Last week, the consequences of Houston’s sign-stealing scandal became clear after commissioner Rob Manfred announced the results of MLB’s investigation into the team’s “banging scheme” and use of replay review to electronically steal signs. By the end of the week, Houston’s field manager and general manager had been fired, and the collateral damage from that investigation led to two more managerial dismissals around the league. While the league-administered discipline for non-Houston personnel is still pending, everyone named in the report has been fired.

Now that Houston has been punished, Manfred will turn his attention to the Red Sox, who are under investigation for illegally using the replay room in their own sign-stealing system. Boston’s scheme wasn’t nearly as elaborate as the one used in Houston. Per a report from Ken Rosenthal and Evan Drellich in The Athletic:

Three people who were with the Red Sox during their 108-win 2018 season told The Athletic that during that regular season, at least some players visited the video replay room during games to learn the sign sequence opponents were using. The replay room is just steps from the home dugout at Fenway Park, through the same doors that lead to the batting cage. Every team’s replay staff travels to road games, making the system viable in other parks as well… The Red Sox’s system was possible only when a runner was on second base, or sometimes even on first base. Nonetheless, a team that is able to discern that information live, during a game, and relay it to base runners has a distinct advantage. A runner at second base can stare in at a flurry of catcher’s signs and know which one matters, then inform the hitter accordingly.

Rather than a using a trash can, the Red Sox decoded signs sequences in the video replay room and conveyed that information to the dugout. Once everyone knew the sign sequence, any runner on second base could communicate the signs to the batter via subtle movements or gestures.

The Red Sox will almost certainly face some sort of discipline, especially since they’re repeat offenders: In September 2017, both the Red Sox and Yankees received what now looks like a slap on the wrist for using electronic means to steal signs — on that occasion, using smart watches to communicate between members of the coaching staff and club personnel. Alex Cora obviously wasn’t part of the organization the first time the Red Sox were caught, but he was likely involved this time around. Cora and the Red Sox have already “mutually agreed to part ways,” but that won’t stop MLB from handing down some sort of suspension on top of the penalties it levies on the team.

From an on-field perspective, the limitations of the Red Sox system are immediately apparent. The system only works if there’s a runner on base to see the signs the catchers puts down. The threat of runners stealing signs from second base has always been a part of game — it’s the reason a different sign sequence is used once a runner reaches base — but decoding the sequence using video replay cuts out that gamesmanship.

As I was with the Astros, I was interested in seeing if we could decipher just how much the Red Sox benefited from their own sign-stealing system.

Back in November, I estimated the Astros cumulatively gained around five wins from their banging scheme. Would Boston’s less sophisticated system result in a similar cumulative benefit or would the constraints of requiring a runner to be on second base limit the net effect? The answer might seem obvious, but based on the reports, the Red Sox were able to use their system both at home and on the road, while the Astros were limited to using their cameras at home. That alone increases the sample size for the Red Sox to about half of the total pitches the Astros saw at home in 2017.

A simple look at the Red Sox’s wOBA with a runner on second reveals a big jump in performance in 2018:

At the surface-level, something seems amiss. The team’s improvement probably isn’t related to an upgraded roster, as it could have been with the Astros in 2017. Of the 11 batters who accumulated more than 200 plate appearances with the 2017 Red Sox, eight were back in 2018.

When we look at Boston’s plate discipline metrics with a runner on second, things look a bit murky:

As a team, with a man on second, the Red Sox chased pitches out of the zone far less often than in years prior but that didn’t necessarily translate to fewer swings and misses. And their contact rate on pitches in the zone actually fell from 2017 to 2018.

With that high-level look not very conclusive, let’s dive into the pitch-level data. As a refresher, I’m calculating run values for every pitch thrown using RE288 — the run expectancy based on the 24 base-out states and the 12 plate count states. When we filter and aggregate those run values, we can get a sense of how a team performed in particular situations, say, when a runner is on second base and they might be relaying the incoming pitch to the batter. To account for the different sample sizes, I scaled the run values to standardize the values per 100 pitches.

In 2018, the Red Sox saw a huge boost in performance when facing offspeed pitches with a runner on second base when compared to 2017, particularly when they swung at those pitches. They also saw a big improvement when swinging at fastballs. They saw smaller benefits when taking those two pitch types. It’s interesting that they didn’t see any improvement against breaking balls, though their improvement against the two other pitch types more than compensated.

What does the data show when we compare their 2018 performance with runners on second to their performance when there were runners on first or third but not on second?

Almost across the board, the Red Sox performed much better when there was a runner on second. And the biggest difference in performance was swinging at offspeed pitches like we saw above. In Rosenthal and Drellich’s initial report about the Red Sox sign-stealing scheme, there was some speculation that the signs could be stolen by a runner on first base. If that’s true, it doesn’t necessarily show up in the data. They clearly saw a benefit when there was specifically a runner on second.

Finally, let’s add their performance when the bases are empty to our analysis.

It’s clear that the Red Sox hit much better when there was a runner on second base. They simply crushed offspeed pitches and saw smaller benefits when facing breaking balls and fastballs. The obvious implication is that the team gained an advantage when a runner on second was able to relay the incoming pitch to the batter. When we compare their aggregate run values from 2017 to 2018, I estimate they gained a total cumulative value around five wins — the same estimated benefit the Astros saw with their sign-stealing scheme in 2017. And of course, that doesn’t completely account for the effects that are difficult to quantify, such as the cumulative benefit of requiring opposing pitchers to throw more pitches as hitters lay off of offspeed deliveries designed to entice a swing and a miss.

This isn’t the space to analyze how individual batters benefited from the system, particularly since no players were directly named in the report from Rosenthal and Drellich. I’d expect we’d see similar results to the Astros data though — marginal benefits for most individuals that add up to significant gains for the team. I was surprised to find that the total cumulative effect for Boston was on par with what I estimated for the Astros. It seemed like the limitations of Boston’s system would have resulted in a smaller effect. Perhaps the familiarity of receiving intel from a runner on second allowed Red Sox batters to effectively act on that information when presented; maybe it was hard for hitters to process information from a clanging trash can in the short time before they had to face an incoming pitch.

It appears that both sign-stealing ploys were similarly effective, which makes it’s clear that MLB needs to find a way to prevent teams from implementing these kind of schemes moving forward. Houston’s harsh punishment and the pending discipline for the Red Sox is one step, but the league needs to take more effective preventative measures. Further regulating who is allowed to use the replay room seems like a quick and simple fix that could be instituted as soon as this season. But as long as teams are looking for any and every small advantage and win-at-all-costs attitudes are promoted within organizational cultures, another controversy of this magnitude seems likely to happen again. Rather than react to that new disruption, MLB needs to be forward thinking, particularly as new technology affects how the game is viewed and played.

Triston Casas continues to grow, and not just developmentally on the field. The top prospect in the Red Sox farm system recently told a trio of reporters, yours truly included, that he’s put on 10 pounds of muscle, and gained nearly an inch in height, since the end of the season. Just a few days past his 20th birthday, the 2018 first-round pick is now 6’ 5″, 255.

Casas comes by his size naturally. Asked about his lineage, he explained that his father is “about the same size height-wise, but has put on a little weight and is bigger than me in terms of roundness.”

The hulking youngster is surprisingly agile and well-rounded for someone of his stature. While his long-term position will almost certainly be first base, Casas was drafted as a third baseman and has seen time at both infield corners since turning pro. His athleticism also makes him a candidate for left field.

His role model is a first baseman.

“I emulate Joey Votto as much as I can,” said Casas, who swings from the left side. “He’s my favorite player. I actually choke up on the bat from the first pitch. Every at bat. And with two strikes I’m 4-5 inches up the bat. If you’ve never seen me play, there are pictures with me way up the pine tar.”

There is also footage of the former Plantation, Florida prep propelling baseballs long distances. As Eric Longenhagen and Kiley McDaniel wrote in his prospect profile, Casas “participated in multiple home run derbies during his amateur summers, and posted gaudy exit velocities during team pre-draft workouts.” They placed a 65/70 on the young slugger’s raw-power grade. Read the rest of this entry »

Earlier this week, I asked our readers to rank the star players rumored to be on the trade block. I asked just two questions. The first asked readers to rank the players by how good they are right now. The second asked readers to rank the players by their trade value.

The first question proved to be an easy one, as 42% of the more than 2,500 responses had the exact same ranking.

Read the rest of this entry »

When the investigation into the Astros’ electronic sign-stealing operations concluded, Houston was hit hard, losing draft picks, dollars, and their general manager and manager. Jay Jaffe went over the penalties for FanGraphs, but Jeff Luhnow, AJ Hinch, and Brandon Taubman weren’t the only people mentioned in the report. New Mets manager Carlos Beltrán was identified as having substantial role in the so-called “banging scheme,” though given that he was a player at the time, he will not face suspension; whether the Mets will retain him as manager is still unclear. And Alex Cora’s name was littered throughout, with the former Astros bench coach identified as having played a prominent role in the team’s cheating scheme. While discipline wasn’t meted out to Cora in the Commissioner’s Monday memo, as he is also the subject of an investigation into more cheating while with Boston in 2018, a suspension is inevitable, and hoping to move forward quickly, the Red Sox and Cora, using language so euphemistic as to almost defy accuracy, “mutually agreed to part ways.”

As soon as the Astros investigation’s findings came out, Cora was as good as gone. From the Red Sox release:

“Today we met to discuss the Commissioner’s report related to the Houston Astros investigation. Given the findings and the Commissioner’s ruling, we collectively decided that it would not be possible for Alex to effectively lead the club going forward and we mutually agreed to part ways.”

As for those findings and that report, Cora’s name is mentioned five times in the Rules Violation section:

Early in the season, Alex Cora, the Astros’ Bench Coach, began to call the replay review room on the replay phone to obtain the sign information.

…

Cora arranged for a video room technician to install a monitor displaying the center field camera feed immediately outside of the Astros’ dugout.

…

Witnesses consistently describe this new scheme as player-driven, and with the exception of Cora, non-player staff, including individuals in the video replay review room, had no involvement in the banging scheme.

…

Rather, the 2017 scheme in which players banged on a trash can was, with the exception of Cora, player-driven and player-executed. The attempt by the Astros’ replay review room staff to decode signs using the center field camera was originated and executed by lower-level baseball operations employees working in conjunction with Astros players and Cora.

Read the rest of this entry »

A new avenue to pursue a competitive advantage, a gray area as to whether it’s considered cheating, a paper ban that goes unenforced, bad behavior spreading around the league through player movement, executives shocked — shocked! — that such behavior is happening on their teams, a commissioner sounding out of touch as he publicly downplays the severity of the problem, once-celebrated achievements now tainted… if the outlines of baseball’s current sign-stealing scandal sound familiar, it’s because they’ve followed a pattern similar to that of the performance-enhancing drug problem that enveloped the game in the 1990s and early 2000s. Of course, there are key differences between the two, but both found Major League Baseball well behind the curve and struggling both to catch up and regain credibility on the issue.

That thought came to mind on Tuesday, as the sign-stealing saga took a new turn when The Athletic’s Ken Rosenthal and Evan Drellich reported that in 2018, the Red Sox used their video replay room in an attempt to decipher opponents’ sign sequences, a practice that proliferated after instant replay reviews were introduced in 2014, one that was broadly prohibited but generally unenforced until 2018. Three members of the 2018 Red Sox told The Athletic that multiple teammates used the team’s video room, which was just a few steps from the home dugout, to break down opponents’ signs. Unlike the bang-on-a-trash-can system Rosenthal and Drellich reported the Astros having used in 2017, the Red Sox did not directly communicate to batters what pitch was coming, instead relaying that information through the dugout to the baserunner and then to the hitter.

While the efficacy of either system is still murky, both the Astros and Red Sox flouted the rules, and both went on to win the World Series in the year they did so, coincidentally beating the Dodgers. While rumors have circulated regarding other teams’ usage of replay rooms and other means to steal signs electronically, thus far the substantiated allegations have been limited to those two clubs, who share a common denominator: Alex Cora, who as bench coach of the Astros in 2017 is said to have played a key role in their sign-stealing system, and who left following that season to manage the Red Sox, a job he still holds. Read the rest of this entry »

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2020 Hall of Fame ballot. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

Given their propensity for injuries, even the best pitchers will break your hearts. The impact of so many hard throws takes its toll on the body, and no matter how talented, not every pitcher can survive long enough to build a resumé worthy of Hall of Fame consideration. In the latest installment of my completest series, two big righties who could dial it up to the high 90s with their fastballs teamed up at the outset of their careers to help the Marlins capture an unlikely championship, and while both excelled further, to the point of making multiple All-Star teams, the ups and downs of the job took their toll, sidelining both by their mid-30s.

Josh Beckett

At his best, when healthy, Josh Beckett was an All-Star, a Cy Young contender, and a championship-caliber pitcher who offset his high-90s heat with a filthy, knee-buckling curve. Indeed, he played a vital role on two World Series winners, first the upstart 2003 Marlins and then the ’07 Red Sox. Alas, injuries — particularly recurrent blisters and shoulder woes — limited him to just four seasons of at least 30 starts, and prevented him from reaching the heights expected of him. The grind of pitching was just too much for his body to stay in working order for two years in a row, and sometimes even for a full season; he developed a notable tendency to excel in odd-numbered years while struggling in even-numbered ones. But when he was good, he was very, very good. Read the rest of this entry »

The Red Sox signed a pair of former top prospects to modest deals at the end of last week: José Peraza, 25, to a one-year deal worth $3 million; and Martín Pérez, 28, to a one year, $6 million deal with a club option for a second year and $6.25 million. Those moves appear targeted to replace the already-departed Brock Holt and the perhaps-soon-be-departed David Price, respectively, on the roster at a significant savings in cost. (Price is signed for $96 million over the next three seasons, and the Red Sox are apparently bound and determined to stay under the $208 million luxury tax threshold next year.)

The Peraza signing is the easiest to evaluate fully now, without the benefit of a full offseason’s worth of moves to put it in context. Holt, who has yet to sign with a team this offseason but now seems unlikely to return to Boston, played seven positions for the Red Sox last year and put up a perfectly respectable 103 wRC+ while doing so. Peraza only played six positions in 2019 — and one of them involved two stunt appearances on the mound — but he’s six years younger, quite likely cheaper, and there’s still hope that he’ll look more like the hitter who posted a .331 wOBA with the Reds back in 2016 than the guy who posted a .272 last season.

If Peraza can bounce back at the plate, the Red Sox can retain his services through arbitration (and at relatively low cost) all the way through the 2022 season. If he can’t, the Sox can non-tender him next season (or sooner) and all it’ll cost them is $3 million. I have my doubts that’ll happen, though. Peraza’s seen ever-fewer pitches inside the zone each year since 2017, as pitchers learn they don’t need to challenge him to get him out, and he was absolutely awful against the slider last year in a way that doesn’t leave me confident he’s due for a bounce back. Still, stranger things have happened, and Holt wasn’t going to be a Boston lifer. Read the rest of this entry »

With the Red Sox trying to cut payroll and increase profits at the expense of the on-field product, it would make sense that the team might try to deal one of their most expensive players. David Price put up a very good season for the Red Sox in 2016 and helped the club win the World Series in 2018, but he made just 22 starts last year and began the offseason recovering from surgery on his wrist. When he did pitch this season, Price was effective, with a 3.62 FIP and 2.6 WAR despite just 107 innings, but the 34-year-old only threw 24 innings after the All-Star Break and his health is a huge question mark. Despite those concerns, Jeff Passan is reporting that teams are inquiring about the possibility of acquiring the left-hander.

The Boston Red Sox continue to pursue ways to shed salary, and multiple teams have targeted starter David Price, sources tell ESPN. He is owed $96 million over the next three years. Red Sox could either attach player with value or potentially pay down some of Price's remaining $.

— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) December 11, 2019

Given the present injury concerns, determining Price’s trade value is a bit difficult. Dan Szymborski provided the following ZiPS projections for Price over the next three seasons:

Read the rest of this entry »

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2020 Hall of Fame ballot. Originally written for the 2013 election at SI.com, it has been updated to reflect recent voting results as well as additional research. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule, and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

Roger Clemens has a reasonable claim as the greatest pitcher of all time. Cy Young, Christy Mathewson, Walter Johnson, and Grover Cleveland Alexander spent all or most of their careers in the dead-ball era, before the home run was a real threat, and pitched while the color line was still in effect, barring some of the game’s most talented players from participating. Sandy Koufax and Tom Seaver pitched when scoring levels were much lower and pitchers held a greater advantage. Koufax and 2015 inductees Randy Johnson and Pedro Martinez didn’t sustain their greatness for nearly as long. Greg Maddux didn’t dominate hitters to nearly the same extent.

Clemens, meanwhile, spent 24 years in the majors and racked up a record seven Cy Young awards, not to mention an MVP award. He won 354 games, led his leagues in the Triple Crown categories (wins, strikeouts, and ERA) a total of 16 times, and helped his teams to six pennants and a pair of world championships.

Alas, whatever claim “The Rocket” may have on such an exalted title is clouded by suspicions that he used performance-enhancing drugs. When those suspicions came to light in the Mitchell Report in 2007, Clemens took the otherwise unprecedented step of challenging the findings during a Congressional hearing, but nearly painted himself into a legal corner; he was subject to a high-profile trial for six counts of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements to Congress. After a mistrial in 2011, he was acquitted on all counts the following year. But despite the verdicts, the specter of PEDs won’t leave Clemens’ case anytime soon, even given that in March 2015, he settled the defamation lawsuit filed by former personal trainer Brian McNamee for an unspecified amount.

Amid the ongoing Hall of Fame-related debates over hitters connected to PEDs — most prominently Barry Bonds, Mark McGwire, and Sammy Sosa — it’s worth remembering that the chemical arms race involved pitchers as well, leveling the playing field a lot more than some critics of the aforementioned sluggers would admit. The voters certainly haven’t forgotten that when it comes to Clemens, whose share of the vote has approximated that of Bonds. Clemens debuted with 37.6% of the vote in 2013 and only in 2016 began making significant headway, climbing to 45.2% thanks largely to the Hall’s purge of voters more than 10 years removed from covering the game. Like Bonds, he surged above 50% — a historically significant marker towards future election — in 2017, benefiting from voters rethinking their positions in the wake of the election of Bud Selig. The former commissioner’s roles in the late-1980s collusion scandal and in presiding over the proliferation of PEDs within the game dwarf the impact of individual PED users and call into question the so-called “character clause.”

Clemens’ march towards Cooperstown has stalled somewhat in the two years since, as he’s added just 5.4% to reach 59.5%. Whether or not the open letter from Hall of Fame Vice Chairman Joe Morgan pleading with voters not to honor players connected to steroids had an impact, the end result is time run off the clock. He still has a shot at reaching 75% before his eligibility runs out in 2022, but like Bonds, needs to regain momentum.

Read the rest of this entry »

The Royals aren’t known for their analytics department. They have one, of course. It’s not as though the organization is the Flintstones while everyone else is the Jetsons. That said, they’re still viewed as being old-school. In the eyes of many, scouting still rules the roost in Kansas City.

Just how true is that perception? According to the team’s longtime general manager, it’s far less accurate than it once was. Which isn’t to say that Dayton Moore has cast aside his roots in an attempt to become something he’s not. What he’s done is adapt to the changing times.

“My background is my background,” Moore told me at last month’s GM Meetings. “I’m not going to be ashamed of that. I grew up in a very traditional way. I grew up as a coach. I grew up as a scout. But the game has changed since I came to Kansas City in 2006.”

Moore remembers meeting with, among others, saber-smart baseball scribe Bradford Doolittle. That “created a pathway to us developing an understanding of analytics.” He went on to hire Michael Groopman as a baseball operations assistant in 2008, then promote him to Director of Baseball Operations/Analytics in 2015. In Moore’s words, Groopman “came in and built our analytics program.” Read the rest of this entry »