Heading into the season, the Milwaukee Brewers were a popular pick to win the NL Central, with half of the writers here at FanGraphs expecting them to emerge victorious. The strength of the team is its pitching, with a rotation spearheaded by Brandon Woodruff and Corbin Burnes as well as an excellent bullpen anchored by Josh Hader and 2020 NL Rookie of the Year Devin Williams. But there was a good deal of uncertainty about where the offense would come from and how much run support the strong pitching would receive. The shortened season saw Lorenzo Cain opt out and underwhelming performances from perennial MVP candidate Christian Yelich and infielder Keston Hiura. ZiPS (along with many other models) projected bounce-back campaigns for both Yelich and Hiura. These two sluggers’ ability to produce is critical to the Brewers’ success this season.

Yelich has not gotten off to a great start and has already missed 12 games due to back issues, which he’s dealt with previously in his career. But it’s Hiura that I want to put the spotlight on. In his rookie season, Hiura took the National League by storm, slashing .303/.368/.570 while hitting 19 home runs; he was second on the team to Yelich with 140 wRC+. Hiura entered the 2020 season expected to hold down the keystone and contribute as a key power bat in the lineup. Yet as was the case for so many hitters in the pandemic-shortened season, Hiura took a step backwards from his prior year’s performance. He managed a disappointing but still respectable 87 wRC+ and 13 home runs, but he struck out more. He walked less. His hard hit rate plummeted from 47.1% to 39.6%.

Nearly a month into the 2021 season, Hiura’s offensive performance has fallen short of even last season’s paltry marks. Through last weekend’s action, he is slashing .145/.264/.242 with a wOBA of .240 and 50 wRC+. One area that is a complete disaster for Hiura is his contact rate. To truly capture the magnitude of his issues, one must look beyond his strikeout rate (34.7%, which is really bad) to Z-Contact%, which is the percentage of balls a hitter makes contact with when he swings at pitches in the strike zone. So far in the early going, Hiura has the worst Z-Contact% in baseball, lagging behind Javier Báez by about 2.5%. Recently, Brewers hitting instructor Andy Haines mentioned Hiura’s timing is off but that he’s “getting closer every day.” While his coaches may express some optimism, any progress has yet to find its way onto the field. Here’s a sample of some swings and misses against the Cubs’ Kyle Ryan. Read the rest of this entry »

The intentional walk is, in my opinion, the most overused tactic in baseball. If you explained it to someone who had just learned the rules, they’d be confused. “The object of the game is to get runners around all the bases to home plate, right?” they’d ask. “You’re purposefully putting a runner partway around those bases? Does his run somehow not count?”

The run does count, and intentional walks are generally a great way to help your opponent score. Given that “helping your opponent score” is a bad way to win baseball games, intentional walks are mostly bad. Thanks for coming to my TED talk.

For decades, managers have intentionally walked dangerous batters. Sometimes it makes sense. Often, it doesn’t. Inevitably, though, the siren call of doing something, doing anything at all, to affect one’s own destiny leads managers astray. It’s an understandable impulse. Who among us, given the choice between doing literally nothing and taking some action to affect the outcome, would pick doing nothing? Since being a manager is largely about purposefully doing nothing when you could instead be doing something, I totally get why over-managing still persists.

Still, not every intentional walk is bad. Not every run is created equal, and there are certainly situations where the tactical advantage of choosing a different batter to face is worth more than the cost of an extra baserunner. Jayce Tingler called for two consecutive intentional walks on Sunday night in a win over the Dodgers, and they actually made sense. That calls for a celebration, as well as an explanation of why these particular walks were sound. Read the rest of this entry »

On Monday, the Rockies announced that executive vice-president/general manager Jeff Bridich would be leaving his role with the team. Whether or not this amounts to a resignation or a “resignation” allowing a long-time employee to save face, the result is the same: there will be a new face responsible for personnel decisions in Colorado. (For now, that’s team COO Greg Feasel, who will serve as the interim GM, but the team expects to hire a full-time replacement after the end of the season.) This organization generally has had a great deal of loyalty to its general managers over the years: After nearly 30 years of existence, the team has only had three GMs in Bridich, Dan O’Dowd, and Bob Gebhard. But will this be enough to right what’s gone horribly wrong in Denver?

The Nolan Arenado trade this winter may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back for the team’s chances of a longshot wild card run in 2021 and the fanbase’s feelings about the Rockies. Bridich’s relationship with Arenado soured the team’s relationship with its franchise player, but ownership was a key player in making the trade happen.

In February, the Rockies bowed to the pressure, trading Arenado and $51 million to the Cardinals for a package that included pitcher Austin Gomber and four mid- to low-level prospects. Monfort was largely the architect of the trade, sources told The Athletic, but blame fell to Bridich. There is enough to go around. Bridich was the one who alienated Arenado; Monfort is the one who allowed it.

“We lack process in so many ways,” one now-former member of Colorado’s front office said. “We lack leadership in most ways. And there’s very, very little accountability.”

So, how did the Rockies get here? Where they sit now, firmly at the bottom of the NL West, is a product of long-term decision-making failures, not just the recent drive to save money or a few poor moves in recent years.

Read the rest of this entry »

Officially recognized or not, one team’s no-hitter is another team’s humiliation, and so the Braves were nearly doubly humbled during Sunday’s twin bill against the Diamondbacks — and at home, no less. In the opener at Truist Park, Zac Gallen held Atlanta to a lone Freddie Freeman single, while in the nightcap, Madison Bumgarner kept them completely hitless while facing the minimum number of batters. Though the Braves rebounded to beat the Cubs on Monday, they’re just 10-12 thus far, tied for third in the NL East and bearing only passing resemblance to the team that has won three straight division titles.

To be fair, until Sunday the Braves’ fortunes had been on the rise. After opening the season by sandwiching two four-game losing streaks around a four-game winning streak, they had gone 5-2 by taking two out of three from the Cubs in Chicago, splitting a two-game set with the Yankees in the Bronx, and then winning the series opener against the Diamondbacks. Even so, the team entered Sunday hitting just .228/.323/.424, and they’ve fallen to .219/.315/.407 (97 wRC+) even with Monday’s 8-7 win. They’ve managed to stretch that discouraging batting line to 4.50 runs per game, good for fifth in the NL, but on the other side of the ball, they’re allowing a league-worst 5.00 runs per game.

Sunday sticks out like a sore thumb, though, so we’ll dig into the offense first. By getting just one hit over two games of any length, the Braves became just the second team in the past 113 years to join a very short list:

Read the rest of this entry »

The recent flurry of matchups between the Dodgers and Padres have been enthralling. That’s what transpires when two teams of similar caliber go head-to-head – both clubs feature impressive lineups, employ the league’s best starters, and have quality bullpens and bench options to maintain the tension in later innings. They also both possess good front offices. The Dodgers have long been at the sabermetric forefront, while the Padres have strengthened their analytics department over the last few years. They share multiple characteristics, and not surprisingly, both teams excel.

However, the intrastate rivals do disagree on one major aspect of the modern game: infield shifts. Since last year, the Dodgers have applied the shift in 58.0% of opportunities, a league-leading rate over that span. In contrast, the Padres have done so just 21.5% of time. Only the Cardinals and Braves, two teams that are notably shift-averse, recorded lower rates.

What’s interesting, though, is that this isn’t because the Padres dislike the shift. Let’s dig a bit deeper. The Dodgers are what you would call equal-opportunity shifters – that is, they don’t discriminate between left- and right-handed hitters. Of their 6,729 shifts during the aforementioned time span, 3,210 (47.7%) of them were against the former. (Here I should clarify that I’m only factoring in Baseball Savant’s shifts, not strategic alignments, to simplify the analysis.)

Ok, now for San Diego. Their total of 2,608 shifts is much lower, but, and I kid you not, 2,524 (96.8%) of them were against left-handed hitters! And no, the Padres didn’t stumble into this. The gap between them and second place, the Rockies, is about 18 percentage points. There’s clear intent here, which looks even more impressive on a graph:

Read the rest of this entry »

Yesterday Jon Sciambi shared a tweet with a few, seemingly impossible stats:

MLB slash into today 232/310/390…BA would be lowest ever…in 2008 about 42% of swings put balls in play, this year 35.4%. In 08 the swing/miss % was 20% and this year it is 27.3%. Yikes.

— Jon Sciambi (@GoGala__Games) April 26, 2021

Yikes indeed. While all of those numbers are concerning on their own, it’s actually the batting average figure that most struck me. If a .232 league batting average sounds absurdly low to you, you’re not wrong. In fact, it’s the lowest since at least the turn of the twentieth century. The .232 mark is five points worse than the league hit in 1968, when Bob Gibson spun a 1.12 ERA, only one American Leaguer managed to hit .300, and nearly a quarter of the season’s games ended in a shutout. It’s also seven points lower than the worst collective batting average of the Dead Ball Era, a year the league slugged .305. And it’s far, far lower than anything in recent memory:

Say what you will about Three True Outcomes baseball, a batting average this low is a bit of a problem. And while the magnitude of the problem may come as a bit of a shock, the “why” is pretty easy to explain.

Much of it can be attributed to strikeouts, of course. Pitchers are fanning their opponents 24.6% of the time, up from 23.4% in last year’s shortened season. Strikeout rates seemingly only go up each year, but it’s worth noting that this is a pretty dramatic uptick even by that standard, easily the largest year-over-year we’ve seen this century. (Hat tip to Marc Webster for noticing.) Read the rest of this entry »

Pitchers are relying on their best pitches more and more. And why should they not? It makes all the sense in the world. Throwing a fastball 60% of the time just so that you can “establish it” is an outdated moniker that players and teams alike are reticent to follow. Take a look at the our season stat grid tool if you want proof that the most dominant pitchers in the league are increasingly relying on their breaking pitches. Select curveballs and you will see Julio Urías, Zack Greinke, Brandon Woodruff, Anthony DeSclafani, Dylan Bundy, Walker Buehler, Corbin Burnes, and John Means toward the top of the list. For sliders, that list features Tyler Glasnow, Lance McCullers Jr. (who is also throwing a new slider), Shane Bieber, a new and improved Jeff Hoffman, Freddy Peralta, and even Clayton Kershaw, whose slider is almost 45% of his pitch diet.

These are cherrypicked examples; not every pitcher on this leaderboard has been as productive as those starters thus far. But it does point to the idea that the best pitchers MLB has to offer are increasingly leaning into their best secondary offerings and have either continued to be successful or found another level in their production.

The idea of simply throwing your best pitch has become more in vogue in recent years. Back in 2017, Eno Sarris wrote that pitchers should try making breaking balls 80% of their total pitch mix. Part of the reason is that non-fastball pitches, specifically breaking balls, have gotten increasingly harder to hit; Ben Clemens wrote about this trend a couple of years ago. Even though fastballs have become harder to hit by virtue of increased velocity, pitchers are turning away from them in favor of other offerings.

This decision raises the question: Are pitchers successful with their non-fastball pitches because they use them less? The idea is that the main driver of offspeed or breaking ball success would be that hitters see them less, making them tougher to adjust to in a plate appearance. Theoretically, then, if a pitcher goes primarily to his secondary pitches, those pitches will become less effective on a per pitch basis. Is this true?

To investigate, I took every pitch type that was thrown at least 100 times in a season from 2018 through ’20. I took the year-over-year changes in pitch usage, swinging-strike rate, and run value per 100 pitches thrown for each season pair (where in both seasons the pitch was thrown on 100-plus occasions).

The first thing I wanted to look at was effectiveness based on changes in usage for each individual pitch type. The short answer to this is that there is little relationship between marginal usage change and marginal success in either of the two measures for any pitch type.

If anything, changeups and curveballs actually induce swinging strikes as a higher percentage of all pitches with more usage. That is the strongest relationship in this dataset, and it still consists mostly of noise. Based on the data, there is no evidence that pitchers should be dissuaded from throwing their best pitches more often, and that holds true for breaking balls, offspeed pitches, and fastballs.

Sure, you may argue, throwing any pitch a little more won’t have adverse effects on its effectiveness, but aren’t there diminishing returns? At a certain point, don’t you throw the pitch too often to fool the batter? To answer that, I placed each pitcher and pitch type pair into a bucket based on usage, then separated the bucket into increments of 10% (so the first consisted of pitches thrown between 0 and 10% of the time, the second 10% and 20%, etc.). I then grouped the pitch usages across the three seasons and looked for any potential deviations in effectiveness.

Again, these relationships are mostly noise. Even for pitches thrown upwards of 70% to 80% of the time (beyond which the the data is scarce), they should not lose any per-pitch potency by virtue of increased predictability.

For those of you skeptical that fastballs make up the majority of pitches and that this lack of a relationship may not be evident with breaking balls or offspeed pitches specifically, I have bad news for you:

As with run values, there’s no strong relationship between swinging-strike rate and usage.

As noted above, fastball usage is on the decline throughout the league. But using the data I collected from ’18 through ’20, it’s clear that pitchers aren’t all now throwing breaking pitches all the time.

The vertical lines represent the 50th percentile in that specific distribution. On average, pitchers using a certain breaking ball less than 30% of the time shied away from using the pitch more. On the other hand, breaking ball usage mostly increased for players who used it more than a cursory amount. That all makes sense: If you have a breaking ball you like to use (or are comfortable using), you’re going to throw it more; if you don’t have a strong breaking pitch, then you’re not going to be tossing it all the time even if it could theoretically be more effective.

Throwing a pitch just for the sake of throwing it is not going to fly in MLB in 2021. Pitches are thrown with a purpose: generating whiffs, or at least groundballs. This is one of the fundamental factors in the ever-increasing strikeout rate: Not only are pitchers throwing harder than ever, but they are also leaning on their best stuff even more. That’s while every one of those pitches is being optimized with the help of technology to generate maximum movement and deception. And that trend will not stop until there is evidence that a pitch will perform worse upon increased usage. Barring that, pitchers across the league will rely on the pitches they deem most dominant.

Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley banter about the latest riveting Padres-Dodgers series, the beef between Trevor Bauer and Fernando Tatis Jr., Tatis’s fielding, the end of GM Jeff Bridich’s reign with the Rockies, Madison Bumgarner’s hitless start (but non-no-hitter?), Jacob deGrom’s dominance and starts in which pitchers produce as many hits as they allow, and John Means and the O’s stopping Oakland’s 13-game winning streak, then follow up on previous discussions about collective action by fans and replay review in cricket and provide updates on Shohei Ohtani and Willians Astudillo, plus a Stat Blast on the AL West’s “ASSHAT” standings and the most common division orders in recent seasons and a Meet a Major Leaguer on Rays pitcher Louis Head and Astros pitcher Kent Emanuel.

Audio intro: Dan Bern, "Rivalry"
Audio outro: Cotton Mather, "April’s Fool"

Link to Tatis-Bauer beef summary
Link to Nick Groke on Bridich
Link to Bumgarner video
Link to Jay Jaffe on Bumgarner
Link to spreadsheet of starts like deGrom’s
Link to ASSHAT standings image
Link to most common standings 2013-20
Link to most common standings 1998-2020
Link to video of Astudillo’s dinger
Link to story about Head
Link to story about Emanuel
Link to video of Emanuel’s debut
Link to Jared Diamond on DHCMT
Link to Ken Rosenthal on DHCMT
Link to Fabian Ardaya on Ohtani’s outing

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More than anything else, I’ll remember Carlos Rodón’s no-hitter for how it ended. Not when he hit Roberto Pérez in the foot — that was no fun, but perfect games end on nonsense all the time — but because he threw harder as the game went on, topping out at 99 mph on his 110th pitch of the game. It’s all the more impressive when you consider that he started the game in the low 90s.

Pitchers losing velocity as the game goes on is a phenomenon as old as baseball itself. That’s just how it works; throwing a pitch requires a ton of physical effort, and doing it 100 times will wear you down. If you’ve ever done repetitions of anything in your life, you can empathize. Rodón laughs at that fact of life, in a way that I think of as Justin Verlander-esque, and I was curious whether other pitchers follow the same pattern, particularly after Jacob deGrom popped a casual 101 mph fastball in the seventh inning of his latest start.

Using deGrom as evidence of anything is an iffy idea at best — the man is a unicorn, a pitching deity descended to earth. But Rodón is mortal, and he does it, so it’s hardly some unobtainable goal. I set out to see whether pitchers are adding velocity in later innings these days, and whether that addition has changed over time. Read the rest of this entry »