Notes on prospects from lead prospect analyst Eric Longenhagen. Read previous installments here.

Tanner Houck, RHP, Boston Red Sox
Level: Hi-A   Age: 22   Org Rank: 4   FV: 45
Line: 7 IP, 4 H, 0 BB, 1 R, 7 K

Notes
The Red Sox have been tinkering with Tanner Houck’s arm slot and pitch grips throughout the year in effort to find the best combination of pitch types for him. Earlier in the year that involved raising his arm slot and incorporating more four seamers into his mix, but now Houck’s fastball and arm slot look more like they did in college. His results have been better of late as he’s walked six and allowed nine runs combined over his last six starts. His low slot makes it easier for lefties to see the ball out of his hand and Houck will still need to find a way to counteract this issues to profile as a starter.

Mickey Moniak, OF, Philadelphia Phillies
Level: Hi-A   Age: 20   Org Rank: 14   FV: 40+
Line: 2-for-4, 2B, 3B

Notes
While his overall line is still disappointing, Mickey Moniak is slashing .298/.341/.465 since May 22. He’s made a subtle swing change that has him taking a using bigger leg kick with his knee driving back toward his rear hip (similar to the one Adam Haseley adopted while in Clearwater this year) and he’s also striding closed which has helped Moniak deal with stuff on the outer half, which had been a problem for him as a pro. I’ve asked teams for updated reports on Moniak and the pro side of the industry think he has tweener outfielder tools but acknowledges it appears he’s been playing a level ahead of his ability so far. The industry considers him a big leaguer but thinks it’s going to take some time.

Bryan Abreu, RHP, Houston Astros
Level: Low-A   Age: 21   Org Rank: 28   FV: 35+
Line: 6 IP, 4 H, 1 BB, 0 R, 10 K

Notes
Bryan Abreu has generated varying reports throughout the year, at times 92-94 with a 50 breaking ball and 40 control (which is barely a prospect) and others when he’s been up to 97, sitting 94-95 with big vertical action on one of two his breaking balls. He’s accrued double-digit strikeouts in two of his last three starts and has a 69:13 strikeout-to-walk ratio in 42.4 innings this season. The Astros are great at installing coherent pitching approaches into their prospects, most of whom are high-spin fastball/breaking ball guys who work up in the zone with their heaters, an approach which leads to more strikeouts. This, combined with Houston’s piggyback approach (where hitters don’t often see the same pitcher three or more times), leads to lots of strikeouts. I think the fastball (which is pretty straight) plays better out of the bullpen and I’m skeptical of Abreu’s short-term walk rate improvement because I’ve still got scouts questioning his command and it’s been an issue for Abreu in the past. I have him projected in relief and have added him to Houston’s team page on The Board.

Meandering Thoughts

Kiley wrote today about how he thinks the Rays have identified pitching subtypes that have skills to fit somewhere on the value spectrum between the perhaps unnecessary extremes of typical six or seven-inning starters and single-inning relievers. I’d like to talk about a few other oddball skillsets that might have a place on a 25-man roster as they help perform traditional and necessary on-field tasks but come in atypical packages. I’ve given them names that that the Cespedes Family BBQ kids will improve upon.

Waxahachie
This role, in which a player acts as relief specialist who can also play the outfield, has actually been utilized in the recent past and has been explored by other clubs in the minors even more recently. Outfielders with superlative arm strength or pitchers with plus athleticism could put an extra late-inning hitter or two at platoon disadvantage. The Astros have done this with Tony Sipp, bringing him in to face a lefty before sending him to the outfield while someone else gets righties out, and then returning Sipp to the mound to face another lefty. It seemed Houston might have hoped Rule 5 selection Anthony Gose would have been able to do something similar, but he didn’t make the team out of spring training and was returned to Texas.

Texas also has several candidates for this type of role in Gose (who is also a 70 runner and good defensive center fielder), James Jones (plus runner, plus outfield defense, low-90s with loopy breaking ball on the mound) and Jairo Beras (right-handed, mid-90s fastball, plus-plus raw power) who have all converted to the mound but have one or two other useful skills that could enable them to be deployed in the right situation.

James Jones, LHP, Texas Rangers from Eric Longenhagen on Vimeo.

Former big league OF Jordan Schafer would seem to have fit this archetype as well and he was used in various ways by different clubs (Atlanta played him in the outfield, the Dodgers tried to make him a base-stealing specialist for the 2016 stretch run and St. Louis tried him on the mound) but never in several different roles at once.

Rick Ankiel, who is attempting a big league comeback, is perfect for this kind of role, too. He could shuttle back and forth from the outfield to the mound a few times, while also pinch hitting when it makes sense to have a power-before-hit bat at the plate and pinch-running on occasion.

If someone like this already exists in the Rays system it’s RHP/OF Tanner Dodson, who the Rays wanted announced as a two-way player when he was drafted out of Cal in June. Dodson sits in the mid-90s on the mound and is also a plus runner who hit near the top of Cal’s lineup last year. He’s not polished in center and has a slap/slash approach at the plate, but there’s premium arm strength and speed here.

Pull-Side Infielder
There are certain hitters who don’t pull the ball enough to merit a shift but still pull the ball on the ground more often than hit it the other way and, perhaps, that means your rangiest infield defender should just play on the hitter’s pull side, even if that means swapping your 2B and SS, hitter-by-hitter. I think this idea is half-baked but I’d argue the Brewers are candidates for something like this right now as they’re playing Travis Shaw out of position at second base to shoehorn better hitters into their lineup. In my opinion, they should be swapping Jonathan Schoop and Shaw, hitter by hitter, something to maximize Schoop’s defensive touches and minimize Shaw’s. Perhaps my name for this type of thing is too narrow but the concept interests me. Tampa Bay has a slew of bat-first 2B-types who are either athletically viable all over the field in a dynamic defensive equation like this (Vidal Brujan, Nick Solak, Lucius Fox) or benefit from being hidden by it (Brandon Lowe, Taylor Walls, Jake Cronenworth)

Among the biggest changes in on-field strategy this year is the Rays’ use of an “opener,” or a starting pitcher who isn’t a traditional starter in style and is expected to throw only an inning or two. While certainly notable, the role itself isn’t my interest here. Rather, I’d like to consider how Tampa Bay has cobbled together a staff from Blake Snell and a cast of misfit toys.

From talking to sources in and around the Rays, the use of an “opener” wasn’t a purposeful strategic shift on the organization’s part, but rather an attempt by the club to deploy the talent present on the roster in the most effective way possible. Snell is the only pitcher who won’t get an opener in front of him, while the rest varies game-to-game based on matchups and other factors. Much like the best coach in the NFL, the Rays are using a player’s strengths and building a scheme around it rather than building a roster around a scheme.

Consider this characterization of Bill Belichick’s coaching philosophy by Greg Bedard of SI in the context of Tampa Bay and their pitching strategy:

On both sides of the ball, the scheme is multiple and adaptable both to personnel and to specific opponents. The Patriots are never a team that just ‘does what it does’ on either side of the ball. There must be a level of unpredictability.

Recently acquired former top prospect Tyler Glasnow has been notably better in his 12 innings with the Rays, but the role the right-hander typically fills (the longest outing on his pitching day, usually after the opener) is a one that could create a competitive advantage for the Rays in player procurement.

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David Bote’s pinch-hitting heroics on Sunday night ensured that Cole Hamels‘ sterling start did not go to waste, but for the rest of the Cubs’ rotation, such outings have lately been more the exception than the rule. On Tuesday afternoon against the Brewers at Wrigley Field, Jose Quintana dug his team a three-run hole in the first inning, serving up a leadoff homer to Lorenzo Cain on just his second pitch of the afternoon and, three batters later, allowing a two-run blast to Ryan Braun. Two innings later, Braun added another two-run shot.

Last Saturday, it was Jon Lester allowing two first-inning runs to the Nationals, and nine in 3.2 innings of a 9-4 Cubs loss. On Friday, it was Kyle Hendricks allowing runs in the first and second innings before righting the ship in a 3-2 win. Lately, it’s always something.

Somehow, the Cubs own the National League’s best record (68-50, .576) despite having one of its most disappointing rotations. Including Quintana’s start, the team’s starters collectively rank 10th in the league in ERA (4.20), 12th in WAR (3.8), and 13th in FIP (4.71). Just after the All-Star break, Craig Edwards noted that the rotation’s performance was on pace to be its worst by WAR since 1974, and somehow, despite the team going 13-12 in the second half (that despite being outscored by 28 runs), it has continued to lag:

The starters are 13th among NL clubs in ERA (5.39) and 11th in FIP (4.85) since the All-Star break. The trouble has begun almost immediately; in the first inning, the starters have posted an 8.64 ERA (last in the NL) and a 5.84 FIP (12th).

The Cubs’ survival and success thus far is testament both to their offense, which is cranking out 4.88 runs per game (second in the league) with a 103 wRC+ (first), and to their bullpen, which is second in the league in ERA (3.35) and fifth in FIP (3.84), though the latter unit has been mid-pack thus far in the second half. But whether it’s the added stress of so many postseason innings, the impact of the change in pitching coaches from Chris Bosio to Jim Hickey, or the difficulty of their newcomers in acclimating — and it could well be some combination of all three — the Cubs can’t be brimming with confidence in their costly, underperforming rotation as they look towards September and October. Hamels, with a 1.00 ERA, 1.94 FIP, and 29.0% strikeout rate in three starts since being acquired from the Rangers, is the exception; Edwards has a breakdown of the 34-year-old southpaw’s ace-like performance here.

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If the pitcher for whom they traded went by a different name, the Cubs’ deadline acquisition of a 34-year-old starter with a 5.20 FIP, 4.72 ERA, and near-replacement 0.3 WAR likely wouldn’t have merited much attention. Even knowing that the pitcher in question was Cole Hamels, one could still be forgiven — in light of the left-hander’s recent track record — for a lack of optimism.

A couple weeks later, Hamels has produced three pretty great starts for Chicago. And while, when the Cubs’ traded for Hamels, there was some thought that a more friendly ballpark, better defense, and easier league would all benefit him — and possibly have benefited him — the fact is that he’s also just pitching a lot better than he did with the Rangers.

To get a sense of this version of Hamels versus the Texas one, consider the numbers from his average start with the Rangers this year relative to the three he’s recorded with the Cubs.

Between the relatively high left-on-base percentage and relatively low BABIP, Hamels has probably benefited from a little bit of luck — although the quality of the Cubs’ defense is also a possible factor here, as well. It’s also quite possible the change in park is benefiting Hamels, as he has yet to concede a home run with Chicago after giving up around one per game with Texas.

That said, Hamels has also struck out an extra batter and walked one batter fewer per appearance. That sort of thing probably resides outside the influence of mere environmental changes. And while it might be a result just of random variation, there is some evidence to suggest Hamels is pitching better in his last three games than at any time during the season.

Likely having no direct relationship to the change of scenery is the matter of Hamels’ velocity. As the graph below reveals, he’s throwing the ball harder as a Cub.

Hamels hadn’t topped an average of 94 mph per start since 2016. He’s alerady done that twice in three starts with the Cubs. Added velocity can only help Hamels. Even as he entered his 30s, Hamels put up good marks by this measure, averaging 93-94 mph from 2014 to -16. When he lost some velocity last year, however, his numbers suffered. When the velocity remained lower over the first half of this season, he continued to struggle. He’s throwing harder with the Cubs and, likely as a consequence, has done a better job of getting batters out.

It isn’t just the bump in velocity that appears to have helped Hamels, though. There’s been a change in approach, as well. The biggest difference for the left-hander in terms of pitch selection has been increased usage of the four-seam fastball — at the expense of his sinker, particularly — over the last two starts.

Prioritizing the four-seam over the two-seam seems to have slightly pre-dated the trade Chicago: three of Hamels’ last five starts for the Rangers have a similar disparity. Nor did usage change emerge in any real way during Hamels’ first start with Chicago, either. Over the last two starts, though, the four-seam fastball has been a lot better — and it isn’t just velocity. Hamels has changed the ball’s location, too. The heat map below shows where Hamels was throwing his four-seam to righties with the Rangers and now with the Cubs.

These images are from the pitcher’s perspective. One finds that, with the Rangers, Hamels threw his four-seamer middle and away; with the Cubs, meanwhile, he appears to be making a concerted effort to go inside against righties. Look at the first pitch of the game on Sunday night against Trea Turner.

It’s an inside fastball. Now, look at the second pitch.

Another inside fastball. Now look at the third pitch.

That one was way inside. Hamels then threw a curve down the middle that Turner fouled off. Here is the final pitch of the at-bat.

That pitch was clocked at 96 mph. Hamels threw four fastballs to Turner, and all of them were inside. The harder he throws, the more comfortably he can work inside without the hitter turning on the pitch. And while the sample for Hamels’ secondary pitches remains quite small, he seems to have thrown his changeup out of the zone a little bit more.

Whether this is signal or mere noise, it’s too early to say, but the Cubs’ version of Hamels looks like a pitcher who is attempting to induce more swinging strikes. So far, it is working: Hamels has recorded a whiff on nearly one-third of his changeups with the Cubs. That’s only a bit higher than with the Rangers, but Hamels has given up seven homers on the pitch this year, so pitching further down could help keep the ball in the field of play when contact is made.

Of Hamels’ 23 homers this season, 16 have come against either the change or four-seam fastball, and 22 of 23 homers have gone against righties. The narrative concerning Hamels’ departure from Texas for Chicago centered around the benefits of leaving the Rangers’ ballpark. While we shouldn’t dismiss that narrative entirely, there’s probably more to it than that. Hamels was probably just throwing too many pitches in the middle of the plate, and those pitches tend to get hit the hardest.

Simultaneously increasing the velocity on his fastball and getting the ball inside to righties seems more likely to help Hamels’ home-run troubles than a simply move to Wrigley Field. Keeping his changeup lower should have similar positive effects. A four-seam fastball on the hands and a change low and away leaves a lot of plate for hitters to cover. Cole Hamels seems to have made some early adjustments that have helped him succeed for the Cubs. It remains to be seen if hitters can adjust back. If Hamels is regularly throwing in the mid-90s and hitting his spots, however, those adjustments will be hard to make.

Projecting the Rookie of the Year award is simultaneously easier and more difficult than the Cy Young. It’s easier in the sense that there are fewer rookies than non-rookies and that, in most seasons, there’s a definite top tier of candidates that crowds out the rest of the pack.

What makes it a bit trickier is that the standards for rookies are applied a bit more haphazardly by writers. Because rookie ballots feature only three players — as opposed to five for the Cy Young and 10 for MVP — we see fewer players actually included in the final voting. Ideally, you’d like to bring in all the voters, crack open their skulls, and somehow read their brains to see how everyone would rank at least the top 10 rookies. My lawyers, however, inform me that this is extremely illegal and also totally gross.

In the end, I’m less confident about the Rookie of the Year model than the MVP or Cy Young versions. While, historically, ZiPS identifies about seven of the top 10 MVP and Cy Young vote-getters, the model only gets three of the top five rookies. Hopefully, as the electorate becomes more and more analytically inclined, I’ll be able to improve the model.

The greatest challenge of projecting the AL race is figuring out what to do with Shohei Ohtani. There’s no guidance available on how two-way players ought to be treated, so there’s a lot more guesswork than usual. Comparing apples to oranges is tricky enough — although rendered less tricky by the fact that they’re frequently right next to each other at the grocery store — but how do you treat something that is an apple and an orange at the same time? Applange and orpple both sound terrible.

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Matt Carpenter just hit another home run. Here, look at it:

That home run was hit on August 13, and for Carpenter, it was his career-high 33rd. He had set a new career high with his 29th, and so this is all just uncharted territory. Right now, Carpenter leads the National League in wRC+. He also leads the National League in Statcast’s expected wOBA, so it’s not like this is all luck. Carpenter has been absolutely outstanding, and he’s likely to generate support for the league MVP. He’s helped to fuel the Cardinals’ recent run toward a wild-card spot, and heaven only knows where the club would be without him.

I should also point out that, according to Statcast again, Carpenter’s top exit velocity this season ranks in the 35th percentile. We’re mostly accustomed to sluggers who slug the ball. Carpenter would never be confused for another Giancarlo Stanton. So let’s quickly walk through how Carpenter makes this all work. To a certain extent this is all pretty basic, but Carpenter happens to be one of the world leaders in bat control.

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Newly retired outfielder Jayson Werth was honored by the Phillies in early August for his contributions to the 2008 World Champions. He made news that weekend for comments that derided “super nerds” as “killing the game.” (It’s worth noting, of course, that Werth was a sabermetric darling back in the day, standing out for his plate discipline.) Of more interest to me, however, was this statement he made on the Howard Eskin podcast:

“I had offers in November, and I was advised by my former agent to wait; ill-advised, I guess.”

***

“Some guys were surprised to hear from me – they didn’t know that I wanted to play. Which was surprising, because I wanted to play. I let my agent know I wanted to play. And they said they either hadn’t heard from him, hadn’t heard from me, just didn’t know that I was available. So that’s one of the reasons why I’m no longer with that agent.”

That raises eyebrows for two reasons. First, because Werth is essentially accusing his agent of a breach of contract, and potentially a breach of fiduciary duty as well. (Keep that term in mind – it’ll be important later.) And second, because the agent in question is Scott Boras, who has been recognized by Forbes as the industry’s most powerful and who, thanks to Eric Hosmer, has now negotiated no fewer than 15 deals of $100 million or more. Accusing Scott Boras of not doing his job is a bit like accusing Clarence Darrow of malpractice: it gets your attention.

Now, Boras, for his part, denies any wrongdoing. His company, the Boras Corporation, gave the Washington Post’s Chelsea Janes this statement:

Unfortunately, it appears someone has misled Jayson. We contacted all 30 teams numerous times during the offseason on his behalf, and we have phone logs, emails, and other records to back it up. We received no offers for Jayson in November, or otherwise. We are always prepared to support our work against inaccuracies spread by third parties. We understand the frustration and disappointment players can face and wish Jayson all the best.

What’s perhaps more interesting is this excerpt from Janes’ story (emphasis mine):

The Boras Corporation sends out a list of its free agents to every team at the start of free agency each November. Werth’s name was on that list. Boras Corp. provided that list for verification, as well as date-stamped phone logs that documented dozens of phone calls and emails made to executives on Werth’s behalf. Boras keeps detailed records of every offer and conversation, documentation that protects them against allegations of malpractice — and any litigation that could accompany them.

The reference to litigation isn’t accidental; I’d even wager that it was provided to Janes by the Boras Corporation itself. Boras is a lawyer and, believe it or not, lawyers are very deliberate in how and when they raise the spectre of litigation. This was a shot across Werth’s bow — a warning, if you will, not to pursue the matter further.

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Five years ago, 23-year-old Patrick Corbin put together a very promising season. In more than 200 innings, Corbin’s 3.41 ERA and 3.43 FIP both represented solidly above-average marks, while the 3.5 WAR he recorded pointed to what was a coming-out party for a player who never featured heavily on top-prospect lists. Unfortunately, the party didn’t last: Corbin underwent Tommy John surgery before the 2014 season, and despite a good showing after his return in 2015, he took a step back in 2016 before producing a decent campaign last year. This season, somewhat surprisingly, Corbin has been one of the best pitchers in all of baseball despite having lost some velocity on his fastball in May.

After just two of the left-hander’s starts this season, Jeff Sullivan noticed that Corbin was using a slider more often — that he was, in fact, using two different sliders — to the exclusion of the fastball. As the season has gone on, the slower slider has been classified often as a curve. Despite the slower speed, however, it still features the same movement as the slider. To consider the similarities of the pitch, consider the graph below, which shows the difference between slider movement and curve movement for all qualified pitchers who throw each pitch at least 5% of the time.

Most pitchers’ curves feature more drop than their sliders. The two pitches typically feature different horizontal movement, as well. On average, the difference is about four inches vertically and three inches horizontally. For Corbin, though, the horizontal difference between the pitches is less than an inch, and the vertical difference is almost nothing. Corbin generally uses the curve on the first pitch of an at-bat, with more than half of his curves coming on the first pitch and nearly three-quarters of his curves coming with no strikes, per Brooks Baseball. It’s a pitch he uses in the strike zone when the batter is probably expecting a fastball. The curve helps Corbin either stay ahead or get back even in the count, and still gets a decent 13% whiff rate because of the timing.

In an era that has seen pitchers move towards the four-seam fastball and away from the sinker, Corbin has actually gone the opposite direction. Over the past two seasons, the lefty has cut his four-seam usage in half and shifted most of those pitches to his best pitch, the slider. He’s also shifted away usage from his change, which has meant doubling the combined usage of the slider and curve to nearly 50%, while his two fastballs have essentially been relegated to secondary offerings.

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