations, and he hit minor league free agency after the season. He signed a minor league deal with the Giants over the winter, now as a full-fledged reliever. And that’s where the meat of this article begins.

The early book on Kilian was a standard one: plus command, wide arsenal, but no true out pitch and below-average velocity. In his time with the Cubs, however, that changed. By 2024, Kilian was touching 100 at times, but we graded his command as only average. In other words, his results and scouting report matched: He was throwing harder, but it wasn’t working better.
Read the rest of this entry »

With the advent of the ABS challenge system, the definition of the strike zone has been laid out with new precision. MLB defines the new ABS zone as follows: “The strike zone will be a two-dimensional rectangle that is set in the middle of home plate with the edges of the zone set to the width of home plate (17 inches) and the top and bottom adjusted based on each individual player’s height (53.5% of the batter’s height at the top and 27% at the bottom).” That’s a change from the way that the strike zone had been understood since 1996. Per MLB.com, that zone was “the area over home plate from the midpoint between a batter’s shoulders and the top of the uniform pants – when the batter is in his stance and prepared to swing at a pitched ball – and a point just below the kneecap. In order to get a strike call, part of the ball must cross over part of home plate while in the aforementioned area.” Those two zones are different, clearly, and it’s reasonable to assume that they would have different sizes and shapes. But how different?

Before the season, estimates of how the zone might change ball and strike calls abounded. We’ve heard anecdotally that pitchers think it’s smaller, and that hitters think it’s taller. But I haven’t seen any studies that attempt to measure it empirically, so I set out to do so.

I’m going to bore you with plenty of math in this article, so let’s start with a few pictures before we dive into the details. I measured a 50% called strike probability border, normalized by player height, using 2025 and 2026 data. The zone has gotten lower and smaller:

That zone considers righties and lefties together. Break it down by handedness, and you get a similar result:

The upshot is that the strike zone has shrunk by around 14 square inches for a 6-foot tall batter, from roughly 454 square inches to 439 square inches. This finding matches the direction of the result that MLB expected to see before the season, if not the precise magnitude. In their ABS explainer, they approximated the strike zone in 2-2 counts as being 449 square inches with the old human-called strike zone and 443 square inches with the new ABS zone.

Now that I’ve given you my top-line findings, let’s get into the methodology. First, I took all the pitches that were called balls or strikes during the 2025 and 2026 seasons. I only considered batters who appeared in both seasons so that I could use their official measured height; I used their official height in 2026 for both years to ensure a consistent sample. Then, for each pitch in each year, I normalized vertical location by height. In other words, a 3-foot high pitch thrown to a 6-foot tall batter would receive a value of 3/6 or 0.5, while a 3-foot high pitch thrown to a 7-foot tall batter would receive a value of 3/7. In this way, I produced a height-normalized form of measurement that is consistent between the past two years, rather than using relative distance from a rulebook defined strike zone. This let me compare like for like — not the area of the strike zone relative to the rulebook in each year, but the true (height-normalized) size of the zone in each year. This is especially important because the exact definition of the zone and the way the zone is called have not always correlated perfectly; in fact, despite no change in the rulebook zone, changes in umpire evaluation have moved the strike zone borders around in recent years.

I took all the normalized pitch locations in my remaining sample, and then I further restricted it by time. I used only pitches that were thrown through April 25, 2025 last season, and through April 25, 2026 this season. I’m not sure whether there are any hidden calendar effects to strike zone size, but I didn’t want to take any chances; this methodology relies on comparing a like zone, and this time restriction still gave me plenty of data. After all, the limiting factor here is the fact that the 2026 season is still incomplete, and I haven’t dropped any of that data.

With these called balls and strikes in hand, I transformed the individual calls into a probability distribution using Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression. In layman’s terms, this is a bin-and-smooth technique. It works by creating a grid, 121×121 in this case, and then placing each pitch into those bins. It then smooths each pitch’s location using a Gaussian filter and calculates the smoothed called-strike probability in each zone. Those called-strike probabilities are used to create the frontier of the 50% called-strike-probability zone, which I’m using to define “the strike zone” for this study. I used the 50% called-strike rate as the border because that matches the on-field experience of the strike zone. For everything inside this border, an umpire is more likely than not to call a strike. For everything outside it, they’re more likely than not to call a ball. Given the inherent uncertainty of the zone as called by humans with occasional robot assistance, I think this is a definition that comes closest to matching how the zone feels to players. As a bonus, it’s also the standard definition used by many seminal studies of the strike zone.

Using this method, I estimated the size and shape of the strike zone in the past two seasons. For example, the top of the strike zone for a 6-foot batter in 2025 was roughly three feet, 5.5 inches. The top of the strike zone for a 6-foot batter in 2026 has been roughly three feet, 4.5 inches. The bottom of the zone for that 6-foot batter was roughly one foot, six inches in 2025; it’s been roughly one foot, 5.5 inches in 2026. There was no meaningful change in the width of the strike zone, as you’d expect; that’s defined by the width of home plate, which has not changed.

To determine whether these changes were statistically significant, I calculated bootstrapped confidence intervals. To do this, I broke my sample out by game and then picked games at random, with replacement, to form new samples for both years. I repeated this process 100 times. I took the 2.5th-percentile and 97.5th-percentile results of the bootstrap to form confidence intervals, both for the size of the zone and the change in the size of the zone. Those results are as follows (reported for a 6-foot batter):

I interpret this as saying the following: The top of the strike zone is lower. The bottom of the strike zone is also lower, though by less. The width of the zone may be very slightly smaller, though it’s hard to say. The total area of the strike zone has declined, likely by between eight and 22 square inches, somewhere between 2% and 5% of the total strike zone area.

Another form of analysis proved more difficult: determining the changing shape of the zone in different counts. There’s a two-fold problem here. First, the sample sizes of the raw pitches thrown in each count are far smaller than they are for the overall population. Second, we’re looking for zones of the plate where strikes are called roughly 50% of the time so that we can perform boundary analysis, but batters don’t take a lot of 50/50 balls in certain counts. Look for a cluster of pitches in a 1-2 count that didn’t produce a swing and yet had a 50% chance of being called a strike, and you’re going to be looking for a while. Batters don’t take those pitches.

However, I was able to cobble something together with a little help from our extensive library. The PitchingBot model produces estimates of the likelihood of a swing for every pitch. I used those estimates to create an inverse probability weighting for each pitch. The less likely a given count/location/pitch type combination was to lead to a take, the more I weighted it in our sample. This statistical method corrects for the sampling bias inherent in looking at only pitches that a batter took.

This method produced two interesting takeaways. First, the strike zone in three-ball counts hasn’t really changed, even while everything else has shrunk. Umpires are in fact calling a slightly larger strike zone in counts with three balls, though it’s statistically indistinguishable from the 2025 zone in the same counts. Second, the old effect of umpires tightening the strike zone in two-strike counts is vanishing. In zero-strike counts, the 2026 strike zone is 8% smaller than the 2025 strike zone. In two-strike counts, the 2026 zone is 1% smaller than the 2025 zone. I’m not confident in this effect size, thanks to the fact that I cut sample sizes down significantly by bucketing by count, but I am confident that an effect exists.

I do not feel confident in making any strong claims about the downstream effects of these changes. This study was set up particularly to measure the size of the zone, not to consider how pitcher and batter behavior have changed as a result. That said, it’s certainly suggestive that walk rates have increased. It’s even more suggestive that the called strike rate for fastballs just above the borders of the ABS strike zone, 53.5% of a batter’s height, has declined markedly. In 2025, fastballs thrown within the width of home plate and between zero and four inches above that 53.5% cutoff were called strikes 54.3% of the time. So far in 2026, pitches thrown to that area have been called strikes 40.8% of the time.

Another interesting effect: ABS challenges themselves aren’t having much effect on the size of the zone. I took all challenged calls and reverted them to the original umpire call, then re-ran the entire model. The difference was minimal; using pre-challenge calls, the zone has shrunk ever so slightly more than the measured effect reported in this study, though not by a statistically significant amount. The net effect of challenges is quite small. Here’s a graphical representation of the difference between the as-called zone (using the final result, post-challenges) and the zone assuming no challenges were allowed:

None of this is settled science. The zone will continue to evolve as batters, pitchers, catchers, and umpires adjust to the new rules. The definition of the strike zone isn’t set in stone – obviously so, given that the zone was called in three dimensions last year and is called in two dimensions in 2026. There are meaningful downstream behavioral implications, too, and I expect league-wide walk rates to decline as pitchers adjust to the new strike zone. But so far, pitchers’ reports of the zone are correct: The strike zone, as called by umpires and the ABS challenge system in 2026, covers less area than it did in 2025.

Appendix A: Data
The data and Python code used to prepare the principal analysis in this article are available here. This code covers the method for normalizing pitch locations, constructing normalized pitch plots, measuring the difference between the two, bootstrapping confidence intervals, and separating results by handedness. A markdown document explaining the function and design of the Python code is also available at that link. Further documentation is available as needed. I’ve left out anything that uses internal-only data, like PitchingBot model values, but I’m happy to discuss specific methodology further on a one-off basis.

Appendix B: Further Reading
I linked to several articles about the changing shape of the strike zone in 2026 at the top of this article. The following is a more complete bibliography of sources who have written about the size of the zone in the ABS era:

• “How MLB’s Ball-Strike Challenge Will Change Baseball,” Peter Abraham, Tim Healey, Alex Speier, John Hancock, and Daigo Fujiwara-Smith, The Boston Globe
• “Players Say Robot Umpires Are Shrinking MLB’s Strike Zone,” David Brandt, Jay Cohen, et al., The Associated Press
• “Everything You Need To Know About The New ABS Challenge System,” Anthony Castrovince, MLB.com
• “MLB’s Switch to ABS Shrunk Nearly Every Hitter’s Strike Zone,” Mike Emeigh and Reddit
• “Jose Altuve’s New Strike Zone,” Jarrett Seidler, Baseball Prospectus
• “MLB Made a Change That Players Say Shrank the Strike Zone,” Jayson Stark, Ken Rosenthal, and Eno Sarris, The Athletic
• “ABS Has Shrunk The Strike Zone; Walks Are Spiking As Hitters Try To Adjust,” Cody Stavenhagen, The Athletic
• “ABS Challenge Rates By Proximity to Border of Strike Zone,” Tom Tango
• “Lefties Eat Hot Dogs, Righties Eat Burgers,” Matthew Trueblood, Baseball Prospectus
• “Yes, MLB’s Strike Zone Is Shrinking. But Baseball Will Be Better For It,” Tom Verducci, Sports Illustrated
• “This is Not Even The Strike Zone’s Final Form,” Bradley Woodrum, Baseball Prospectus

Though spring training concluded several weeks ago, it’s still spring on the solar calendar, and this year, spring cleaning in Boston involved the Red Sox clearing out some dirty laundry. On Saturday night, ESPN reported the firings of manager Alex Cora, bench coach Ramón Vázquez, third base and outfield coach Kyle Hudson, hitting coach Peter Fatse, assistant hitting coach Dillon Lawson, and major league hitting strategist Joe Cronin. Further, game planning and run prevention coach Jason Varitek has been offered a different role within the organization.

The Red Sox began the season projected to win 85 games, with 60.8% odds to make the playoffs. Of the 25 writers who contributed to the FanGraphs 2026 Staff Predictions, 21 picked the Red Sox to make the postseason and nine had them winning the division, which tied Boston with Toronto as the most popular pick to take the AL East. Heading into Sunday’s games, the Red Sox had a projected win total of 80, and their odds of making the playoffs were down to 31.4%. Their drop of 29.4 percentage points in playoff odds was the largest in the AL, while in the NL, the Mets and Phillies saw their playoff odds decline by 41.0 points and 33.0 points, respectively.

At just 27 games into the season, Boston’s dismissal of Cora is the earliest manager firing since 2018, when the Reds fired Bryan Price after the club started the year 3-15. Cincinnati entered the season looking to complete the transition from rebuilding to contention, but instead finished in last place in the NL Central with a 67-95 record. The Reds simultaneously cut ties with pitching coach Mack Jenkins, which is representative of a common pattern with coaching changes. When a team’s struggle is particularly acute on one side of the ball, the coach leading that effort is often held accountable along with the manager. But rarely does an organization remove seven members of its major league coaching staff in one fell swoop. Boston’s overhaul was so dramatic, the team had to bring in what appears to be a party bus to transport the deposed coaches away from the team hotel. Read the rest of this entry »

Nathan Lukes was 28 years old and in his ninth professional season when he made his MLB debut with the Toronto Blue Jays in 2023. He almost didn’t make it that far. Life down on the farm isn’t exactly a bed of roses, and that was especially true prior to conditions — financial and otherwise — improving via a collective bargaining agreement that essentially coincided with his reaching the bigs. A few years earlier, Lukes almost walked away.

“It’s been a journey,” Lukes said of his path, which began when Cleveland selected him in the seventh round of the 2015 draft out of Cal State Sacramento. “Five games into my career — this was in short-season ball — I broke my hamate and was out for the rest of the year. The next year, I started in Low-A, and halfway through I got traded to Tampa Bay at the deadline. I stayed with the Rays until my minor-league contract was up, then signed here [in November 2021].

“It was getting to the point where it was almost time to think about hanging it up,” continued Lukes, whom the Blue Jays placed on the IL with a hamstring strain prior to yesterday’s game. “But then, in 2023, they put me on the 40-man roster. Pretty much as long I had that 40-man ticket, I was going to keep running with it.”

The now-31-year-old outfielder didn’t feel that he had stalled out developmentally when he pondered calling it a career — “I always felt that I could play in the big leagues” — but he did recognize that there is more to life than baseball. Lukes and his wife had a child in 2021, and as he explained. “Family changes things.” While his financial situation had improved somewhat thanks to minor-league free agency, he was “going to play the 2022 season, and after that, probably just be a dad.”

“You weren’t getting rich,” I said to Lukes in our spring training conversation. “No,” he replied. “I was getting poor. My wife was working at the time, which helped… actually, it didn’t just help, it kept us running. At the lower levels, I was bringing home six thousand dollars a year after taxes, so I was making a thousand dollars a month. The most I ever made on a minor-league contract was $15,000. You can’t really do too much with that.” Read the rest of this entry »

A question popped into my head as I edited Ryan Blake’s column on the Nationals Friday morning. In the piece, shortly after noting that James Wood ranked third in the majors with a 170 wRC+, Ryan mentioned that Wood’s teammate, CJ Abrams, was sixth with a mark of 168. Upon reading this, I pulled up our leaderboards to see if the Nationals were the only team to have two players in the top 10. Turns out that, yes, they are. I thought about that for all of two seconds before something else caught my eye. Just below Abrams on the list was Mike Trout, who also had a 168 wRC+. This prompted me to wonder: Can Trout return to form? Can he both stay healthy and produce this year?

I’m hardly the only one who spent the bulk of the 2020s dreaming on a fully healthy season from Trout, just as I’m not alone in having abandoned that hope as the injuries piled up. But after watching him blast home run after home run last week from the Yankee Stadium pressbox, I felt the pull of the past encroach upon the present, and perhaps against my better judgment, I started dreaming again. He sure looked as healthy as ever as his broad body barreled up baseballs and roamed center field. The best way to describe the way Trout moves — really, the way he has always moved — is that he lumbers and boulders; for all of his natural athleticism and breathtaking blend of speed and strength, he does not glide gracefully. I put that dream of a Trout renaissance on ice when the Angels left town, only for it to come back a week later. This time, though, I considered whether, at 34, he still has one more MVP season in him. He entered this weekend slashing .239/.417/.557 with eight home runs, and has posted 1.2 WAR in 25 games. He’s walking more than he’s striking out, and he’s already stolen four bases. His BABIP is a mere .228, 111 points below his career mark, so we should expect his batting average to see some positive regression. (Even if we know batting average isn’t all that indicative of player performance, it still matters for MVP voters.) His .483 xwOBA is second in the majors and 62 points above his wOBA. His defense has been below average so far, but if Trout keeps hitting like this, his glove won’t matter much for his MVP case. The narrative would certainly be in his favor.

I just answered two of my own questions from Friday in this mailbag, so I guess it’s time to get to yours. What if the Astros blow it all up? How might the Pirates benefit from a Houston fire sale? Why don’t teams develop bench players to be knuckleballers? What the heck was Austin Warren doing in the game with the bases loaded in the Mets’ 12th straight loss? We answer all these questions and more in this week’s mailbag. Plus, Jay Jaffe remembers Garret Anderson. But first, I’d like to remind you that this mailbag is exclusive to FanGraphs Members. If you aren’t yet a Member and would like to keep reading, you can sign up for a Membership here. It’s the best way to both experience the site and support our staff, and it comes with a bunch of other great benefits. Also, if you’d like to ask a question for an upcoming mailbag, send me an email at mailbag@fangraphs.com. Read the rest of this entry »

Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the Washington Nationals. Scouting reports were compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as my own observations. This is the sixth year we’re delineating between two anticipated relief roles, the abbreviations for which you’ll see in the “position” column below: MIRP for multi-inning relief pitchers, and SIRP for single-inning relief pitchers. The ETAs listed generally correspond to the year a player has to be added to the 40-man roster to avoid being made eligible for the Rule 5 draft. Manual adjustments are made where they seem appropriate, but we use that as a rule of thumb.

A quick overview of what FV (Future Value) means can be found here. A much deeper overview can be found here.

All of the ranked prospects below also appear on The Board, a resource the site offers featuring sortable scouting information for every organization. It has more details (and updated TrackMan data from various sources) than this article and integrates every team’s list so readers can compare prospects across farm systems. It can be found here. Read the rest of this entry »

I’m sure you know the joke about the two hikers, the bear, and the running shoes. A bear is chasing two men through the woods; one stops to put on his running shoes. “You fool!” his friend says. “Even in those shoes you’ll never outrun the bear!”

“I don’t need to outrun the bear,” says the man. “I just need to outrun you.”

It’s an old joke, and I tell it a lot because I find it to have the probative value of an actual Biblical parable. You don’t need to be great; just be better than the other guy. For the past week, the Phillies have been mired in a losing streak that would’ve gotten national attention had the bear not been devoting its attention to eating the Mets. But on Wednesday, the Mets finally snapped their 12-game skid and the Phillies dropped their eighth game on the bounce. Now the two rivals both sit at 8-16, the worst record in the National League. Read the rest of this entry »

Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the Kansas City Royals. Scouting reports were compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as my own observations. This is the sixth year we’re delineating between two anticipated relief roles, the abbreviations for which you’ll see in the “position” column below: MIRP for multi-inning relief pitchers, and SIRP for single-inning relief pitchers. The ETAs listed generally correspond to the year a player has to be added to the 40-man roster to avoid being made eligible for the Rule 5 draft. Manual adjustments are made where they seem appropriate, but we use that as a rule of thumb.

A quick overview of what FV (Future Value) means can be found here. A much deeper overview can be found here.

All of the ranked prospects below also appear on The Board, a resource the site offers featuring sortable scouting information for every organization. It has more details (and updated TrackMan data from various sources) than this article and integrates every team’s list so readers can compare prospects across farm systems. It can be found here. Read the rest of this entry »