Ben Lindbergh and Jeff Sullivan banter about another volcanic comment by Scott Boras, the Eric Hosmer and J.D. Martinez signings and the Rays’ sudden sell-off, MLB’s latest pace-of-play initiatives, why spring training intentions often go awry, and sabermetric trailblazer Sherri Nichols, then preview the 2018 Nationals (23:46) with the Washington Post’s Chelsea Janes, and the 2018 Tigers (50:44) with MLB.com’s Jason Beck.

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After having typically appeared in the hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have now been released at FanGraphs for half a decade. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Washington Nationals. Szymborski can be found at ESPN and on Twitter at @DSzymborski.

Batters
The Nationals have developed into one of the league’s “super teams” in recent years, having compiled a roster that is rivaled by few others in terms of balance and overall strength. In 2017, for example, both the club’s hitters and pitchers finished seventh or better by WAR. That feat was accomplished by only three other clubs, all of which reached the postseason.

Regard:

With regard to the Nationals’ field-playing cohort, specifically, almost all the principals from the 2017 club return in 2018. Even some of the non-principals return, as well. Bryce Harper (575 PA, 4.9 zWAR) and Anthony Rendon (585, 4.5) are near-MVP types, while Trea Turner (558, 3.4) does quite well here, too. Adam Eaton (583, 3.0), meanwhile, will essentially serve as a new acquisition for Washington after having recorded just 107 plate appearances in his first year with the organization.

Ryan Zimmerman (496, 0.8) is the club’s weakest link per ZiPS, forecast for just a 102 wRC+ after producing a 138 wRC+ mark in 2017. Szymborski’s computer calls for a 38-point drop in BABIP (.335 to .297) and 60-point decline in isolated power (.269 to .209), too.

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The Marlins have already had what would be a record-setting sell-off. Not only have they completely dismantled arguably the best outfield in baseball; they’ve also traded away a quality second baseman about to move to center. So, in a sense, the Marlins’ teardown has involved the trading of four starting outfielders, and there’s only so much meaningful selling left to do. Dan Straily could get something, sure. Justin Bour is better than his pretty much non-existent reputation. Yet the one jewel left is J.T. Realmuto. He’d be the ticket to one last Miami blockbuster.

Realmuto is a catcher who turns only 27 years old in a month and a half, and he’s got another three seasons of club control. As a player, Realmuto is incredibly valuable, and, even more, he’s expressed an interest in getting the chance to play for someone else. Even though Realmuto’s actual leverage here is low, the Marlins wouldn’t hesitate to grant his wish, should the right offer come along. And, say, wouldn’t you know it, but the Nationals could use a quality backstop! Matt Wieters probably shouldn’t be that guy. Miguel Montero isn’t likely to be that guy. The Nationals have been included in catcher rumors all offseason long.

It seems like there should be a reasonable fit. And maybe something here will actually happen. It’s just that there’s a stumbling block: The Nationals are already perhaps too good.

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I noticed an underlying theme in both pieces I’ve written since coming back, along with many others written this offseason at FanGraphs. If you are a fan of a small- or medium-market team that will never spend to the luxury-tax line and thus always be at a disadvantage, do you want your team to try to always be .500 or better, or do you want them push all the chips in the middle for a smaller competitive window? In my stats vs. scouting article I referenced a progressive vs. traditional divide, which was broadly defined by design, but there are often noticeable differences in team-building strategies from the two overarching philosophies, which I will again illustrate broadly to show the two contrasting viewpoints.

The traditional clubs tend favor prospects with pedigree (bonus or draft position, mostly), with big tools/upside and the process of team-building is often to not push the chips into the middle (spending in free agency, trading prospects) until the core talents (best prospects and young MLB assets) have arrived in the big leagues and have established themselves. When that window opens, you do whatever you can afford to do within reason to make those 3-5 years the best you can and, in practice, it’s usually 2-3 years of a peak, often followed directly by a tear-down rebuild. The Royals appear to have just passed the peak stage of this plan, the Braves hope their core is established in 2019 and the Padres may be just behind the Braves (you could also argue the old-school Marlins have done this multiple times and are about to try again now).

On the progressive side, you have a more conservative, corporate approach where the club’s goal is to almost always have a 78-92 win team entering Spring Training, with a chance to make the playoffs every year, never with a bottom-ten ranked farm system, so they are flexible and can go where the breaks lead them. The valuation techniques emphasize the analytic more often, which can sometimes seem superior and sometimes seem foolish, depending on the execution. When a rare group of talent and a potential World Series contender emerges, the progressive team will push some chips in depending on how big the payroll is. The Rays have a bottom-five payroll and can only cash in some chips without mortgaging multiple future years, whereas the Indians and Astros are higher up the food chain and can do a little more when the time comes, and have done just that.

What we just saw in Pittsburgh (and may see soon in Tampa Bay) is what happens when a very low-payroll team sees a dip coming (controllable talent becoming uncontrolled soon) and doesn’t think there’s a World Series contender core, so they slide down toward the bottom end of that win range so that in a couple years they can have a sustainable core with a chance to slide near the top of it, rather than just tread water. Ideally, you can slash payroll in the down years, then reinvest it in the competing years (the Rays has done this in the past) to match the competitive cycle and not waste free-agent money on veterans in years when they are less needed. You could argue many teams are in this bucket, with varying payroll/margin for error: the D’Backs, Brewers, Phillies, A’s and Twins, along with the aforementioned Rays, Pirates, Indians and Astros.

Eleven clubs were over $175 million in payroll for the 2017 season (Dodgers, Yankees, Red Sox, Blue Jays, Tigers, Giants, Nationals, Rangers, Orioles, Cubs, Angels), so let’s toss those teams out and ask fans of the other 19 clubs: if forced to pick one or the other, which of these overarching philosophies would you prefer to root for?

Manny Margot had a breakout within a breakout last year. After accounting for his offensive and defensive contributions, the Padres’ rookie center fielder was worth roughly two wins in slightly less than a full season’s worth of plate appearances. Even for a player who was highly touted as a prospect, producing league-average work at 22 years old represents, in itself, a kind of breakout.

Hidden within that strong end-of-year line was a drastic change in the second half, though. Margot started hitting the ball in the air. That’s a change that has powered many other breakouts. But before we book the skinny center fielder for all of the homers next year, we have to ask: what’s happened with launch-angle surgers in the past?

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The Nationals just used Adam Lind as a bat-first, left-handed first baseman and bench bat. Lind turned in a 127 wRC+ against righties. His career wRC+, overall, is 111. Against righties, it’s 126, and against lefties, it’s 56. The Nationals turned down Lind’s $5-million option for 2018, making him a free agent. There was a $0.5-million buyout, meaning it was basically a $4.5-million decision.

The Nationals have now signed Matt Adams as a bat-first, left-handed first baseman and bench bat. It’s a $4-million deal, with an additional $0.5 million in incentives. In other words, it could be a $4.5-million decision. Adams just turned in a 126 wRC+ against righties. His career wRC+, overall, is 111. Against righties, it’s 123, and against lefties, it’s 58. Matt Adams is…this is the same profile. Basically the same profile for basically the same money. The Nationals dropped Adam Lind to pick up another Adam Lind. The one upside about Adams is that he’s five years Lind’s junior. I assume that’s what made the difference, even though Lind was already the familiar one. Smart business. Tough business.

There’s not much that needs to be said about a part-time player. It’s certainly funny that Adams has the same career wRC+ as Eric Hosmer, given their divergent contract expectations, but Hosmer has been better lately, and Adams needs to be strictly platooned. Hosmer, as you could imagine, projects to be better moving forward. Still, I want to highlight one aspect of the comparison. Hosmer and Adams are both first basemen. How about their defense?

Hosmer has a very good defensive reputation. He’s won four Gold Gloves, and he has a 57 overall rating in the historical Fan Scouting Reports. Since 2011, 39 different players have played at least 2,500 innings at first base. Hosmer’s rating is tied for fifth-best, with Anthony Rizzo and Mark Teixeira.

Adams does not have a very good defensive reputation. He was briefly tried in the outfield, but the less said about that, the better. He’s never won a Gold Glove, and he has a 37 overall rating in the historical Fan Scouting Reports. That rating is tied for 27th-best, or 12th-worst. The fans think that Adams has been below average. He definitely lacks Hosmer’s general athleticism.

And yet! If you sort by DRS over a common denominator, Adams ranks eighth, and Hosmer ranks 30th. If you sort by UZR over a common denominator, Adams ranks 10th, and Hosmer ranks 33rd. If you blend the two, then Adams ranks 10th, and Hosmer ranks 32nd. According to the advanced defensive numbers, there’s a significant difference between Matt Adams and Eric Hosmer, in Adams’ favor. He rates as the better defensive first baseman. Against what I assume would be all odds.

I’m not saying that anything is gospel. There are legitimate complaints about the advanced defensive metrics these days, in particular among infielders. We can’t just outright dismiss the eye test, and we can’t dismiss that the baseball industry holds Hosmer’s first-base defense in such high regard. But still, after all this time, there’s an explanation that’s missing. The best numbers we have say that Adams is considerably better than Hosmer is. The numbers are far from perfect, yet they also can’t be trashed. Perception is a hell of a thing.

Anyway, Adams will be a backup, behind Ryan Zimmerman. He will probably be fine.

If you consider his performance over the past few seasons as a whole, it’s clear why the Nationals gave reliever Brandon Kintzler at least $10 million over the next two years to pitch in Washington. Isolating just his 2017 campaign, however, there’s reason to think there’s some risk attached to the deal despite the modest price tag.

Since the beginning of 2016, Kintzler has used his sinker to induce ground ball after ground ball. Indeed, only 13 qualified relievers have recorded better ground-ball rates over those two years. Only 31 sinkers, meanwhile, have allowed a lower launch angle (minimum 150 balls in play). It’s largely that pitch which has allowed Kintzler to suppress homers despite having exhibited little capacity to miss bats.

In a world where Anthony Swarzak and his lack of a track record is getting two years and $14 million, this deal makes absolute sense. If a club’s player-value metric says the reliever class of player is consistently overpaid, there are only two choices: either (a) never pay a free-agent reliever or (b) try to get value from one of the cheaper ones. In that regard, the Nationals did well.

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Jeff Sullivan has found that framing data is going insane. Jeff has also previously written about the rise of the framing floor. And perhaps none of this should comes as a surprise. As the value of pitch-framing has become more apparent, clubs seem to have valued the skill more, emphasizing catcher presentation both in development and in their assessment of players. The narrowing of the advantage for some clubs was probably inevitable.

Still, there remain some players with a consistent year-to-year individual advantage at the position. Players like Yasmani Grandal and Yadier Molina and Buster Posey. And in 2017, there remained a sizeable gap between framing Haves and Have Nots.

After signing Matt Wieters to be their primary catcher last offseason, the Nationals suffered a 30-run decrease in framing runs from 2016 to 2017. Last season, only the Rockies were worse than the Nationals by that measure among postseason teams.

Readers of this site are likely familiar with Wieters’ framing issues. This author alone has addressed them at least three times: prior to last offseason, prior to the trade deadline, and during the postseason. And even though Wieters exercised his $10.5 million option earlier this offseason, the Nationals could still stand to upgrade at the position.

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Going into the 2017 season, the Washington Nationals would have been right to view their outfield as a strength. With Bryce Harper already present in right, the front office traded a pair of highly prized pitching prospects to add Adam Eaton, as well. The acquisition had the benefit of sending Trea Turner to his natural shortstop position, filling another of the Nationals’ holes. Jayson Werth could still be counted on as the weak side of a platoon, and there were bench bats who could otherwise fill in.

Not many people were talking about Michael Taylor at that point — and rightfully so. He’d dealt with a demotion to Triple-A the year prior in order to iron out his swing, and he was increasingly looking like a prospect who’d failed to live up to expectations. Mark Zuckerman of MASN Sports speculated that he was “at best looking at a spot on the bench” alongside Chris Heisey and Adam Lind.

Things changed quickly on April 30th. General manager Mike Rizzo announced that Adam Eaton would be out for the year after stepping awkwardly on first base while legging out an infield single. Suddenly, the Nationals would be leaning much more heavily on Michael Taylor. He responded very well, putting up three-plus wins over the course of the season, with above-average offense and defense in center field. His emergence not only helped push the Nationals to a playoff spot, but now gives them valuable flexibility heading into 2018.

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When I talked to Mike Rizzo in Orlando earlier this week, he told me the Washington Nationals have an eight-person analytics department that includes “three or four employees” who have been added in the last two years. The veteran GM also told me they have their own “Scouting Solutions, which (they) call The Pentagon.” In Rizzo’s opinion, his team has gone from behind the times to having “some of the best and brightest analytics people in all of baseball.”

A pair of uniformed-personnel changes further suggest an increased emphasis on analytics. Dave Martinez has replaced Dusty Baker as manager, and Tim Bogar has come on board as the first base coach. According to Rizzo, their saber-savviness played a role in their hirings.

“It was part of the process,” related Rizzo. “Davey is a 16-year major league veteran who can appeal to a clubhouse of major league players — there’s a respect factor there — and he’s also coming from two of the most-analytical organizations in baseball, in Tampa Bay and Chicago. He’s bringing that love of analytics and the implementation of those statistics with his thought process. Read the rest of this entry »