Postseason Manager Report Cards: Craig Counsell and Don Mattingly

Ben Clemens’ managerial report cards have become a postseason staple here at FanGraphs. We’re continuing the tradition this year, while expanding the pool of writers who’ll contribute, and I’ll be stepping in with grades for the abbreviated Wild Card Series. Since I’m only going over two or three games per manager, these will be briefer than the report cards for the managers who are eliminated from the playoffs in later rounds. We’ll start with the two eliminated National League managers today, and then get into Joe Espada’s and Chad Tracy’s decisions in a couple of days.
Like Ben, I care about process and not results here. It’s easy to say “that was a great move because it worked” or “that was a bad move because it failed,” but managers obviously can’t know the result of their decision as they’re making it. I’ve tried my best to transport myself back to the moment of each decision — taking into account the pitches, innings, and plate appearances that led up to it — while ignoring the outcomes.
Before we get into it, I’ll caution that while these are ostensibly manager report cards, there’s a much larger group of people behind the manager that helps to inform his decisions. Before the game, that includes discussions with the front office, which provides the reams of data that every manager has at his disposal during play; in-game, he’s getting feedback from his coaching staff and players on their levels of health and readiness. It really does take a village to get through a baseball game, and realistically, the praise and scorn doesn’t belong to the manager alone.
And now, away we go.
Craig Counsell
Batting: Incomplete
I was going to give Craig Counsell an A here because the moves he did make were perfectly fine, but that’s giving him far too much credit for three pinch-hitting decisions. The Cubs didn’t hit well this series, through no fault of Counsell’s own, and they have a pretty plug-and-play lineup that became even more rigid after Alex Bregman’s facial fractures limited him to DHing during the team’s anemic offensive showing.
The lineup mirrored the one that had made the Cubs successful basically all season, and the three pinch-hit opportunities Counsell did pull the trigger on were obvious platoon-advantage layups. In Game 1, he hit Michael Conforto (113 wRC+ against righties this season) for catcher Carson Kelly (84) down by eight runs; at that point, leaving Kelly in wouldn’t really have mattered anyway. In Game 2, Tyrone Taylor and his 153 wRC+ against southpaws hit for Michael Busch (who had a still-solid 117 wRC+ against lefties this year) against extremely tough lefty Adrian Morejon; Conforto was used again to hit for Matt Shaw against ninth-inning demigod Mason Miller. Shaw had just 90 plate appearances against righties this year and was 21% below league average by wRC+.
Pitching: C
Normally, I really enjoy watching Counsell manage a pitching staff in the postseason. He’s aggressive. Roles and innings go out the window, and the idea that a starter has to go at least a time or two through the order is nowhere to be found. But I really didn’t see that level of urgency in this series. In Game 1, Matthew Boyd was shaky from literally the first pitch, a changeup that Fernando Tatis Jr. deposited over the center field wall. It didn’t get any better after that; he gave up another homer on another changeup to Manny Machado two batters later. I wouldn’t have necessarily gotten the bullpen up at that point, but I certainly would not have given Boyd the rope to go through the order almost a full second time before pulling him after 17 batters.
Game 2 was a similar story, with Kevin Gausman laboring through the second inning after a strong first. He clearly lacked the higher-end velocity that I thought might show up with the adrenaline of the playoffs but (unfortunately for the Cubs) never did. That created a tighter velocity band between his fastball and splitter, and his whiff rate was a rather mediocre 23%. And yet, he too was permitted to face the top of the order for a second time.
Perhaps Counsell’s reticence to call for a reliever was due to the bullpen’s personnel. The Cubs pitching staff was injury-ravaged the entire season and came into the playoffs without a closer; trade deadline acquisition Ryan Zeferjahn didn’t stabilize the bullpen as hoped, taking a step back after his acquisition from the Angels. But the Cubs had length options in spades, namely David Peterson, Aaron Civale, Shota Imanaga, and Clay Holmes. Imanaga or Holmes may well have been earmarked to start a potential Game 3, but the other options were underutilized. Pairing the righty Civale with the lefty Boyd, or the lefty Peterson with the righty Gausman, and more aggressively managing the starters would have created more inflection points for opposing manager Craig Stammen to have to sort through as he thought about deploying his bench.
Instead, the shaky starters were pushed too far, leading to Game 1 being all but decided by the time Javier Assad was first out of the bullpen, while Daniel Palencia was forced into a dirty inning in Game 2.
Don Mattingly
Batting: B+
The Phillies lineup limped down the stretch, almost blowing the team’s playoff spot in the process. To add injury to insult, Luis Arraez’s badly sprained ankle kept him off the Wild Card roster entirely. That left Don Mattingly with a restricted bench and a handcuffed set of in-game options, not to mention a somewhat makeshift starting lineup. Shielding Brandon Marsh and Justin Crawford from lefties almost entirely in favor of Derek Hill and Bryan De La Cruz made sense, and considering the tools he had at his disposal, I have no qualms with how Mattingly handled his in-game platooning.
Ultimately, I bumped Mattingly down just a hair here for sticking with Trea Turner in the leadoff spot, as he did for the last few games of the regular season while the Phillies were spiraling. I know that a single lineup spot in a handful of games doesn’t actually matter that much, but having a struggling batter guaranteed to get as many or more plate appearances as anyone else on the team still doesn’t sit quite right with me. Additionally, having Kyle Schwarber and Bryce Harper hit back-to-back (with Bryson Stott just two spots later) created an obvious pocket for Walt Weiss to deploy southpaw Dylan Lee, and even Chris Sale, out of the bullpen. For as bad as Turner’s struggles had been, having a righty amidst the two big lefties may have given Weiss just a little bit more pause when making pitching changes.
Pitching: D+
Like Counsell, Mattingly didn’t have a whole lot to work with here. Jesús Luzardo, Cristopher Sánchez, and Zack Wheeler are awesome. Beyond that, well… it seemed like Jhoan Duran was the only reliever Mattingly thought he could truly trust, and he used him like it in Game 1.
Duran came in to start the seventh inning with the Phillies ahead by a run and Atlanta’s 9-1-2 hitters due up. If things went perfectly, Drake Baldwin and Ronald Acuña Jr.’s last plate appearances — in a Phillies win — would come against Duran in that inning, with Matt Olson looming. With that in mind, I fully endorse using Duran in that spot — and sending him back out for the eighth — with the information Mattingly had at the time. Your best reliever has to face the meat of the lineup and not whoever is due to hit with three outs left in the game. Starting Duran with the nine spot and a clean inning rather than going batter-to-batter with Alex McFarlane or another reliever was perfectly sensical considering Duran’s regular season usage, which almost invariably started with nobody on base.
We have no way of knowing if Duran would have gone three innings and taken it to the house had Austin Riley not taken him deep in the eighth, but there weren’t obvious warning signs showing that he shouldn’t have been allowed to face Riley. Riley was coming off a horrible regular season, and his three-run homer was set up by a well-placed but poorly-hit groundball by Michael Harris II and a yanked knuckle-curve Ozzie Albies hit-by-pitch, this after having secured two outs on three pitches. One poorly-placed fastball doesn’t make leaving Duran in a bad decision; it’s not as if he had thrown 40 pitches and was clearly tiring.
The crushing Game 1 loss left the Phillies with their backs against the wall and Duran unavailable after 27 pitches and nine batters, and considering Donnie Baseball’s hands were tied even more, I thought he mostly did a passable job with his choices in Game 2. If I had been in Mattingly’s shoes, I would have pulled Sánchez immediately after a Baldwin RBI double gave the Braves the lead in the seventh rather than intentionally walking Albies to set up a platoon-advantaged matchup of a gassed Sánchez facing Matt Olson. As the manager there, I’d much prefer a fresher McFarlane against the worse bat of Albies than Sánchez against Olson for a fourth time; that non-move was overly deferential to left-on-left and living and dying with your ace rather than recognizing how little Sánchez had left.
Mattingly and pitching coach Caleb Cotham redeemed themselves to some extent by recognizing that with Duran unavailable, Andrew Painter was the best option out of the bullpen for the eighth and beyond. Sending Painter back out there for the 10th and ultimately letting him face Riley and Harris a second time later in the inning was not without risk, but Painter’s velocity and stuff held, and again, who else did the Phillies really have at that point?
If the series had ended after two games, I’d give Mattingly a solid B or B+ for his moves. But Game 3 was so baffling in its entirety that I tanked his grade a full two letters. The decision to start Aaron Nola over Wheeler frankly defied logic in its reasoning. Nola purportedly got the nod because he was the more rested of the two, with the NBC broadcast also noting that the Phillies thought Wheeler profiled better in relief. But the sequencing of pitcher usage should prioritize the best pitcher, not the guy who’s the most-rested or has the best relief profile. Plus, Wheeler ultimately proved he could be stretched to four innings and 68 pitches — he didn’t exactly turn in a traditional relief outing. (I know, I said I would operate based on the information known to the managers at the time and not what ended up happening, but Wheeler’s eventual workload shows that he had a good amount in the tank, which the Phillies would have been aware of before the game.)
Regardless of how much he had to give, Wheeler having anything at all meant he should have started the game; it guaranteed that his outing would start with the Phillies tied or ahead, not when the club was already playing catch-up. To be clear, Nola was almost surely going to have to pitch at some point in the game — the Phillies put themselves in this mess by taking so long to clinch that Wheeler had to pitch the last game of the season, and he was on short rest in Game 3 — but using him as the opening salvo was the wrong move.
Mattingly was sufficiently aggressive in pulling Nola for Tim Mayza after nine batters faced, though while I’m picking nits, I’ll say I would have brought Mayza (or José Alvarado) in for Dominic Smith in the nine spot rather than have Nola face him. Weiss had been aggressive with pinch-hitting with his down-lineup hitters to that point in the series, and it would’ve been worth finding out if he’d go to his bench early and take one of his weapons for later in the game off the board. Even if Weiss had countered, I’d rather have had a lefty reliever against a righty than Nola against a lefty, as shaky as he had looked to that point.
From there, I can’t quibble with much. Wheeler gave what he could and Duran’s availability was evidently limited to a single inning, with Jonathan Bowlan filling the space between the two arms. Bowlan was a fine choice down by three runs, with McFarlane having pitched the prior two games and presumably available but potentially considerably less sharp. Luzardo was reportedly available for an inning or two despite starting Game 1 and throwing 77 pitches coming back from shoulder inflammation, but I’m okay with not using him as a Hail Mary at that point in the game. Perhaps Wheeler or Duran could’ve instead been stretched to cover the gap that Bowlan filled, but at that point the Phillies were chasing runs, and I’ll give the benefit of the doubt to Mattingly and Cotham for knowing their pitchers’ limits better than I do. The decision to start Nola ultimately had the team playing from behind and using its best arms while trailing, not exactly an unforeseeable outcome.










