Much Ado About Luis Castillo’s Changeup

At some point in your baseball fandom, you’ll end up thinking about Schrödinger’s Baseball Player. The question posed by it is simple: When does a struggling hitter or pitcher stop existing as a superposition of states – either plain unlucky or genuinely worrisome – and become one or the other?

Consider the case of Luis Castillo. Like most, I initially ignored his first few bad starts. But now, about a quarter of the way into the season, the righty’s 7.71 ERA is the worst amongst all qualified starters. Though his peripherals are much better, including a relatively respectable 4.79 FIP, you have to imagine that something is off. Maybe we should open the box and find out what.

There are a couple of things to consider regarding Castillo, but let’s focus on his changeup. Improved command of it led to a breakout season in 2019, which he followed up with an excellent 2020. A pitch with incredible movement and a penchant for missing bats, it’s the foundation of his entire repertoire. In fact, even this season, hitters have only mustered a .254 xwOBA against it, which is obviously great. So what’s the hold up? Well:

Whiff per Swing rate, 2019-21
Year Whiff/Swing%
2019 47.8%
2020 40.1%
2021 26.2%
SOURCE: Baseball Savant

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Parsing a Pile of Confusing Data About Sliders

What’s the most important characteristic of a slider? Let me show you a table:

Slider Value by Location, 2020-21
Attack Zone Run Value RV/100 Pitches
Heart -138.9 -0.7
Shadow -785.0 -2.5
Chase 163.8 0.8
Waste 465.2 4.5

There are two things that might need explaining in here. The attack zones are Baseball Savant’s way of cutting the strike zone up into granular pieces, and I think they’re neat. They look like so:

Run values are from the batter’s perspective, so that -785 runs in the shadow zone means that batters have been 785 runs below average — what they’ve done on all pitches across the whole year — when they faced sliders in the shadow zone. In other words, sliders on the corners of the plate have been excellent — not really a shock.

What’s the most important characteristic of a slider, then? Well, allow me to show you a different table:

Slider Value by Speed, 2020-21
Velocity (mph) Run Value RV/100
87+ -149.3 -0.8
85-87 -80.6 -0.4
82-85 -43.8 -0.2
<82 37.2 0.2

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The Angels Reinforce Their Bullpen with Hunter Strickland

The Angels made a minor move to bolster their relief corps over the weekend, acquiring veteran reliever Hunter Strickland from the Rays. Strickland has been effective over the first six weeks of the season, with a 1.62 ERA and a 2.83 FIP in 16 innings for Tampa Bay. In return for his services, Los Angeles will give up either cash considerations or a player to be named later.

The Rays love reclamation projects, and Strickland was one of their latest, signing a minor-league deal with the team just before the start of spring training. It wasn’t Strickland’s first time. Once a rotation prospect with the Pirates — he was a Red Sox draftee picked up in the Adam LaRoche trade — he missed the 2011 season due to rotator cuff surgery and was waived by Pittsburgh after a disappointing 2012 season. The Giants moved him to the bullpen, and the big righty with big fastball looked like a future closer candidate. He also came equipped with a big temper, resulting in such incidents and playing the cavalry general for a bullpen charge into the Yasiel PuigMadison Bumgarner incident, yelling at Salvador Perez after an Omar Infante homer in the 2014 World Series, and intentionally hitting Bryce Harper in 2017.

That hot-headedness led to a broken hand that caused him to miss two months in 2018, the unsurprising result of punching a door after blowing a save, and the Giants non-tendered Strickland after that season.

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Daily Prospect Notes: 5/17/21

These are notes on prospects from lead prospect analyst Eric Longenhagen. Read previous installments here.

Wander Franco, SS, Tampa Bay Rays
Level & Affiliate: Triple-A Durham   Age: 20   Org Rank: 1 (1st overall)   FV: 80
Line:
4-for-5, 2B
Notes
Franco is now hitting .348/.404/.652 on the year and he’s doing it as a 20-year-old at Triple-A while playing flashy defense all over the infield (his bicep soreness, which caused him to leave winter ball, seems fine). This is a guy who hasn’t had so much as a dry spell as a player, no multi-week slump that needed to be busted in a superstitious, charitable, or ethically dubious way. He’s indomitable and so far is meeting the unprecedented expectations put upon him.

The “when will Wander Franco debut?” questions have already begun, as have the chat/social media queries about Vidal Bruján. Willy Adames is struggling (though he’s shown signs of life lately), but as I wrote on the Rays list, I think Taylor Walls is a better role replacement for Adames if Willy were to pull a hammy or something. Part of Adames’ roster fit is because of his excellent defense, which is one of Walls’ carrying tools. Franco is a cleaner fit in the role Joey Wendle plays. Bruján isn’t a polished defender anywhere and needs more reps in the outfield. Who of those three top 100 prospect debuts first and when likely depends more on the kind of situation the Rays find themselves in rather than the prospects themselves. Read the rest of this entry »


Ben Clemens FanGraphs Chat – 5/17/21

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The Dodgers’ Addition of Albert Pujols Didn’t Make Sense Until…

It’s always a strange thing to see an all-time great donning an unfamiliar uniform at the tail end of his career. Even if the sights of Willie Mays in Mets pinstripes or Hank Aaron wearing a Brewers pullover — to say nothing of Babe Ruth as a Brave — predate your time as a viewer, they probably produce a double-take. Examples such as Ken Griffey Jr. in White Sox garb, Mike Piazza in A’s green and gold (or Padres blue and sand), or Randy Johnson in Giants black and orange might be more recent, but those sights are no less alien. Which brings us to Albert Pujols of the Los Angeles Dodgers.

The 41-year-old Pujols, a future Hall of Famer who is one of four players to attain the dual milestones of 3,000 hits and 600 home runs, was designated for assignment by the Angels last week. Not surprisingly, given that he was hitting just .198/.250/.372 while still due the bulk of this year’s $30 million salary, he cleared waivers, thus sticking the Angels for the lion’s share of that amount. After clearing waivers, he reportedly drew interest from three or four teams, but while it was easy to spitball a few possible destinations — the Cardinals given his status as franchise icon, the Reds because they’d just lost Joey Votto to a broken thumb, the White Sox because they’re managed by Tony La Russa, the Marlins because they could use an attendance bump — nobody saw the Dodgers as contenders for his services. Yet on Saturday afternoon, the Los Angeles Times‘ Jorge Castillo reported that the defending champions had signed Pujols to a major league deal for the remainder of the season. They’ll pay him the minimum salary while the Angels pick up the rest of the tab.

In a vacuum, the move was something of a head scratcher, but the Dodgers are amid an incessant wave of injuries that on the offensive side had already claimed center fielder Cody Bellinger, superutilityman Zach McKinstry, and infielder Edwin Ríos, and kept growing over the weekend. On Friday, left fielder AJ Pollock reaggravated a left hamstring injury that had limited him to three plate appearances in a week, and on Saturday, just hours after the Pujols news broke, so too did the fifth metacarpal in Corey Seager’s right hand, via a pitch from the Marlins’ Ross Detwiler. Given all the moving parts among the Dodgers’ multiposition players, the injury opens up a lane for Pujols to get some playing time, but whether he can improve upon his meager production to date is another story. Read the rest of this entry »


FanGraphs Power Rankings: May 10–16

We’re now a quarter of the way through the season and the biggest storyline has been the remarkable parity throughout baseball. A few pre-season favorites have continued to disappoint and some early season surprises have proven they’re for real, but with the standings so bunched up, anything could still happen. No team is on pace to win more than 100 games right now, and there are a gaggle of teams sitting just below or just above .500. With more teams sitting on the bubble between holding fast and selling, it should make for a dramatic summer.

A quick refresher: my approach takes the three most important components of a team — their offense (wRC+), and their starting rotation and bullpen (50%/50% FIP- and RA9-) — and combines them to create an overall team quality metric. I add in a factor for “luck” — adjusting based on a team’s expected win-loss record — to produce a power ranking.

Tier 1 – The Best
Team Record “Luck” wRC+ SP- RP- Team Quality Playoff Odds Δ
White Sox 24-15 -2 115 80 91 175 ↗ 78.6% 0
Red Sox 25-17 -1 113 85 89 168 ↗ 53.6% 0

These two teams barely budged in the rankings this week. The White Sox crushed the Twins in a three-game series and then split a four-game set with the Royals that ended with a wild, walk-off win on Sunday. They now possess the best record in baseball backed by the best run differential in baseball. The concerns about how their offense and defense will perform without Luis Robert are still present — Billy Hamilton has been nearly as good in the field though definitely not with the bat. They’ll need to lean on their fantastic pitching staff even more to carry them through the season. Read the rest of this entry »


Kevin Goldstein FanGraphs Chat – 5/17/2021

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The Kumar Rocker Velocity Roller Coaster

The best word to describe how teams are approaching the 2021 draft might be “uneasy.” Teams lean hard on things like the Cape Cod League and summer high school showcases, which the industry lost in 2020 due to the pandemic. Track records of performance are hard to come by because of it (as well as other factors), and teams are desperate for anything resembling a sure thing.

Entering the season, Vanderbilt right-hander Kumar Rocker looked like one of these few sure things. A highly regarded prep arm out of Georgia in 2018, he might have slipped into the first round that year had he not made it abundantly clear that without an elite bonus offer, he had every intention of honoring his college commitment. He’s succeeded since arriving in Nashville, stepping right into the weekend rotation and throwing a no-hitter in Super Regional Play as a freshman. With athletic bloodlines and the much-desired combination of above-average stuff and command, Rocker entered the season as a strong candidate to be selected by the Pirates with the No. 1 pick come July.

He’s certainly held up his end on a performance level. Through 13 starts for the Commodores, he’s struck out 118 over 81 innings and allowed just 47 hits and 25 walks. But on a stuff level, it’s been a different story, as the average firmness of Rocker’s fastball has ranged by as much as six miles per hour on average from one start to the next. He is still expected to be a top-five pick at minimum, and that 1–1 slot is in play for him as well, but for teams looking for consistency, the varying fastball is a bit troubling. For teams looking for answer as to his ability to handle a pro workload, it’s even more so.

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Let’s Take Another Stab at Unpacking the Rising Strikeout Rate

If you are a regular FanGraphs reader, chances are that you’re aware of the rise in strikeouts across the majors. At this point, bemoaning the rise in strikeouts is an essential component of the baseball media apparatus. Every season is accompanied by pieces on the subject. I found this type of article going as far back as 2013, and they have been especially prevalent in recent seasons. It seems to be a rite of passage to put out a piece on the increasing strikeout rate, so as a newly minted member of the baseball writing community, here is my entry in the genre.

For context, the league-wide strikeout rate has increased every season since 2005, when it sat at 16.4%. In 2021, that figure has risen to 24.1%. That is a 47% increase in 16 seasons. Not only has the strikeout percentage monotonically increased, but the rate at which it is increasing is growing. From 2005-09, the rate increased by 9.7%; from 2010-14, 10.3%. In the most recent five seasons, the strikeout rate increased by 11.6%.

The question is always who and what is driving this phenomenon, and the answer is almost always “well, there are a few factors at play.” One angle that I thought has been under-researched is hitter behavior with two strikes. You may have heard your favorite local newspaper columnist bemoan the idea that hitters do not have a two-strike approach anymore, that all they try to do is hit home runs, which has led to all the strikeouts. Of course, this type of thinking is reductive, mostly because it does not even consider the role of the pitcher. Nevertheless, many have discussed two-strike results, though more anecdotally than quantitatively. So let’s investigate this aspect of the strikeout rate problem first. The following is the strikeout rate and wOBA in plate appearances that reach two-strike counts in the Statcast era:

Two Strike Performance
Season K% wOBA
2015 40.4 .240
2016 .41.1 .243
2017 41.5 .247
2018 42.2 .241
2019 42.8 .247
2020 43.2 .245
2021 44.6 .229
SOURCE: Baseball Savant

Like the overall strikeout rate, the strikeout rate in these plate appearances is monotonically increasing but much more slowly. Year-over-year, the increase never exceeds 2% besides this season and 2020 (about 3%). I will note we are only about a month and a half into the season and given the weather, league offense is at its nadir, so I would expect this to regress some. wOBA with two strikes has jumped in the Statcast era and this season so far has stuck out like a sore thumb. The weather caveat applies here also, as does the caveat that we are dealing with only a fraction of the plate appearances in 2021 versus all other seasons besides 2020 (for obvious reasons). This information seemingly debunks the awful two strike approach theory, at least within the defined time frame. Hitters are barely striking out more when they get to two strikes and their overall performance has not changed much season-over-season, 2021 notwithstanding. If we dig further into two strike behavior, the idea that hitters have drastically changed when they are confronted with two strikes does not track:

Two Strike Behavior
Season SwStr% CS% Swing% Chase% BBE%
2015 13.1 4.4 59 45.8 23.8
2016 13.3 4.4 58.8 44.7 23.2
2017 13.5 4.4 58.5 43.6 22.8
2018 13.8 4.5 58.6 43.1 22.6
2019 14 4.4 58.4 43.5 22
2020 14.1 4.6 57.5 42.8 21.8
2021 14.4 5.1 58 42.1 21.6
SOURCE: Baseball Savant

I will note that the chase rate calculation is based on my own filtering of the Statcast data from Baseball Savant. The swinging strike rate has increased every season and the rate at which balls are put in play with two strikes has decreased every year, which gives some credence to the complaint about hitter behavior. I would argue the changes are so small, however, that drastic claims about today’s players are not warranted. We are talking about 1.3 percentage points in terms of swinging strike rate, and 2.2 percentage points in balls in play rate from 2015-21. I do not think anyone without access to this kind of statistical information can really tell the difference between those figures when watching the game. The swing rate with two strikes has been very stable in this era. In terms of chase rate, batters have become more discerning, which can only be construed as a positive development, assuming we believe it’s better to have fewer strikeouts.

Interestingly, the rate of called strikes as a percentage of total two-strike pitches has seen a noticeable jump in 2021. Devan Fink wrote about how pitchers have become more aggressive throwing the ball in the zone this season with the advent of the new ball. I would imagine this is the impetus for the growth in the percentage of strikeouts via the called strike.

Overall, the differences in two-strike performances between seasons do not seem substantial enough to explain the acceleration of the strikeout rate growth. Maybe it is not batter performance in two strike counts, but instead a notably higher percentage of total pitches being thrown with two strikes?

Percentage of Pitches in Each Count
Season 0-0 0-1 0-2 1-0 1-1 1-2 2-0 2-1 2-2 3-0 3-1 3-2
2015-20 25.8 12.8 6.5 10.1 10.2 9.5 3.5 5.3 8.1 1.1 2.2 4.9
2021 25.5 12.5 6.7 10.2 10 9.5 3.5 5.3 8.3 1.2 2.3 4.9
SOURCE: Baseball Savant

There is basically no difference between 2021 and the preceding five seasons combined. The count-based run values are more of a mixed bag with no discernible trend.

Run Values by Count
Season 0-0 0-1 0-2 1-0 1-1 1-2 2-0 2-1 2-2 3-0 3-1 3-2
2015-2020 0.009 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.001 0.016 0.025 0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.008 0.013
2020 0.024 -0.079 -0.067 0.176 0.047 0.142 0.357 0.002 0.056 -0.15 -0.121 -0.098
SOURCE: Baseball Savant
Run Values per 100 Pitches Thrown

Two strike performance changes does not seem notable in recent vintage. In fact, the swinging strike rates in all counts have effectively increased at the same rate across all counts.

The last thing I investigated was looking at pitch types and seeing if any groups of pitches are more responsible for the rate of whiffs than the others. Here there are more interesting trends.

Neither breaking pitches nor offspeed pitches have seen much of an influx in swinging strikes. Hitters have struggled more with fastballs, on the other hand, in all situations. (Another hat tip to Devan Fink, who wrote about the unusually large increase in fastball velocity in the month of April this season.) Pitchers’ fastballs are becoming tougher to time-up and now that they are becoming more aggressive throwing the ball in the zone, they are inducing more swinging strikes with those pitches.

The league’s two-strike approach does not seem to be having an outsized effect on the rise in strikeouts, at least in this most recent era of baseball. There are small upticks in a few relevant metrics, but more of the increase has to do with swings and misses in all counts, especially on fastballs. This count-based analysis yielded similar results to an excellent piece from Chet Gutwein here at FanGraphs. He found that not only has the league’s swinging strike rate on fastballs increased more relative to other pitch types, but fastballs high in the zone were mostly to blame due to the continuing growth of velocity and, as a consequence, spin rate.

As the league tries to address the issue of fewer balls in play now and in the future, finding a way to combat the rise in pitcher velocity should be one of the first items on the docket. The fact that pitches are moving more than ever does not appear to be as large a factor, given the changes in whiff rates on breaking and offspeed pitches. Moving the mound back, which will be implemented in the Atlantic League this season, and giving hitters more time to react seems like a good start. After parsing through the two strike data, it seems like rectifying the lack of formidable two strike approaches across the majors is not the silver bullet many believe. Digging further into the data by pitch type in all counts, the main issue is rising whiff rates on fastballs, which Chet Gutwein opined on in his own piece I referenced above. So maybe combating velocity is the elusive silver bullet? Without a relatively controlled experiment we cannot say for certain. But we can say that hitters being criticized for forgoing any semblance of a two strike approach and placing the blame on them for the rise in strikeouts is most likely a futile exercise.