My Worst Report: Lessons Learned From the Field

Scout long enough, and you’ll write every kind of report. Good ones, bad ones, accurate projections for the wrong reasons, misfires despite a good process. Like baseball itself, evaluating players is hard. You’ll be right plenty, but everyone has whiffs. While some reports miss the mark more than others, the ones that sting most are the ones you don’t learn from. Even the worst reports can turn into a positive if they change your thinking or provide a valuable lesson along the way.
Sometimes, these lessons are simple. Bet on the athletes. Be leery of the guy with a 55% contact rate. Others come in waves, sometimes over an extended period of time. Such was the case with Richy Valdez, a Royals pitcher with a live arm who was both the subject of the report with the greatest misalignment between the grade I submitted and what wound up happening, and the bridge between two lessons that made me a better evaluator than if I’d never come across him. We’ll come back to him in a second.
Lesson One: You Have To Like Players
“You can’t just go org the complex.”
It was my first year and one of Pittsburgh’s more experienced scouts was on a Zoom with me, trying to teach me how to evaluate a rookie ball team. I had, in fact, recently doled out a bunch of org and non-prospect grades to a complex-level team. At the time, I hadn’t thought twice. The gap between the complex and Low-A is vast, a bigger jump in talent than any other in the minors. Good players in Arizona and Florida can be in short supply, and even good rosters probably only have a handful of future big leaguers. Get stuck with a bad team, and you can go a week without seeing an above-average big league tool, much less a real prospect. Why wouldn’t you org the complex?
The crosschecker sympathized with my arguments — that I hadn’t seen many prospects, that a lot of the guys were very old or very raw — but he held firm in his advice.
“It is a fact that most of the players at that level will not make the major leagues. But we need to find tools. We need to find players who can make it. People get better.”
It was a difficult message to fully internalize. Coming from the public side after my first stint at FanGraphs, I felt an urge to round down on players, to err on the side of saying a guy can’t play rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt. I can’t say for sure whether colleagues here and elsewhere felt or feel similarly, but the incentives seem to align that way. Readers, understandably, want to know who will be good in the future. On the writer’s end, to express skepticism widely is to play the odds.
It’s a different equation for teams. Clubs don’t have the luxury of waiting to see which rookie baller can handle Double-A pitching. The guys who can will either be unavailable or very, very expensive to acquire by that point, so if you want to find the next Junior Caminero, you better do it while he’s still swinging at spin in the other batter’s box. And that requires evaluators of all stripes to embrace a degree of uncertainty.
“If you go down there and write ‘org’ every time, you will be right more often than anyone in the department,” the crosschecker told me. “But we’ll need to find a new scout.”
Lesson Two: It Can Be Hard To Find Players on the Complex
It sounds a little silly, but the conditions at the ballpark can play tricks on evaluators, and both the Florida and Arizona complexes present challenges for scouts. Raw players, warm climes, a dead atmosphere, and a low level of play make for a product that bears little resemblance to the games fans are accustomed to seeing on television. Pitchers usually have underwhelming stuff, no idea where the ball is going, or both, while for their part, hitters have little power, no feel for contact, or both. Pop flies find grass as often as they land in gloves, and infielders sometimes lose high choppers in the sun. The scorekeeper might need your help deciding between a hit and an error, and they may or may not have accurately logged all of the night’s substitutions. On a good day, there’s a pitch clock. The mid-inning music is very loud. If you’re not careful, you can get sucked into a conversation with other scouts or team staffers in a way that diverts your attention further. It’s a difficult environment in which to lock in.
There’s talent there, but sometimes it’s well camouflaged. This is especially true in Arizona during the summer, when game-time temperatures routinely reach triple digits, and even more so if you’re tasked with a squad like the 2023 ACL Chicago White Sox. It’s giving nothing away to say that that team simply wasn’t very good. Of the 30 Sox I saw that week in early June, only five remain in the organization two and a half years later. Just one, Ryan Burrowes, cracked the Honorable Mention section of our White Sox prospect list this offseason. Draftees like Christian Oppor and George Wolkow eventually brought an infusion of talent to the roster later that summer, but the pickings were slim when I scouted them.
Preparing to scout a complex game is a bit like getting ready for a hike. You need to hydrate all day, bring plenty of water and ice to the game on top of that, time your meals just right, and dress smartly. Some orgs require scouts to wear pants on the complex and others don’t, but regardless of the code, even the slower learners only need to wear jeans once. Seats are at a premium, so many scouts bring portable chairs. Sunscreen is a must for day games. I learned the hard way that birds like to sit in the trees that adorn the Dodgers backfields at Camelback Ranch.
For the week, I was primarily responsible for scouting the White Sox, with clearance to write up pitchers on the opposing team who caught my eye as well. There wasn’t much to see. The second night’s starter, Josimar Cousin, was a little interesting as an older Cuban signee with far more pitchability than you normally get on the backfields, but nobody was lighting up the radar gun. Many of the pitchers left were non-prospects I’d seen the year before; I was starting to prepare for a slow week. And it was at this point, heading into the bottom of the second in a dehydrated and overheated stupor, a bit too comfortably ensconced in my camping chair and perhaps a tad restless to write up a player, that the Royals summoned Valdez from the bullpen.
I wish I had a better memory of that night. I recall that Valdez was about six feet tall at the time, of slight build, a little looser and more filled out than your typical 17-year-old arm just up from the DSL. I distinctly remember he touched 95 — nothing special on its own, but practically an oasis for dried-out scouts parched for something to write. His slider flashed average, and he even had a changeup, no sure thing for a teenager. My notes tell me that his slider was a bad fit for his arm slot and that he almost immediately lost his velocity. His game logs reveal that he struck out four and walked one in four innings of work.
This feels too recent for a “back in those days” moment, but the preponderance of video-sharing and data really has ticked up in recent years. At the time, on the day this very young right-hander made his seasonal debut, I had no other video or recent numbers to reference, no way of double checking that my sweat-soaked notes of “flashed a breaking ball” and “chance to clean up the delivery” or “projectable change” passed muster. I just knew that the kid had viable velocity, that I thought he had a path to a tick more and at least one secondary, and that something about him had made me sit up straight while everything else in the desert ambient pushed me to want to lay down and take a nap. With that night’s performance fresh in my mind and a goal to get more aggressive on the complex, I fired up my laptop and put a B2 on the guy — roughly equivalent to the 50 FV we have here, though thankfully with some amount of an implied caveat given the level.
Lesson Three: There’s a Lot To Learn From Your Mistakes
Suffice to say, Valdez does not appear on track to reaching that lofty projection. He’s still 20, so you never know, but in the spring of 2025, less than two years after I submitted my report, the Royals released him; he has not been picked up by another club. As mentioned earlier, scouts miss all the time, and if you’re never playing a 10-2 offsuit, you’re probably not helping your team find talent. Still, there’s a difference between selective aggression and recklessness. Plenty of guys with a B2 or a 50 don’t make it. Most manage to escape the complex, though. I had to figure out what happened.
For Valdez, the rest of the 2023 season went well enough. He posted a 6.92 ERA that summer with an encouraging strikeout rate, and while he was a little wild, he kept his walks under control. It’s not the kind of production that jumps off the page, but it’s totally fine for one of the youngest pitchers in the Fire League (as the ACL has long been disaffectionately known). As he returned to the bump for a second stint in Surprise in 2024, I was curious to follow along.
It didn’t go well:
- May 8: 1.1 innings, two runs, one strikeout, one walk, one homer
- May 23: 1.0 inning, two strikeouts, one walk, one hit batter
- May 30: 0.2 innings, three runs, one hit, one walk, one hit batter
- June 13: 0.1 innings, three runs, three walks
That outing in June wound up being his final affiliated appearance. A look at the tape proved revelatory. The arm strength was still intact (though not substantially better), but with a clearer head and more experience in the rearview mirror, I saw a few things I’d overlooked that first outing. Late separation. Poor timing. Jumpy delivery. Inability to repeat. Still a decent athlete with paths forward, but a project. In the intervening period, more exposure to the level led me to a more nuanced portrait of what I’d actually seen the year before: A lottery ticket, not a likely rotation piece.
Fortunately, the Pirates didn’t dangle Paul Skenes for the young righty out in Surprise. But regardless of what happened with Valdez’s career after I submitted my report, there was a lesson waiting to be found. I may have missed on the player, but the experience inspired reflection, led to valuable conversations with peers, and made me think differently about how to project on young talent in difficult environments.
It’s a moment that resonates again as we mark Prospect Week and the dawn of a new season. We’ll be covering a lot of players in the following weeks and months. We’ll miss on a few forecasts, but the breakdowns will always be thoughtful, measured, and better than what came before. People get better, after all. Prospect writers too.
Brendan covers prospects and the minor leagues for FanGraphs. Previously he worked as a Pro Scout for the Pittsburgh Pirates.
Great piece, Brendan!
The “You’ll be right more than most, but we’ll need to find a new scout” line is a great insight into the actual work of scouting.
It’s even better than that. It was “You’ll be right more than anyone, but you won’t be creating any value for the team whatsoever.”
It really clarified for me the asymmetric costs of a scouting report being wrong. (Well, ignoring trades – the costs there are pretty symmetric.)
It’s a great general insight into many epistemic fields, too. When you’re trying to sort out a little bit of signal from a bunch of noise, the most accurate approach isn’t going to be the most useful one here.
It’s a great complement to the How’s My Driving article. That list is a curated list of the most promising prospects and something like half of them were somewhere in between serious disappointments and outright busts.
But if that’s what the Top 100 is like you definitely don’t want to see the next 100 after that. The fact is you still need a judgment call of which prospects to value more because otherwise you don’t know what to do.
So there has to be some sort of ordinal ranking to guide decision making. Because that’s the point, not to be the most “accurate” but to ensure you make the right decision more often than the wrong one.
This was excellent. Thank you. I learn as much or more from your reflections as I do from your normal write ups.
Brendan’s couple of pieces that discuss the team perspective on scouting and development have been fascinating. He’s also a good writer. Glad he’s writing for FG!
You could say the same about most Low-A games…or High-A….and sometimes AA! Just look at industry Top-100 lists from 5+ years ago: some of those guys never MADE IT to The Show, much less became viable big-leaguers. It’s why many teams are moving away from the use of pro scouts and relying on longer term analysis of how they perform, what the underlying metrics that drive that performance are, and pitch/exit velo models. It’s why you are likely going to see the length of the draft, minor league affiliates and number of controllable players cut again in the coming CBA (certainly by the end of 2029 and the PDL); it’s HARD to play in the big leagues, and owners aren’t as romantic about the quest to find talent as scouts, prospect writers, or hardcore fans.
Players don’t even get to the point where they can be measured and modeled unless they get scooped by scouts first
Author said it better: “if you want to find the next Junior Caminero, you better do it while he’s still swinging at spin in the other batter’s box”
The best orgs use both scouts and analytics and combine them to paint an picture of an athlete.
Do you think the actualization rate of top prospects will be helped or hurt by another round of contraction to the draft and minor leagues?
i am sure you are a fine evaluator, but I KNOW you are an excellent writer. I have read most of your stuff Brendan, and you hit 97-98.
With no offense to Eric, Kiley, or other Fangraphs writers, past or present, this was one of the best articles I’ve ever read here. Like many readers, I’m guilty of focusing on the FV grade and/or ranking, but these peeks behind the curtain really give the numbers great context. Nice work!
Terrific piece – thanks. Great to get a peek behind the curtain. Not nearly the romance I hoped would be back there but a truly engaging and informative article.
I remember reading something that feels appropriate here, too. I think that I’m specifically recalling it from one of Eric’s chats, but it is a bit of a scouting truism: there’s always a chance that you happen to see the guy on the best day he has all season — maybe his whole career.
If you were to scout Cam Schlittler solely based on his WC start, you’d slap a 70 on him and go grab a sandwich. The reality is that there’s a high probability that’s the greatest game he throws in his entire career — that can be true even if he goes on to be a very good pitcher in the league, BTW.
Vasquez instead of Valdez in the second to last paragraph
I noticed that too and it almost reinforced how much he disappeared from baseball
This is super appreciated. So, obviously you mentioned the variation that’s baked into a report on a guy at that level. How much would the org have other people check on this guy if they get a report like that? Jokes about trading him for Skenes aside, it’s not like they went and traded a MLB reliever for him or something. Would they have another scout check it? Did they already have other reports on him and say “gee, this one is an outlier, we’re gonna have to see more before we fully rely on this?”
I would love to see the answer to this. I am guessing he was listed as a long lottery ticket somewhere, for if they were making a deal. But if they got serious about going to get him, they would send a cross-checker.
A report like that would put a flag on him for further cross checks, at the least.
One piece of context that might not be obvious from the piece: Pro teams will have a looooot more B2/50/whatever-your-scale scouting reports than FG does. Scouting reports project what they think the guy will be and let other decision makers sort out out the valuation. So, the Valdez report may have put him on the radar in a way he wasn’t before, but it wasn’t like “holy moses send the director down there for a look!”
Thanks, Brendan!
Honestly, might be the best piece I’ve read since Lars Anderson’s series a few years ago.
I wonder who the last holy moses was.
Excellent piece. Always hydrate.
Love this article Brendan, I for one would love more articles about your detailed scouting experiences!
I enjoyed this article and the inside perspective that Brendan adds to Fangraph’s.
In the future it might be helpful to explain some jargon you use a little more thoroughly. When you said “org the complex”, I had no idea what that meant, and I was confused enough that I read past the couple of words that gave the first insight into the meaning without properly digesting it. I eventually figured it out via context, but it could be helpful for many readers if you assume terminology like that needs a reasonable explanation.
Wonderful article!! Really gives an insight, but also is relatable for anyone who has had a job, made mistakes, and had to learn from those mistakes and other people.
Just to add to the chorus of praise: great piece. In re this line:
I still see analysts continuing to not get this. Just to mention one example from someone well known, but not from FanGraphs: in his report last year on the ChiSox he didn’t just rank Colson Montgomery poorly (totally fair) but also really denigrated him as well as anyone in the comments who suggested he might have a better future than said analyst saw.
Of course, Montgomery ended up with a very respectable 2.7 WAR in about a half season, an impressive debut albeit one could still fairly have doubts if that’s sustainable. My point is that when questioned about that in comments this year, the response was dismissively repeating that the White Sox sent Montgomery to development camp before he turned his season (his career?) around.
What a complete non sequitur on his part. No one thinks any analyst will always be right; it’s a highly uncertain process. And no one would debate that Montgomery needed to get better. But if part of that betterment happened on the backfields of Arizona or Florida for a few weeks, so be it. As you say, players “sometimes get better.” Yet somehow said analyst refused to say “oh, messed up on that one, didn’t see his path to getting better.” Rather he self-righteously claimed that the fact that the player needed to work on his skills to actualize his talent meant that he was right in denigrating his future. No sir. Of course, he needed to get better. Dismissing the possibility that he could do so is the problem.
In short: he should learn precisely the lesson that this great article mentions.
A more charitable reading of (presumably) Keith’s comment is that the Montgomery who had a great year was essentially a different player than the one he evaluated.
That’s where “bet on athletes” comes in, to be fair!
This was tremendous, thank you for sharing
Really enjoyed this look behind the curtain!