For the 21st consecutive season, the ZiPS projection system is unleashing a full set of prognostications. For more information on the ZiPS projections, please consult this year’s introduction and MLB’s glossary entry. The team order is selected by lot, and the next team up is the Tampa Bay Rays.

Batters

Coming off a 99-win season, the Rays shed 19 games last year to finish at 80-82, their first losing record since 2017. While certainly some of that loss can be chalked up to Wander Franco’s troubling legal issues, which have likely brought an end to his baseball career, a blend of injuries and few pleasant surprises also played a big part in the Rays’ dropping out of solid contention. Two-thirds of last year’s projected starters, both in the lineup and the rotation, are gone, making this season a bit of a transition for Tampa Bay.

For a team that doesn’t spend money practically ever, and coming off a bloodbath of trades of youngish veterans, one could call the lineup projections surprisingly good. There are only a few positions that project to be below average, and even those spots aren’t disasters; in fact, every position on the team projects for more than 1 WAR. That’s a testament to the team’s player development system, which has to continually restock the shelves year after year because the organization doesn’t have enough money in the budget to bring in established talent through free agency.

Even so, the best parts of this lineup are rather uninspiring. ZiPS projects the Rays to get at least 3 WAR from only one position, second base, but I’m more skeptical than the Depth Charts are about Brandon Lowe’s ability to stay healthy. In the outfield, ZiPS doesn’t think Jonny DeLuca’s defense will be enough to make up for his bat, and it believes that Christopher Morel is best suited as a DH, where he may have the best chance to live up to his power potential.

But it’s not all bad. ZiPS does like some Rays players, just not the ones on the top of the depth chart – yet. Four of the top-eight WAR projections on offense are players who have not yet seized the primary jobs at their positions. Carson Williams is hardly unexpected, of course, given that he’s a top-five prospect. ZiPS thinks his bat is already acceptable for a starter in the middle infield, and the coordinate-based defensive system I use for the minor leagues thought he was one of the best fielding shortstops in the minors. He’s not the only minor leaguer to get defensive plaudits from ZiPS; third baseman Brayden Taylor also appears to be elite with the leather. He’s not as big a name as Williams, but my colleague Eric Longenhagen gave him a 45/70 evaluation for defense last year, and the Rays have liked his glove enough to give him some run at shortstop, something you don’t do with your third baseman if you think he’s a butcher. Going well down the prospect lists, catcher Dominic Keegan and center fielder Chandler Simpson also get very promising projections.

Sum it all up and the Rays have a solid offense with a lot of depth and a real future, but I’m not sure the upside will be realized this season.

Pitchers

When you compare the innings pitched in the ZiPS projections and the ones listed on our Depth Charts, one conclusion I think you should draw is that the Rays are very reliant on getting healthy innings from Shane McClanahan and Drew Rasmussen. The projections gauge the two as the most talented pitchers on the team right now, so it’s understandable that the Rays would struggle if they’re without McClanahan for the entire season and Rasmussen for most of it due to their respective major elbow surgeries.

That’s not to say ZiPS hates the rest of the rotation, just that McClanahan and Rasmussen would change the whole complexion of the staff. Ryan Pepiot was the odd man out in Los Angeles, but he thrived as a solid no. 2 or 3 starter with the Rays, who just stuck him in the rotation and left him there. Taj Bradley showed great progress from his rookie season, getting hit a lot less hard last year, and Zack Littell showed that Tampa hasn’t lost its touch for taking other teams’ castoffs and transmogrifying them into above-average starters, almost instantly.

A surprising number of other pitchers project to be about league average as starters: Shane Baz, Joe Rock, Mason Montgomery, and Mike Vasil. A few of these guys will likely see some significant bullpen innings, especially Montgomery.

The Rays don’t have the high-end bullpen arms that the Twins or Guardians do, at least not according to ZiPS, but they do still have is an impressive amount of relief pitching depth. The majority of the bullpen projects to be better than average, but only Kevin Kelly and Pete Fairbanks do by a large margin, with the computer not being all that high on Edwin Uceta. If the projections prove accurate, this is a solid bullpen, but it’s probably not going to make or break their chances of reaching the postseason.

The Rays are a good team, but they likely aren’t a great one. ZiPS projects them to finish with 84-88 wins, enough to put them back into contention, but perhaps not enough to actually make the playoffs.

Ballpark graphic is Dan’s mockup of George M. Steinbrenner Field. Depth charts constructed by way of those listed here. Size of player names is very roughly proportional to Depth Charts playing time. The final team projections may differ considerably from our Depth Charts playing time.

Players are listed with their most recent teams wherever possible. This includes players who are unsigned or have retired, players who will miss 2025 due to injury, and players who were released in 2024. So yes, if you see Joe Schmoe, who quit baseball back in August to form a Norwegian Ukulele Dixieland Jazz band that only covers songs by The Smiths, he’s still listed here intentionally. ZiPS is assuming a league with an ERA of 4.11.

Hitters are ranked by zWAR, which is to say, WAR values as calculated by me, Dan Szymborski, whose surname is spelled with a z. WAR values might differ slightly from those that appear in the full release of ZiPS. Finally, I will advise anyone against — and might karate chop anyone guilty of — merely adding up WAR totals on a depth chart to produce projected team WAR. It is important to remember that ZiPS is agnostic about playing time, and has no information about, for example, how quickly a team will call up a prospect or what veteran has fallen into disfavor.

As always, incorrect projections are either caused by misinformation, a non-pragmatic reality, or by the skillful sabotage of our friend and former editor. You can, however, still get mad at me on Twitter or on BlueSky.

The 2023 Miami Marlins were pretty good. They couldn’t hit much, but they had a huge surplus of pitching. Enough not only to survive an injury to 2022 Cy Young winner Sandy Alcantara, but to trade from that surplus and acquire batting champion Luis Arraez. They won 84 games and made the playoffs. Once there, they got completely smoked in the Wild Card round, but things seemed to be going in the right direction.

They weren’t. More injuries piled up in 2024. Other pitchers regressed. Many, if not most, of the key players from 2023 — Jazz Chisholm Jr., Jake Burger, Josh Bell, Jesús Luzardo, Jorge Soler, Tanner Scott, A.J. Puk, even Arraez himself — either were traded or left as free agents. So too did manager Skip Schumaker, who earned plaudits for his handling of a flawed but decent roster in 2023, but lost 100 games a year later with the shattered remnants of that playoff team. He’s probably better off.

If you want reasons for optimism, you’re going to have to look hard. But if you want to find the successor to Arraez, you can stop at the top of Miami’s lineup. Read the rest of this entry »

Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the San Francisco Giants. Scouting reports were compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as my own observations. This is the fifth year we’re delineating between two anticipated relief roles, the abbreviations for which you’ll see in the “position” column below: MIRP for multi-inning relief pitchers, and SIRP for single-inning relief pitchers. The ETAs listed generally correspond to the year a player has to be added to the 40-man roster to avoid being made eligible for the Rule 5 draft. Manual adjustments are made where they seem appropriate, but we use that as a rule of thumb.

A quick overview of what FV (Future Value) means can be found here. A much deeper overview can be found here.

All of the ranked prospects below also appear on The Board, a resource the site offers featuring sortable scouting information for every organization. It has more details (and updated TrackMan data from various sources) than this article and integrates every team’s list so readers can compare prospects across farm systems. It can be found here. Read the rest of this entry »

Deaths don’t actually come in threes—unfortunately, there are many more than that—but Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley begin by marking the passings of a trio of notable figures: David Lynch, Bob Uecker, and Tommy Brown. Then (35:27) they talk about the maybe-momentous signing of a Japanese player not named Roki Sasaki (Shotaro Morii), follow up on previous conversations about “breakout” creep, answer a couple of questions about breakouts, and then respond to listener emails on other topics, including nicknames for pitches, the evolving meaning of “moneyball,” phasing out Hall of Famers, and a modification to the infield fly rule.

Audio intro: Gabriel-Ernest, “Effectively Wild Theme”
Audio outro: Ian Phillips, “Effectively Wild Theme”

Link to Lynch NYT obit
Link to Uecker NYT obit
Link to Uecker acting roles
Link to Brown NYT obit
Link to Brown AP obit
Link to Brown SABR bio
Link to Brown text interview
Link to Brown audio interview
Link to MLBTR on Brown
Link to 1940s clippings on Brown
Link to Ben’s Brown Twitter thread
Link to The Athletic on Morii
Link to Silver on breakouts
Link to skeuomorph wiki
Link to Detroiters on Netflix
Link to Ben on Detroiters
Link to Baker on LinkedIn
Link to infield fly play
Link to Strike Four
Link to listener emails database
Link to grumkins wiki
Link to EW gift subscriptions

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Do me favor. Don’t imagine trading Mookie Betts. Who would do that, anyway? Instead, imagine Mookie Betts trading Mookie Betts. That is to say, imagine Mookie Betts deciding to trade the current version of himself for a younger version of himself. Most of us would make that trade in a second – my younger self had so much hair and was already reading at a fifth-grade level! – but why would Mookie Betts make that trade? Coming into 2024, he had just put up a seven-win season while running a 166 wRC+, the second-best batting line of what should end up as a Hall of Fame career. That’s the ideal self, right there. No trades necessary.

From afar, Betts’s 2024 season was of a piece with the ones that preceded it. He put up his eighth-career 4-WAR season and ran a 141 wRC+, almost exactly in line with his career mark. But look at this:

Go ahead and ignore the short 2020 season, when Betts posted a low pull rate. All the numbers go up toward the second half of the graph before dipping back down in 2024. In a couple of major ways, Betts looked a lot less like what we’ve seen in this decade, and a lot more like what we saw back in the first few seasons of his career. He went back to striking out less, pulling the ball less, and hitting the ball significantly softer. In case that graph isn’t clear to you, let me show you the same numbers, this time split up into three chunks: 2014 through 2017, 2018 through 2023, and then just the 2024 season.

See the chunks? If those three metrics — Betts’ strikeout rate, hard-hit rate, and pull rate — are ringing some bells, it’s probably because I wrote about them back in May. At the time, I noticed that pitchers were doing their absolute best to pitch Betts away, away, away. Well, that trend continued throughout the season, and it certainly seems possible that it explains a lot of these numbers. Continuing with our theme, let’s take this in chunks. We’ll talk about the strikeout rate first because it’s the least dramatic.

Betts has never been anything but excellent at avoiding strikeouts. However, he had an 11% strikeout rate in 2024, and even by his own ridiculous standards, that was something. It was tied for the best mark of his career, it represented a nearly 30% drop-off from his 2023 rate, and it put him in the 98th percentile of all major league hitters. The thing is, his plate discipline didn’t change all that dramatically. He saw fewer pitches in the zone, which is a good way to avoid strikeouts, but he also had one of the higher chase rates of his career. The big difference was that he swung more often on the first pitch and he recorded one of the highest contact rates of his career. That’s a little odd, because chasing more normally leads to whiffing more. However, seeing more outside pitches could lead to more contact, as the ideal contact point for an outside pitch is further behind home plate, which gives the batter more time to react. As I mentioned, all of these numbers were within Betts’ career norms, but between the aggression, especially on the first pitch, and the higher chase rate, it seems safe to say that Betts was looking to put the ball in play a bit more often.

At the same time, Betts’ contact quality took an enormous dip. His hard-hit rate fell from 48.5% in 2023 all the way to 39.5%. That still left him fairly close to the league average, but it was one of the biggest drops in baseball, and the underlying numbers are even uglier. Betts’ 90th percentile exit velocity and his best speed (which throws out the weakest 50% of batted balls and then takes the average of the remaining 50%) represented career lows. The 90th percentile mark put him in the 27th percentile. This is not the direction in which you want to be trending.

As I noted back in May, Betts adjusted to the outside pitches by setting up closer to the plate. That can make it difficult to hit the inside pitch with authority, because you have less time to turn on it, but Betts’ contact quality was down across the board. Here’s his hard-hit rate on pitches in the zone:

The inner third definitely saw the biggest drop-off, but his hard-hit rate was down on pitches out over the plate too. That brings us to our third and final chunk. Betts ran a 34.3% pull rate, the lowest of his career and at least 10 percentage points lower than his rate in each of the three previous seasons. Here are spray heat maps for 2023 and 2024. Everything’s shifting away from left field and toward right field. It’s also shifting away from deep fly balls.

Betts has never been the strongest player in the league, but he’s always hit the ball hard, and he transformed himself into one of the game’s true masters at turning on the inside pitch and ripping it down the line or over the fence. In 2024, however, he traded that super power for the ability to spray line drives to all fields. It certainly seems like this was a response to the way he was being pitched. After all, it’s pretty hard to yank a pitch on the outside corner down the left field line. And if you’re not seeing pitches that you can yank to the pull side, then it no longer makes sense to build your whole approach around that goal.

I don’t want to overreact to a single season, let alone one in which Betts produced his typical fantastic offensive numbers — especially considering that Betts missed nearly two months with a fractured hand. This is one of those times when I really wish we had bat tracking data stretching back over the last several years. Betts had an average bat speed of 69.1 mph in 2024, which put him in just the 14th percentile, and I wish there were a way to know whether that was a big drop-off from previous seasons. He turned 32 last year, and just Tuesday, Tom Tango published an aging curve that makes it look like there’s a dramatic bat speed drop-off starting at 32. If you look at Betts’ spray charts and his contact rates, you get the sense that he just reworked his approach in order to make the most of the pitches he was seeing. However, the exit velocity numbers are such an extreme departure from his previous seasons. To some degree, they’re probably a symptom of that larger adjustment, but Betts’ bat may just be slower than it used to be.

11:44

Dan Szymborski: Umm, it seems to have started already, so I’ll be back here in 16 minutes.

12:01

Dan Szymborski: OK, NOW we’re starting for real!

12:02

Dan Szymborski: ZiPS has him at a 3.14 ERA/3.09 FIP, ERA+ 131 with a billion strikeouts in 57 IP in NY

12:03

Dan Szymborski: Things that you have done.

Read the rest of this entry »

Earlier this week, I threw some numbers together on the value of productive outs. I focused on Corbin Carroll, and rightly so: His electric skill set is a perfect entry point for explaining how hitters can add (or subtract) value relative to average even when making an out. Putting the ball in play? We love it. Avoiding double plays? We love that too. The Diamondbacks are a team full of speedsters, and Carroll’s productive outs gave their baserunners a chance to show off their wheels.

A quick refresher: I calculated the difference in run scoring expectation between the average out and a specific type of out (strikeout, air out, non-GIDP groundout, double play) for each base/out state. Then I had a computer program tag each out made in 2024 with that difference. For example, the average out made with a runner on second and no outs cost teams 0.35 runs of scoring expectation in 2024. Groundouts in that situation only cost 0.25 runs, a difference of 0.1 runs.

Thus, on every groundout that occurred with a runner on second and no out, I had the computer note ‘plus 0.1’ for the “productive out” value. A strikeout in that situation, on the other hand, lowered scoring expectancy by 0.43 runs, a difference from average of -.09 runs. So the computer noted ‘minus 0.09’ for every strikeout with a runner on second and no out. Do this for every combination of base/out state and out type, add it all up, and you can work out the total value of a player’s productive outs. Read the rest of this entry »

Good swing decisions are vital to a hitter’s success. Having a finely tuned stroke is important — swing mechanics are diligently honed for a reason — but the ability to consistently attack the right pitches is every bit as valuable. Avoiding chasing while keying in on offerings you can drive greatly enhances your chances of squaring up a baseball.

Dillon Lawson, the new assistant hitting coach of the Boston Red Sox, is a huge proponent of a disciplined approach. The Louisville, Kentucky native views the optimization of swing decisions as an integral part of his job — one that now includes working alongside co-assistant hitting coach Ben Rosenthal and lead hitting coach Peter Fatse.

Prior to joining the Red Sox organization last year as its minor league hitting coordinator, the 39-year-old Lawson spent parts of five seasons with the New York Yankees, first as their minor league hitting coordinator from 2019-2021 and then as their major league hitting coach from 2022 until July 2023. He also tutored minor leaguer hitters for two seasons in the Houston Astros organization, in 2016 and 2018.

Lawson sat down to talk hitting at Fenway Park last weekend.

———

David Laurila: There are swing coaches and there are more traditional hitting coaches. Where do you fit into that dynamic?

Dillon Lawson: “Whether it’s what I feel is right, or it’s just a sense of pride, I think we’re all trying to be the best hitting coaches we could possibly be. That means you’re able to help players in whatever way they need to be helped. Sometimes that’s with an approach. Sometimes it’s with confidence. Sometimes it’s a swing change, whether that’s with the load or the path. Some people need more power. Other people need more contact.

“In the minor leagues, with the whole department… let’s say you’ve got 10 hitting coaches all pushing the same direction, trying to help a large group of hitters. Then, here with Boston — same with the Yankees — a group of three [at the big league level] is nice, because the better the player is, the more difficult it is to get them just a half a percent better. Sometimes you have to get creative. Sometimes you have to dig deep into your toolkit. When you have the group all working together, working well together, you can help players more quickly.”

Laurila: Is the swing overemphasized in today’s game? Read the rest of this entry »

After a fairly brisk start, the pace of free agency has bogged down in the new year. The clog in the pipeline is Pete Alonso, the burly first baseman late of the New York Mets. Alonso’s free agent case fascinates me, as he represents a possibly rare intersection of fame and scarcity of skill, making him especially difficult to put a value on.

Given Alonso’s popularity in New York, the shortness of the Mets’ lineup even after signing Juan Soto, and the fact that owner Steve Cohen is so rich the Sumerians might not have invented currency if they’d known he was going to come along, a reunion makes a certain amount of sense. Read the rest of this entry »

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2025 Hall of Fame ballot. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

Like Sara Lee, nobody doesn’t like Curtis Granderson. A power-hitting center fielder who reached the 20-homer plateau 10 times, with a high of 43, he was a threat to steal a base during the first decade of his major league career as well. He made three All-Star teams and had a knack for turning up on winners, starting (and starring) for six teams that made the playoffs, including two that reached the World Series, while reaching the postseason twice as a reserve acquired for the stretch run. His penchant for strikeouts made him a somewhat streaky performer, but he earned a reputation within the game for being even-keeled, thoughtful, hard working, and generous — a clubhouse leader and a favorite of teammates, fans, and media. At a time when African-American participation in baseball was (and still is) on the wane, he wore his socks high every day as a tribute to Negro Leagues players, and channeled his charitable efforts towards increasing Black participation in the sport, an effort that has carried over into his retirement. Read the rest of this entry »