Jay Jaffe FanGraphs Chat – 6/27/19

12:02
Avatar Jay Jaffe: Good afternoon folks, and welcome to another edition of my Thursday chat. I’m back from a (mostly) restful vacation on Cape Cod, and today I’ve got a deep dive into the soaring home run rates; I think we’ve reached the point of “Too Many Homers” https://blogs.fangraphs.com/weve-reached-the-point-of-too-many-homers/

12:03
I Won a Phone: How come FG on mobile is such a spammy wasteland?

12:04
Avatar Jay Jaffe: I have no idea because I never encounter this, as I get to sign into my account. I know that if you become a member, you get an ad-free annual membership (https://plus.fangraphs.com/product/fangraphs-membership/), and if your woes are happening even with that going on, well — we’ve got something that needs fixing.

12:04
Cove Dweller: Do you think that MadBum gets Jack Morris-like consideration for the Hall?

12:06
Avatar Jay Jaffe: I think he’s going to have to pitch well for a long time for that to happen, and right now, given that he’s staring a third straight season with fewer than 10 wins (yawn) in the face, with a set of peripherals that have generally been moving in the wrong direction for years, I have a hard time imagining him getting the bulk numbers on which to base such a case that would obviously play up given his postseason accomplishments.

12:06
Ryan: Hi Jay, thanks for the chat. When you’re looking at historical stats, how do you decide what date cutoffs to use? I’m looking at team records following a loss using baseball-reference data, and I was thinking only looking at seasons from 1900-present day would make sense- thoughts?

Read the rest of this entry »


What Mike Trout Proved in May

Here’s the picture that got me interested in what Mike Trout had been up to between the end of April and the beginning of May, 2019:

I thought a big red circle would be gauche, so I’ll write this out: Starting on April 19, the rate at which Trout saw sliders (as a percentage of all pitches seen, and as measured by Pitch Info) rose from 8.7% over the 15 games preceding that date to an astonishing 30.9% over the 15 games preceding May 11. That’s the highest such number ever observed during Trout’s eight-season career. No other period even comes close. Over the course of his career, in fact, Trout has seen sliders less than half as often (15.0%) as he did over that 15-game stretch at the beginning of May.

To some extent, this is a consequence of the schedule. Slider use is up league-wide again this year, to 18.4% from last year’s 16.9%, and from 13.7% just five years ago. Thus, my first theory of the case — the case, here, being why Trout was suddenly seeing so many more sliders than he ever had before — was that Trout had just run into a series of teams that happened to be at the leading end of the league-wide rush away from fastballs and toward sliders. In other words, that this was just a bit of random chance. Could happen to anyone. And indeed, the seven teams Trout’s Angels faced during the period from April 19 to May 11 are throwing more sliders than the league as a whole this season:

Trout Faced Slider-Happy Teams in Late April
Team Slider% in 2019
Royals (1st) 26.5%
Tigers (2nd) 22.6%
Yankees (5th) 21.4%
Astros (7th) 21.0%
Orioles (9th) 20.8%
Mariners (14th) 19.0%
Blue Jays (16th) 18.5%
Teams Trout Faced 21.4%
Teams Trout Didn’t Face 17.3%
Note: “Teams Trout Didn’t Face” doesn’t include the Angels, although it’s true that he didn’t face them. Major-league rank in slider percentage in parentheses.

Read the rest of this entry »


Effectively Wild Episode 1395: Trade Dreams and Low Seams

EWFI
In a bonus episode, Ben Lindbergh banters with FanGraphs writer Craig Edwards about Craig’s explanation for the struggles of José Ramírez, and then (11:15) Ben and Craig talk to John Bitzer, founder and editor of the new site Baseball Trade Values, about designing the trade-simulation site, the challenges of valuing players and constructing fair baseball trades, how he used real trades to refine his trade model, whether teams might scout for front-office talent via his site, how he accounts for changing team behavior, the outlook for the 2019 trade deadline, and more. Then (49:12) Ben brings on astrophysicist and contributor to The Athletic Dr. Meredith Wills to discuss her groundbreaking research into the construction of the baseball, the difficulty of disassembling the ball, why and how the 2019 ball is different from the 2018 ball, the multiple phases of home-run-happy balls, what MLB could do to suppress the home-run rate, solving home run mysteries with science, and more.

Audio intro: Matthew Sweet, "Trade Places"
Audio interstitial: The Inbreds, "Drag Us Down"
Audio outro: Stevie Nicks (Feat. Don Henley), "Leather and Lace"

Link to Craig on Ramírez
Link to Baseball Trade Values
Link to Ben on internet commenters trying to trade for Stanton
Link to Ben on internet commenters trying to trade for Price
Link to Meredith’s new research into the 2019 ball
Link to Meredith on lace thickness
Link to Ben on blisters
Link to Ben and Rob on the 2015 home-run spike
Link to Ben and Rob on the ball at midseason 2016
Link to write-up of Alan Nathan’s 2017 Saber Seminar presentation
Link to 2018 MLB-commissioned report
Link to Rob on decreased drag in early 2019
Link to Rob on decreased drag in Triple-A in 2019
Link to Manfred’s latest comments about the ball
Link to article about Lena Blackburne Baseball Rubbing Mud
Link to order The MVP Machine

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Pete Alonso Busted His Slump

In his rookie season, Pete Alonso has already hit 27 home runs, second in baseball behind Christian Yelich. He’s sporting a .281/.371/.634 slash line that’s created a 161 wRC+, which trails only Cody Bellinger, Mike Trout, and Yelich. Even after adjusting for defense, Alonso’s 3.3 WAR is seventh among all position players. With numbers like that, it might be difficult to believe that Alonso has already gone through a prolonged slump with just half the season finished. He has, though. Behold:

Peter Alonso’s Slump
PA HR BB% K% BABIP ISO wRC+
4/28-5/28 109 8 4.6% 31.2% .203 .303 95

Hitting like a slightly below-average player for a month might not be classified as a slump for most, but Alonso has been one of the most productive hitters in the game, and the middle-third of his season thus far is a departure from the rest of his numbers. I could have massaged the numbers to make them slightly worse by going from April 30 to May 25, but the above sample fits neatly as the middle third of Alonso’s season so far. Earlier this season when Alonso was doing very well, Ben Clemens discussed the good and bad aspects of the first baseman’s game, though Ben’s focus was on the good as Alonso was annihilating baseballs at the time:

The two parts of this article are the Pete Alonso experience in a nutshell. The quality of contact isn’t the question — when Alonso hits something, it goes a long way. The question is always going to be whether he can make enough contact to tap into his tremendous raw power. The early returns are promising, but they’re also confusing. Alonso can hit — not that there were many questions about that before — but he’s been a pure manifestation of 80-grade power this year. He’s also struck out 30% of the time, which is, you know, not great.

What we saw from Alonso for much of May was the troublesome aspect of his profile. He was swinging and missing a lot, and not drawing walks. He was hitting home runs, but he produced such a low batting average that his hitting line was below average. We could chalk the BABIP up to bad luck, but his expected numbers from Statcast weren’t much better than what he actually produced. For a first baseman with potential fielding issues, that profile is nearly unplayable on a contending team. Alonso was experiencing his first adjustment from pitchers, and for about a month, he adjusted poorly.

Here are Alonso’s plate discipline numbers from the first few months of the season:

Peter Alonso’s Plate Discipline Changes
O-Swing% Z-Swing% Swing% O-Contact% Z-Contact% Contact% Zone% F-Strike% SwStr%
3/28-4/27 33.0 % 63.4 % 44.8 % 58.8 % 83.1 % 72.1 % 38.8 % 59.6 % 12.5 %
4/28-5/28 38.6 % 69.8 % 49.5 % 68.9 % 83.7 % 76.2 % 35.1 % 56.9 % 11.8 %

Pitchers threw to Alonso more carefully and he responded in the worst way possible: swinging more. His O-Swing% numbers were already below average at the start of the season, and for a month, he got worse. In visual form, here’s Alonso’s swing percentage heatmaps from those periods:

Maybe those maps don’t look completely different, but look at the sections up and in, and low and away. On the left map from April, Alonso isn’t swinging frequently at those pitches, while in May, he offered at the same pitches more often. That he made contact more often on pitches out of the zone might have prevented even more strikeouts, but it also caused weaker contact when Alonso put the ball in play. At the height of his slump, he told Mike Puma of the New York Post about his need to focus on pitch location.

“If I am swinging at junk then they are going to keep throwing it,” he said. “If I am doing my job and swinging at strikes and taking borderline pitches or sitting on good pitchers’ pitches and being locked in on my zone then it is kind of rewarding if I get a quality pitch to hit, whether it be a breaking ball that’s over the middle of the plate or changeup over the middle or fastball.

“For me it doesn’t matter what type of pitch it is, I need something middle, because even if I expand the zone on a fastball then I am still going to get myself out or not get myself in a good count to do damage or help the team.”

Alonso identified and understood his weakness. Making a demonstrable change against the best pitchers in the world can be difficult. Here’s his swing map over roughly the last month:

That area down and in is still the place to throw it if you want to try to get it by Alonso, but he’s pretty clearly swung less in an effort to avoid chasing bad pitches. That up and in area, and the low and away area look even better than they did the first month of the season. The lack of swings on the outside of the zone isn’t an indication it is a safe place to throw there, though, as Cole Hamels recently found out:

This is what Alonso’s plate discipline numbers have looked like over the past month compared to the first two we saw above:

Peter Alonso’s Plate Discipline
O-Swing% Z-Swing% Swing% O-Contact% Z-Contact% Contact% Zone% F-Strike% SwStr%
3/28-4/27 33.0 % 63.4 % 44.8 % 58.8 % 83.1 % 72.1 % 38.8 % 59.6 % 12.5 %
4/28-5/28 38.6 % 69.8 % 49.5 % 68.9 % 83.7 % 76.2 % 35.1 % 56.9 % 11.8 %
5/29-6/25 29.8 % 59.9 % 39.9 % 66.3 % 84.1 % 75.3 % 33.7 % 59.7 % 9.9 %

I highlighted the O-Swing% and Zone% because those stats show the changes pitchers have made against Alonso and how Alonso has responded. Pitchers continue to hope Alonso chases, and are hopeful to avoid the strike zone. The Mets’ slugger initially responded with poor plate discipline but has since responded with fewer swings. As a result, Alonso has been better lately than he was in April when he took the league by storm:

Peter Alonso’s Big Month
PA HR BB% K% BABIP ISO wRC+
3/28-4/27 109 9 11.9% 27.5% .364 .372 182
4/28-5/28 109 8 4.6% 31.2% .203 .303 95
5/29-6/25 114 10 13.2% 17.5% .328 .394 204

Alonso has seen a massive decrease in his strikeout rate as pitchers have opted to avoid the strike zone. It’s possible his passivity could be exploited, but that’s a dangerous game given his ability to punish strikes. For good measure, here’s how his Statcast statistics during the same time periods measure up:

Peter Alonso’s Statcast Ranks
xwOBA MLB Rank (75 PA) xwOBACON MLB Rank (50 BB)
3/28-4/27 .407 18 .530 10
4/28-5/28 .336 107 .464 34
5/29-6/25 .472 2 .539 3
SOURCE: Baseball Savant

Since the end of May, only Mike Trout and Jorge Soler have been hitting the ball with more authority when contact is made. Factoring in walks and strikeouts, only Trout has exceeded Alonso by Statcast’s metrics over that span. Statcast’s numbers align with our own, as Mike Trout has a 227 wRC+ since May 29, with Alonso second to Trout with a 204 mark just besting Christian Yelich. He’s made some of my skepticism at his pace seem foolish, but at least I’m in good company along with a lot of the game’s best pitchers.


Job Posting: White Sox Baseball Operations Software Engineer and Analyst

Please note, this posting contains two positions.

Position: Baseball Operations Software Engineer

Location: Chicago, IL

Description:
The Chicago White Sox seek an experienced Software Engineer to join their baseball operations group. The engineer will be responsible for building and maintaining data driven systems with a focus on Baseball Analytics, however there will be additional exposure to all facets of baseball operations. This position will report to the Director of Baseball Analytics.

Responsibilities:

  • Develop data-driven web applications and reports to assist the White Sox front office with player evaluation, arbitration, scouting, and player development.
  • Manage the integration of new and existing data sources.
  • Provide operational support.

Requirements:

  • Degree in computer science, engineering, or similar field.
  • Technical proficiency in web development and scripting technologies such as HTML, PHP, AJAX, and JavaScript.
  • Object oriented development experience with Visual Studio and C#.
  • Strong UI design fundamentals, with examples of intuitive and flexible interfaces.
  • Knowledge of SQL Server or MySQL with the ability to write and optimize complex queries and stored procedures.
  • Experience working with large datasets.
  • Familiarity with advanced baseball metrics and research.
  • Strong communication and presentation skills.
  • Demonstrated high degree of integrity, professionalism, accountability, and discretion.
  • Ability to work flexible hours.

Preferred Qualifications:

  • Experience with ETL methodologies.
  • Experience presenting data with Tableau.
  • Experience performing advanced statistical analysis with analytical tools such as R, MatLab, or Python.
  • Advanced quantitative degree or published research.
  • Prior baseball playing or operations experience.

To Apply:
Please review the requirements above and send a resume/cover letter to ApplyAnalytics@chisox.com. Due to the large number of applicants, you may not receive a response.

Position: Baseball Analyst

Description:
The Chicago White Sox seek a passionate, knowledgeable, and dedicated individual with a desire to work in Baseball Operations. The position will focus primarily on the numerical methods that drive Baseball Analytics, however there will be additional exposure to all facets of baseball operations. This position will report to the Director of Baseball Analytics.

Responsibilities:

  • Create proprietary performance metrics and predictive models using regression and machine learning.
  • Develop data-driven applications and reports to assist the White Sox front office with player evaluation, arbitration, scouting, and player development.
  • Provide operational support.

Requirements:

  • Degree in computer science, mathematics, engineering, or similar field.
  • Experience performing advanced statistical analysis (regression, mixed models, machine learning) with analytical tools such as R, MatLab, or Python.
  • Knowledge of SQL Server or MySQL with the ability to write and optimize complex queries and stored procedures.
  • Experience working with large datasets.
  • Familiarity with advanced baseball metrics and research.
  • Strong communication and presentation skills.
  • Demonstrated high degree of integrity, professionalism, accountability, and discretion.
  • Ability to work flexible hours.

Preferred Qualifications:

  • Technical proficiency in web development and scripting technologies such as HTML, PHP, AJAX, JavaScript, Node.js, and Vue-js.
  • Object oriented development experience with Visual Studio and C#.
  • Knowledge and practice with ETL solutions and best practices.
  • Experience creating computer vision models with OpenCV or TensorFlow.
  • Experience presenting data with Tableau.
  • Advanced quantitative degree or published research.
  • Prior baseball playing or operations experience.

To Apply:
Please review the requirements above and send a resume/cover letter to ApplyAnalytics@chisox.com. Due to the large number of applicants, you may not receive a response.

The content in this posting was created and provided solely by the Chicago White Sox.


Effectively Wild Episode 1394: Hard Cora

EWFI
Ben Lindbergh and Sam Miller banter about whether the Red Sox pulling a pitcher in the middle of a plate appearance was an instance of “Strategy,” share a Stat Blast about whether the platoon advantage is more pronounced early or late in plate appearances, and discuss a pitch-framing flare-up between Tyler Flowers and Willson Contreras, then answer listener emails about how different baseball could be and still be baseball, whether moving the mound back would lead to many more hit batters, whether teams should be buying low on fly-ball pitchers and the future of MLB’s home-run rate, and whether the Astros or another team with a reputation for building better players could deke their rivals by expressing interest in trading for players they don’t actually want.

Audio intro: Golden Earring, "Desperately Trying to be Different"
Audio outro: Death Cab for Cutie, "No Room in Frame"

Link to Flowers vs. Contreras beef background
Link to video of Flowers-Contreras encounter
Link to Ben on Flowers
Link to Cooper on moving the mound back
Link to Rob on moving the mound back
Link to info on Ohtani’s throwing session
Link to order The MVP Machine

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 Email Us: podcast@fangraphs.com


The Next Man Up in the Rays ‘Pen

Since August 1, 2018, the Tampa Bay Rays have compiled the third best record in the majors, winning just over 60% of their games. Their pitching staff has been the stingiest in all of baseball during this period, allowing just 3.5 runs to score per game. Their rotation deserves a ton of credit, as their starting five— and openers —posted a league and park adjusted FIP 24% better than league average. But their bullpen, including their bulk pitchers, has been almost as effective, posting a league and park adjusted FIP 11% better than league average. That’s even more impressive when you consider the sheer number of innings their relievers have thrown due to their opener strategy.

Here’s a list of relievers who have thrown 20 or more innings for the Rays since the beginning of August last year, with bulk pitchers removed:

Rays Relievers, Aug 2018–June 2019
Player IP K% BB% ERA FIP gmLI
José Alvarado 43 1/3 37.9% 12.4% 2.70 1.91 1.70
Emilio Pagán 29 1/3 32.4% 7.2% 1.23 2.44 1.27
Adam Kolarek 53 16.7% 5.9% 3.40 3.36 1.25
Hunter Wood 31 1/3 17.3% 6.3% 2.87 3.78 0.82
Chaz Roe 38 1/3 26.3% 12.9% 4.23 4.14 1.38
Diego Castillo 48 27.7% 9.7% 3.38 4.26 1.49
Serigo Romo 20 28.2% 4.7% 5.40 4.61 1.53
(min. 20 IP)

Read the rest of this entry »


Mike Moustakas’ Subtle Adjustment

The last two offseasons have not been kind to Mike Moustakas.

After hitting a Royals franchise record 38 home runs in 2017, Moustakas went into free agency hoping to score a long-term deal. Months went by without a new contract. He was forced to settle in early March, taking a one-year, $6.5 million deal to return to Kansas City.

The Royals traded Moustakas to the Brewers midway through the 2018 season, ending his 12-year tenure with the organization. (Moustakas had been the Royals’ first round pick in 2007.) While he played well, his offensive production took a dip from the year prior. This was particularly true in the power department: Moustakas’ ISO fell from .249 to .208. He posted a 105 wRC+ and 2.4 WAR overall.

Due to improved defense, Moustakas was actually more valuable in 2018 than he was in 2017, but he faced similar issues in his attempt to procure a new contract. Again, Moustakas was forced to wait until late in the game to sign. A February 19 contract with the Brewers — a one-year, $10 million pact with a $7 million mutual option — to be the starting second baseman was the offer he ultimately accepted.

But now, after his second chilly free agency winter, Moustakas has stepped up his game, reaching a new level of offensive performance that we have not previously witnessed.

His numbers are better across the board. He’s already hit 22 home runs, just six shy of his 2018 season total. His 47-home run pace (per 650 PA) would result in a career-high. But in a larger sense, Moustakas has done more than just crank homers. He is getting on base at a higher rate and collecting more hits, many of which have been of the extra-base variety. His .390 wOBA would be a career-high, as would be his 140 wRC+. Moustakas has already produced 2.7 WAR, his highest total in four years and already the third-highest mark of his career. All of which is to say that Mike Moustakas has experienced an offensive surge, and I’m here to tell you why. Read the rest of this entry »


It’s Hard to Take the Rays’ Tale of Two Cities Seriously

At first glance, any plan for the Rays to split their home games between the Tampa Bay area and Montreal — the exploration of which was reported last week by ESPN’s Jeff Passan — seems like a cockamamie idea. At second and third glances, too, not only because of the numerous legal and logistical hurdles involved, and the specifics of how those will be overcome so lacking, but because the underlying premise is so flawed.

That aspect was underscored on Tuesday, when Rays principal owner Stuart Sternberg and team presidents Brian Auld and Matt Silverman held a press conference in St. Petersburg to discuss the plan. Let’s cut to the chase:

Anyone who has followed the past quarter-century or so of Major League Baseball ought to be able to see the problem instantly. A franchise that has otherwise proven itself to be highly resourceful and competitive over the past 12 seasons has nonetheless been unable to convince area taxpayers and public officials to fund a new ballpark to replace Tropicana Field, where their lease expires following the 2027 season. Said franchise now hopes not only to build a new ballpark in that region, but also one in Montreal, a city the Expos and MLB abandoned in 2004 after a similar failure. You don’t need an Excel spreadsheet to do the math: convincing two cities to build ballparks for roughly half a season of usage per year is in no way going to be easier than convincing one city to build a ballpark for a full season of use, particularly given that in both cases the public will be expected to bear the lion’s share of the cost while the team profits.

Likewise, convincing two fan bases who have historically shown themselves to be particularly resistant to attending games to make a similar investment while confronting the reality of what amounts to a half-season road trip seems farfetched, to say the least. Let us consider the attendance histories of both cities:

A Tale of Two Cities’ Attendance Woes
Team Seasons Top Half Bottom 3 Last
Montreal Expos (1969-2004) 36 7 16 8
Tampa Bay Rays (1998-2019) 22 1 18 14
SOURCE: Baseball-Reference
During the Expos’ existence, the NL had 12 teams from 1969-92, 14 from 1993-97, and 16 from 1998-2004. During the Rays’ existence, the AL had 14 teams from 1998-2012, and has had 15 since.

The Expos spent their first eight seasons (1969-76) in Jarry Park before moving to Stade Olympique (1977-2004). Aside from 1970, their second season of existence, all of the seasons when they ranked among the NL’s upper half in attendance occurred during the 1977-83 span, when Stade Olympique was new. It helped that their lineup featured three future Hall of Famers (Gary Carter, Andre Dawson, and Tim Raines) for most of that period, but even so, they never ranked higher than third in the league in attendance, and made the postseason only in 1981.* From 1986 onward, only once did they rank higher than 10th (ninth out of 12 teams in 1987), and in their final seven seasons, they were dead last out of 16 teams, cracking one million fans just once.

*One aspect I neglected to note when I first published this was the fact that the team was robbed of a potential postseason berth — and with it, the long-term impact upon attendance and revenue — in 1994, when they had the majors’ best record (74-40) before the strike it. The powerhouse squad was dismantled before play resumed in 1995; attendance dropped by 26% that year, and for the remainder of the Expos’ tenure, only once did they even average half as many fans per game as in 1994.

In their final two seasons, they played a total of 43 games at Estadio Hiram Bithorn in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Despite the park seating just 18,000, they averaged more fans there (14,222 in 2003, 10,334 in ’04), than at Stade Olympique, which in its post-1992 configuration could seat 45,757 (12,081 in 2003, 8,876 in ’04). As Jonah Keri — a Montreal native who coincidentally wrote a book about the Rays — recently wrote of the two-city arrangement, which would seem to be relevant here: “[I]t was still a split-the-baby approach that ultimately left no one happy, and did nothing to help the health of the team in its original city.”

While much of the blame for the latter-day Expos’ attendance woes falls upon owner Jeffrey Loria (who bought the team in 1999) and MLB (which assumed control of the franchise in 2002 while allowing Loria to purchase the Marlins), the underlying reality is that the team could not secure public funding for a new ballpark. Ultimately, the franchise moved to Washington, D.C. following the 2004 season and became the Nationals.

The Rays are now in their 22nd season at Tropicana Field, where only twice have they ranked higher than 10th in the AL in attendance. They ranked seventh out of 14 teams in 1998, their inaugural season, and ninth out of 14 in 2010. They have ranked last or second-to-last in every season since, and, despite winning 90 games last year and being on pace to improve upon that record this year, are currently on their way to their fifth straight season of ranking last among the AL’s 15 teams. The ballpark’s location in downtown St. Petersburg is a major problem, as it’s far from the area’s corporate base and wealthiest suburbs, with significant traffic congestion problems and a lack of sufficient mass transit service. As Keri noted, “Fewer people live within a 30-minute drive of Tropicana Field than any other stadium.”

The Rays have spent more than a decade trying to get another ballpark built in the Tampa-St. Petersburg vicinity, but have been unable to get a plan off the ground. They can’t escape their lease, which has commonly been described as iron-clad. Earlier this week, colleague Sheryl Ring delved into their use agreement’s “exclusive dealings” clause, which forbids the team from even negotiating to play elsewhere. She also noted a similarly restrictive memorandum of understanding that allowed the team only to seek new stadium sites in the two Florida counties that encompass the Tampa-St. Pete area, Pinellas and Hillsborough.

You may recall that at the 2018 Winter Meetings, Sternberg made a show of announcing that a plan to build a glitzy, $900 million new ballpark in the Tampa neighborhood of Ybor City had fallen through, with MLB commissioner Rob Manfred blasting Hillsborogh County’s lack of specifics (read “public funding”). That came near the end of the three-year window granted by the aforementioned MOU, which expired on December 31, 2018.

If the Rays’ attempt to sell a dual-city plan weren’t already underwater enough, St. Petersburg mayor Rick Kriseman handed ownership an anvil last week when he said, “I have no intention of bringing this idea to our city council to consider.” Without that, the Rays can’t get another MOU that would allow them to discuss any proposal with Montreal. In fact, there’s already an inquiry into whether Sternberg violated the lease agreement by discussing his plan with Montreal mogul Stephen Bronfman, son of former Expos owner Charles Bronfman and a prime mover in a group spearheading effort to return baseball to Montreal.

If the Rays were hoping to find high-level civic support elsewhere, Pinellas County Commissioner and 2021 St. Petersburg mayoral candidate Ken Welch said, “I am not open to funding a part-time stadium where our home team is shared with another city.” Meanwhile, former St. Petersburg mayor Bill Foster likened the two-city plan to the team wanting a wife and a mistress. Good times.

“I’m confident it’s an amazing idea,” said Sternberg on Tuesday while denying that this plan was part of “a staged exit,” or “a page out of a playbook to gain leverage.” His main selling point appears to be the fact that both new ballparks would be intimate, open-air venues with 30,000 or fewer seats, which would be less costly than building parks with retractable roofs, as in Arizona, Houston, Miami, Milwaukee, Seattle, and Toronto (the Trop is currently the only dome). According to Neil deMause, who has spent the past two decades chronicling MLB’s stadium shell game in his co-authored book Field of Schemes and a long-running blog of the same name, the “ballpark figure” for such a roof is an additional $200 million to $300 million, though “it depends what kind of roof, and how it affects the overall design.”

Secondarily, Sternberg claimed that such an arrangement will drive plenty of Canadian fans to the region, the kind of vaporous “economic impact” claim so common in stadium proposals. As FloridaPolitics.com’s Noah Pransky wrote:

In short, he suggested losing 41 home games a year — while also paying for a new Rays stadium — would pay for itself, as new Canadian tourists would come down to see their “home” team early in the season.

Back-of-the-napkin math on this suggests St. Pete would need tens — or even hundreds — of thousands of new Canadian tourists to make this work, which seems somewhat ridiculous, given that no Montreal fan is going to want to watch their team in Florida’s June humidity when they could wait three weeks and watch them up north in July.

You could also simply count all the empty seats at Blue Jays’ spring training games in Dunedin to know hundreds of thousands of fans aren’t coming down to watch their home team play baseball in Florida.

DeMause has his own debunking of Tuesday’s presser at Field of Schemes. His conclusion:

Whatever exactly Sternberg has in mind, this is clearly a long, long con, or if nothing else a way to kill time and build momentum for something while waiting out the remaining eight years of his lease. It’s transparently a classic non-threat threat — even Twitter noticed — but the question now becomes what the Rays owner plans to do with any leverage that he’s savvily created, especially considering he faces an opponent in St. Pete Mayor Rick Kriseman who isn’t afraid to sue to enforce the lease’s gag rule on stadium talks.

Of course, it’s always possible this non-threat threat is all Sternberg plans to do, in hopes that it will shake loose more stadium talks in Tampa Bay, given that he’s tried that move (albeit without the Montreal gambit) roughly a billion times before:

DeMause then linked to a tweet promoting this Pronsky article enumerating five separate occasions over the past decade in which Sternberg suggested the Rays’ future in the region was in doubt.

The one unplayed card Sternberg appears to have is that once the Trop is replaced, the team will receive 50% of the revenues that come from redeveloping the current site’s 86-acre footprint — but only if they remain in St. Petersburg. Any escape route from their current lease probably runs through that arrangement, with the Rays either forgoing some percentage of that revenue or paying the city a lump sum. Even if that happens, the obstacles to building two part-time ballparks remain, and it is difficult to imagine the Major League Baseball Players Association signing off on putting its constituents through the extra hassle. Even though players are well compensated relative to most Americans (and Canadians) — admittedly, less well compensated in the case of anyone in a Rays’ uniform — they and their families already lead lives that are bifurcated by the realities of the baseball season. Adding another temporary residence to that arrangement, particularly one in a foreign country, will be a tough sell.

Given all of the above, it hardly seems worth scratching the surface as far as the Montreal aspect of this plan, which surely has its own obstacles. While it would be wonderful to imagine major league baseball returning to the city, which would appear to be at or near the top of any short list of desirable expansion sites, it’s nearly impossible to believe that this is how it will happen. While Bronfman’s group has made progress towards a downtown ballpark, as Keri wrote, “It’s even harder to imagine the city, provincial, or federal governments kicking in a big chunk of the construction cost (which could easily approach or even exceed $1 billion Canadian) for partial seasons.”

Thus, the Rays’ plan makes for an interesting thought experiment, but that’s about it. Don’t hold your breath for this tale of two cities to end happily.


Zack Greinke, Junk Merchant

Zack Greinke shouldn’t still be this good. His fastball velocity has ticked down yet again; per Pitch Info, his four-seamer is averaging under 90 mph for the first time in his career. This isn’t a new phenomenon — his velocity has been in slow decline since his masterful 2015 season, when he posted a 1.66 ERA and finished second in Cy Young voting. These days, Greinke makes the news for shunning no-hitters and hitting like a position player more than he does for his pitching. Quietly, though, he’s having another superlative season, defying the slow ravages of time to amass a vintage stat line. His ERA and FIP are both lower than his career averages, which must be gratifying for someone who cares about his FIP more than perhaps any other active pitcher.

The way Greinke has adapted to aging is particularly interesting when compared to his former teammate, Clayton Kershaw, whose adaptations Ben Lindbergh recently chronicled. Kershaw was a singular marvel at his peak, and he remains so today. He’s always been predictable, and it hasn’t seemed to matter. When he was all-caps KERSHAW, he basically never threw a curveball when he was behind in the count. Hitters knew it, and it didn’t matter. Now, he’s throwing more pitches in the zone than ever on 0-0 before throwing fewer than ever in the zone after that. He’s still predictable, only in different ways.

Greinke, by contrast, was never as dogmatic as Kershaw. He’s thrown 62.5% fastballs when down in the count for his career, compared to Kershaw’s 72.8%. His first-pitch zone percentage this year, 52.3%, is actually below his career average, whereas Kershaw’s 61.3% rate is the highest of his career. Greinke has also always erred on the side of more pitches rather than fewer, throwing most of his pitches in any count and any location. Despite this difference in mindset, though, Greinke and Kershaw’s 2019s share two major themes: fewer fastballs, and using the count (and base/out state) to their advantage. Read the rest of this entry »