The 2020 ZiPS projection season starts Friday, and before it does, I wanted to offer a brief refresher of what ZiPS is and is not.

ZiPS is a computer projection system, initially developed by me from 2002-2004, and “officially” released in 2004. As technology and data availability have improved over the last 15 years, ZiPS has continually evolved. The current edition of ZiPS can’t even run on the Pentium 4 3.0 processor I used to develop the original version starting in 2002 (I checked). There are a lot more bells and whistles, but at its core, ZiPS engages in two fundamental tasks when making a projection: establishing a baseline for a player, and estimating what their future looks like using that baseline.

ZiPS uses multi-year statistics, with more recent seasons weighted more heavily; in the beginning, all the statistics received the same yearly weighting, but eventually, this became more varied based on additional research. Research is a big part of ZiPS and every year, I run literally hundreds of studies on various aspects of the system to determine their predictive value and better calibrate the player baselines. What started with the data available in 2002 has expanded considerably; basic hit, velocity, and pitch data began playing a larger role starting in 2013, and data derived from StatCast has been included in recent years as I got a handle on the predictive value and impact of those numbers on existing models. I believe in cautious, conservative design, so data is only included once I have confidence in improved accuracy; there are always builds of ZiPS that are still a couple of years away. Additional internal ZiPS tools like zBABIP, zHR, zBB, and zSO are used to better establish baseline expectations for players. These stats work similarly to the various flavors of “x” stats, with the z standing for something I’d wager you’ve already figured out!

When estimating a player’s future production, ZiPS compares their baseline performance, both in quality and shape, to the baseline of every player in its database at every point in their career. This database consists of every major leaguer since the Deadball era — the game was so different prior to then that I’ve found pre-Deadball comps make projections less accurate — and every minor league translation since what is now the late 1960s. Using cluster analysis techniques (Mahalanobis distance is one of my favorite tools), ZiPS assembles a cohort of fairly similar players across history for player comparisons, something you see in the most similar comps list. Non-statistical factors include age, position, handedness, and, to a lesser extent, height and weight compared to the average height and weight of the era (unfortunately, this data is not very good). ZiPS then generates a probable aging curve — both midpoint projections and range — on the fly for each player. Read the rest of this entry »

How much major league teams are willing to spend on player salaries in any given year can be a bit murky. Teams don’t want to show their hand and lose negotiating power with free agents, though we can usually figure out their number by the end of spring when the money has been spent. How much every team is likely to spend is more opaque. We know that, generally speaking, teams are making boatloads, but while the revenue across the sport has increased over the last few years, it hasn’t resulted in increased payrolls. Every team has lots of money — the budget constraints we hear front office types reference are, more often than not, self-imposed rather than the result of empty coffers — but some will spend more than others. Trying to pin down what teams will spend in 2020 at this point in the winter is difficult, but we can use last year’s payroll numbers as a guide to get a rough idea of what each is likely to do, and thus gauge which ones will commit to payroll increases and which are likely to embrace thrift.

To answer those questions, we can look to the contracts coming off the books at the end of 2019, but that number can be misleading. Raises to players with long-term contracts, as well as increased pay in arbitration can bite into some of the departed money. Let’s start with how much money every team has committed for 2020 as of right now, using estimates for arbitration figures and minimum salaried players. (All the data can be found in the Payroll section on our RosterResource pages.)

Read the rest of this entry »

The non-tender deadline isn’t a date everyone circles on the calendar expecting big moves and excitement, but it does force teams into decisions on a handful of players and causes some movement as well as a handful of new free agents. Last night’s non-tender deadline was more active than most. As Jeff Passan noted, there were 40 non-tenders after a combined 46 over the previous two years. It was busy, and a few productive players were not offered contracts despite expectations for fairly reasonable salaries. There are some big conclusions to reach about the state of the game as well as some small ones based on last night. Here’s what we learned.

Teams Aren’t Paying for a Return to Form

Among the biggest non-tenders in terms of past production and expected salary were players who struggled for various reasons in 2019. Formerly injured pitchers in the process of returning from injury or needing time to return from injury like Taijuan Walker, Jimmy Nelson, and Aaron Sanchez were all non-tendered despite expected salaries in the $4 million to $6 million range. Previous successful players with rough years like Kevin Gausman, Blake Treinen, and Travis Shaw were all let go despite prior track records of success. In the cases of Gausman and Treinen, an expected salary of close to $10 million likely played a role, though it isn’t necessarily clear that the decisions wouldn’t have been the same even if a few million dollars had been shaved off the cost. Steven Souza Jr. has decent projections for next season, but he did poorly in 2018 and didn’t play at all last season. For the most part, teams weren’t willing to roll the dice on bounce-back campaigns. Read the rest of this entry »

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2020 Hall of Fame ballot. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

No other player, not even 2019 Hall of Fame inductee Mariano Rivera — the first player ever elected unanimously by the writers — typified the Yankees’ late-1990s resurgence and evolution into a dynasty more than Derek Jeter. A 1992 first-round pick out of Kalamazoo, Michigan, the 6-foot-3 shortstop seemed not only to be built for stardom but engineered to withstand the spotlight’s glare. Famously instilled with a level-headedness by his parents, who during his childhood made him sign code-of-conduct contracts, he pulled off the remarkable feat of simultaneously exuding a cocky charisma and an off-the-charts baseball IQ while remaining completely enigmatic even in the country’s largest media market. Not only did he avoid mental mistakes on the field, he ably evaded virtually every controversy that surrounded the Yankees; by the time he turned 29 years old, he had been named team captain. During his two decades in pinstripes, he played a pivotal role for 16 playoff teams, seven pennant winners, and five champions. Not until he was 34, deep into his 14th season, did he play a game in which his team had been mathematically eliminated from postseason contention.

With an inside-out swing that yielded consistently high batting averages and on-base percentages, Jeter was a hit machine, an ideal table-setter among the Bronx Bombers. In 15 of his 18 full seasons, he collected at least 179 hits, and 13 times, he scored at least 100 runs. He did both with such consistency and longevity that he ranks sixth all-time in hits (3,465) — not just more than any other shortstop, but more than any other infielder — and 11th in runs scored (1,923). Though he had less power than Alex Rodriguez and Nomar Garciaparra, the pair with whom he formed the “Holy Trinity” of shortstops, he was fully capable of hitting a well-timed home run. In fact, his 20 postseason homers are third all-time, yet one of the rare October (and November, ahem) records that he does not hold. He wasn’t without flaws, of course. Though his strong arm, sure hands, and low error totals helped him pass the eye tests of casual fans, broadcasters, and even the opposing managers who bestowed five Gold Gloves upon him, his defensive metrics are brutal. Even so, they’re outweighed by contributions in every other aspect of the game.

Thanks to his 3,000-plus hits and his collection of championship rings, Jeter will have no trouble gaining first-ballot entry to the Hall of Fame. With the precedent of non-unanimity finally broken, the primary suspense of this cycle is whether he’ll match Rivera by receiving the full 100% from the writers. Secondarily, and more frustratingly, the possibility exists that his presence on the ballot will overshadow other worthy candidates. Either way, he’ll be standing on the dais in Cooperstown next summer. Read the rest of this entry »

Wichita’s windy season is said to last from early February to late May, when the gusts change from frigid blasts to hot breaths. The windiest day of the year is historically April 4; a day when hairdos and stacks of loose papers must stand strong against gales blustering at an average of 13 mph.

Occasionally, there will be a spike in velocity that knocks out the power or rolls back a tin roof or tries to tear the awning off of the Valero gas station on Caulfield and Kemp. A fire inspector once cast a wary eye on the 1916 Wichita Fair and Exposition, concerned, per the The Wichita Daily Eagle on October 22, that the flammable structures of the event created a great risk of conflagration due to the “high, dry winds we have in the fall,” his fears rooted in both science and the fact that this very thing had happened the previous year.

So in Wichita, they are aware of the wind. They know that it blows, that it carries the cold and the heat of the plains, and that it occasionally bends a gas station in half. They do not all understand why it is the name of the town’s new Triple-A franchise, the Wichita Wind Surge, an affiliate of the Miami Marlins.

“I guess it’s windy here,” says Wichita resident Eric Pierce, “but… wind’s kind of everywhere.” Read the rest of this entry »

Not long ago, César Hernández felt like one of the safer bets in baseball. He was a speedy, slick-gloved second baseman who posted strong walk rates, working a 109 wRC+ from 2016-17 and posting 7.1 WAR, which made him the seventh-most valuable second baseman in baseball over that time span. But with his value declining, Hernández was non-tendered on Monday by the Phillies, for whom he has played seven major league seasons and 13 total years as a professional, all before turning 30.

With his final year of arbitration on the horizon, Hernández was projected to make around $11 million if the Phillies tendered him a contract for the 2020 season. But as Philadelphia reached a decision point with both him and third baseman Maikel Franco, the organization concluded that the money due to each player didn’t match up with what it believed they’d contribute in the coming year.

This decision point arrived at an inopportune time for Hernández, who is coming off his worse season since 2015. He was worth just 1.7 WAR in 161 games in 2019, hitting .279/.333/.408 for a 92 wRC+ and registering as just slightly above average in the field and on the basepaths. His durability, glove, and past production should still make him an attractive candidate for any team with a hole at second base. Those interested in his services, however, are no doubt working on answering an important question: What happened to Hernández’s walk rate? Read the rest of this entry »

The Reds signaled their intentions to compete in 2019 by trading for Tanner Roark, Sonny Gray, and Yasiel Puig, among others. They did compete with a BaseRuns record above .500 that with neutral luck would have put them in contention until the end of the season. They were 4 1/2 games off the division lead at the All-Star break, but a crowded division and a lack of talent relative to their competitors left them with 75 wins at the end of the year.

Cincinnati also announced their intentions to compete in 2020 by acquiring Trevor Bauer at the trade deadline. Bauer is now a part of what should be one of the better rotations in baseball along with Luis Castillo, Gray, Anthony DeSclafani, and Tyler Mahle. Even with a good rotation, the present roster wasn’t going to be enough in 2020, so the Reds struck a big deal with Mike Moustakas for four years and $64 million, as first reported by Jon Heyman and Jeff Passan.

For Moustakas, this deal was a long time coming. Two seasons ago, Dave Cameron and the crowd here at FanGraphs expected Moustakas would get five years and somewhere between $85-95 million. At the time, the Royals third baseman was coming off a 38-homer, 113-wRC+ season, but there were some questions about his defense due to knee problems in addition to the stigma of a qualifying offer. Moustakas ended up settling for one year and a $6.5 million guarantee in returning to Kansas City. He improved his defense in his time with the Royals and Brewers in 2018, but he hit 10 fewer home runs and was just a bit above average on offense. Behind Manny Machado and Josh Donaldson in the third base pecking order, Moustakas again found his market lacking and signed with the Brewers for $10 million. Read the rest of this entry »

If there is one month when even the most diehard baseball fans tend to check out and focus their attention elsewhere, it’s probably November. It’s not that things don’t happen — eight managerial vacancies have been filled, a few of the top free agents have signed, and 118 minor leaguers have been added to their parent club’s 40-man rosters — but the offseason rarely picks up much steam until the Winter Meetings begin. So it’s understandable if you might need to get caught up on all of the recent comings and goings around the league.

I have compiled that list for you here, along with links to the applicable RosterResource depth charts and payroll pages, and analysis from FanGraphs writers for each of the more notable moves.

National League

Arizona Diamondbacks | Depth Chart | Payroll
Free Agent Signings

• C Stephen Vogt signed to one-year, $3 million contract with 2021 vesting option. Analysis

Lost Off Waivers

• RP T.J. McFarland lost off waivers to Oakland Athletics.

Added to 40-Man Roster

• INF Wyatt Mathisen, INF Andy Young, SP Riley Smith, SP Taylor Widener

Read the rest of this entry »

Kole Calhoun stood at his locker near the close of the 2019 season and talked about appreciating every moment of his eight seasons in Anaheim, knowing that any day could have been his last day. A few months later, the Angels declined his $14 million contract option. He departs Los Angeles having played a little bit of left and a smidgen of center, but mostly the Angels kept Kalhoun sequestered to right field, where in 2019 he hacked fiendishly amid frequent swing adjustments. His final season with the Angels produced inconsistency in his monthly outputs, as well as a new career high in strikeout rate (25.6 percent) and a modest 108 wRC+.

Calhoun is a member of the Fraternity of Less Effective Outfielders the Angels Have Put Next to Mike Trout. There have been many others over the years, placed out there in the corners beside the reigning AL MVP: Vernon Wells, Torii Hunter, Josh Hamilton, Ben Revere. And in 2019, Trout’s partners in the grass were Kole Calhoun and Justin Upton. Calhoun is gone, but Upton, another veteran who is not as good as Mike Trout, will remain. He doesn’t need to be as good as Trout to be of use, something that has to be true for him, since it’s true for every other player in the league. The question is, can Upton still be good, despite the obstacles ahead of him, and the comparisons to the outfielders around him?

Upton, at 32 years old, is a once fearsome slugger from the National League whose turf toe, wonky knee, and brief, passionate encounter with an outfield wall left him hurt and unproductive for most of 2019. Upton will be baseball’s active leader in errors among outfielders in 2020, and he may be entering the part of his career in which expectations are lowered, especially given how he got beat up so much and only made it into 63 games last season — the first time he’s played in fewer than 100 since 2008.

His durability has been one of his strengths; that, and his ability to do this. At 30 years old, he was worth 3.8 WAR for the Angels before baseball sent him into a wall this past season, so it’s not foolhardy to think Upton could be one of the Angels’ “new” contributors moving forward, or at least play a key role, even though he ended 2019 with a shot in the knee and a pair of crutches. Read the rest of this entry »

Austin Hedges had a disastrous season at the plate. He batted .176/.252/.311, good for a 47 wRC+ that placed him last among batters with at least 300 plate appearances. But Hedges had a remarkable season behind the plate. He was worth 27.3 defensive runs above average, second only to J.T. Realmuto and first on a rate basis among all players in baseball.

WAR gives us a handy way to convert this, and WAR was pretty happy with Hedges in 2019. He was worth 1.4 WAR in 347 plate appearances, which works out to 2.4 WAR per 600 plate appearances. An average player would be worth just under 2 WAR per 600, which means Hedges was above-average despite his sub-Mendoza batting stats.

But when someone’s batting line is as poor as Hedges’, there’s an impulse to say that WAR doesn’t capture everything. Hedges isn’t a bad hitter; he’s an exceptionally bad hitter. He had a 47 wRC+! Six pitchers had better batting lines last year. My former colleague Sheryl Ring pointed this out recently, and opined that NL teams simply couldn’t afford to carry a bat that poor in addition to the pitcher’s spot. This made me think several things at once. My first thought was “Of course not! WAR works.” My second thought was “Actually yeah, two pitcher-level batters in a row would be awful. I’m not sure that a linear stat could handle that.” My third thought was: time to do some analysis.

At a high level, it’s clear that wRC+ isn’t simply additive. Consider a team with four batters who always walk or hit a single, and five batters who always strike out. This is an extreme example, of course, but that team would have a roughly average wRC+. It would also be an incredibly potent offense if you stacked your four productive hitters together; it would average something like 7.5 runs a game depending on the timing of singles and walks.

Of course, if you sequenced your hitters poorly, it could also average zero runs per game. When we’re looking at extreme examples (and Hedges is extreme, though not nearly this extreme), the order really does matter. How should one deal with this? It’s a bit of a cliche, but: very carefully. Read the rest of this entry »