Less than a week after Cody Bellinger signed a three-year deal that allows him to opt out after each of the first two seasons, Matt Chapman has done the same. The 30-year-old third baseman, who spent the past two seasons with the Blue Jays, has agreed to a three-year, $54 million deal with the Giants, with a mutual option for a fourth year — a deal that looks significantly less favorable than that of Bellinger.

Chapman placed seventh on our Top 50 Free Agents list in November, and like Bellinger (who was third on the list) sought and seemed likely to land a larger contract, particularly given the track record of their mutual agent, Scott Boras. That said, Chapman hit free agency after an uneven season, with his overall numbers (.240/.330/.424 for a 110 wRC+ with 3.5 WAR) representing a slight falloff from his 2022 performance (.229/.330/.433, 118 wRC+, 4.2 WAR). A closer look shows that last year Chapman had just two productive months and four bad ones, as well as difficulties hitting with runners in scoring position.

I’ll explore those details below, but the overarching impression I get from this deal — far more so than from Bellinger’s contract, in fact — is that Chapman and Boras overestimated how robust the market for his services would be and had to settle for much less. According to TSN Sports’ Scott Mitchell, the third baseman declined a six-year, $120 million extension offer from the Blue Jays at some point within the past year. His new contract falls short of that average annual value, even though it is half the length.

As initially reported, Chapman is guaranteed $20 million for 2024, $18 million for ’25, and $16 million for ’26, but the breakdown is more complicated. He’ll receive a $2 million signing bonus and a $16 million salary for 2024, with a $17 million player option and $2 million buyout for ’25, an $18 million player option and $3 million buyout for ’26, and then a $20 million mutual option and $1 million buyout for ’27. So if this winds up being a one-year deal, he’ll make $20 million ($2 million signing bonus, plus $16 million salary, plus $2 million buyout); for the two-year deal, it’s $38 million (the initial bonus, salaries of $16 million and $17 million, and a $3 million buyout); and for the three-year deal, it’s $54 million (bonus, salaries of $16 million, $17 million, and $18 million, $1 million buyout). If the mutual option is picked up — which is certainly no guarantee, considering he’ll be entering his age-34 season — the total value of the four-year deal will be $73 million (that $54 million, minus the $1 million buyout, plus $20 million). Got all that?

Chapman’s $18 million AAV is 25% below Ben Clemens’ estimate from our Top 50 list. Ben figured that Chapman would get $24 million per year (five years, $120 million), while our median crowdsource estimate came in at a $20 million AAV (four years, $80 million). By comparison, Bellinger’s $26.7 million AAV actually topped the estimates of $25 million per year by Clemens and $24 million per year by our crowd. What’s more, where Bellinger’s deal appeared to be a slight overpay relative to Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS-projected contract of three years and $70 million, Chapman’s deal falls short of the three-year, $79 million contract projected by the ZiPS model:

For both deals, Dan also provided contract valuations with the opt-outs priced in: three years and $58 million for Bellinger, and three years and $66 million for Chapman. The former exceeded the model’s estimate by about 38%, but the latter fell short by about 18%. That’s quite a haircut, particularly when one considers the questions of sustainability of Bellinger’s performance given his dreadful 2021–22 stretch and last year’s batted ball stats, which reflected a more contact-based two-strike approach. By comparison, for Chapman — who is more than two years older, which is already reflected in ZiPS — the concerns are more garden variety ones about season-to-season variance and aging.

Traditional numbers amplified the perception that Chapman’s decline from 2022 to ’23 was steeper than the advanced stats suggest; his 17 home runs and 54 RBIs last season were a considerable dip from his 27 home runs and 76 RBIs the year before. His career-low full-season RBIs total was in large part the product of a .215/.320/.299 (77 wRC+) performance with runners in scoring position. It was an anomalous showing — he produced a 122 wC+ in 170 PA with runners in scoring position in 2022, and owned a 128 wRC+ in that capacity for the first six years of his career — but it was poorly timed.

Situational hitting aside, Chapman’s monthly splits further shed light on why his season may have been viewed as worse than it actually was:

Chapman’s strong start was impossible to sustain — he had a 32.9% barrel rate over the first month of the season — but his production didn’t regress so much as it cratered. He posted a .205/.298/.361 (84 wRC+) line after April. The split on the bottom two lines illustrates Chapman’s numbers before and after spraining his right middle finger in a weight room mishap; he initially missed three games after suffering the injury, then went just 5-for-32 with a 40% strikeout rate in nine games before landing on the injured list. He missed 15 games and continued to be unproductive in the 15 games he played between his return and the end of the regular season, though he barreled the ball at a 16.2% clip, with a 51.4% hard-hit rate in that final stretch.

Chapman’s strikeout rate crept up one point from 2022, to 28.4%, but when he made contact, he absolutely pasted the ball. He produced average exit velocities of 92.5 mph or higher and hard-hit rates of at least 51.4% or higher in every month except August (90.0 mph and 42.6%, respectively), while his barrel rates were 10.5% or higher in every month except May (9.2%). His full-season 93.4 mph average exit velocity and 17.1% barrel rate both placed in the 98th percentile, while his 56.4% hard-hit rate trailed only that of Aaron Judge among all hitters. He was unlucky in the power department, in that he fell 3.7 home runs short of his expected total based upon the batted ball specs of his biggest flies, a gap that ranked eighth in the majors. He fell 33 points short of his .457 expected slugging percentage.

Chapman did play very good defense, with 12 DRS, 4.5 UZR, and 3 RAA. Those numbers all represented improvements on his 2022 metrics, even in about 130 fewer innings. That performance didn’t escape recognition, as he took home his fourth Gold Glove.

In all, it was a good-not-great season, one with an arc that didn’t particularly help Chapman’s cause. It was reported back in May that he and the team were both interested in an extension, though it’s not clear when the Blue Jays offered him the $120 million deal. Chapman turned down Toronto’s $20.325 million qualifying offer as well, but in mid-November, the team was still reportedly “making a big push” to keep him.

Yet the Blue Jays, who at one point thought they had landed Shohei Ohtani, and who were viewed as being the favorites to sign Bellinger, instead chose to make a series of smaller moves: They re-signed Kevin Kiermaier to a one-year deal in late December, signed Isiah Kiner-Falefa to a two-year deal soon afterward, and added Justin Turner on a one-year deal in late January. With Kiner-Falefa, Turner, Santiago Espinal, and Cavan Biggio all in the fold, the Blue Jays figured they had third base covered, even if that quartet doesn’t make up for the production that Chapman would have provided. Our Depth Charts projects the Blue Jays to finish with 2.1 WAR at third base; Chapman is projected for 3.3 WAR by Depth Charts. In addition to the roster crunch, Chapman’s salary, even at a discount, was more than what the team was comfortable paying after pivoting to those other players. The Blue Jays’ luxury tax payroll is estimated to be just under $12 million above the first Competitive Balance Tax threshold ($237 million), and they will be paying the tax for a second straight season.

With half a dozen teams — the Angels, Braves, Cardinals, Guardians, Padres, Red Sox — already committing at least $20 million to their third basemen on deals that extend through at least 2026, plus the Dodgers and Yankees prioritizing spending elsewhere and the Mets looking to cut expenses, Chapman only had a limited number of options for landing spots. The Mariners, Cubs, and Giants were the only teams other than the Blue Jays that were publicly connected to him.

This is the latest move for the Giants in a winter that also included a six-year, $113 million deal for center fielder Jung Hoo Lee , four years and $44 million for righty Jordan Hicks, three years and $42 million for DH/outfielder Jorge Soler, and two years and $8.25 million for catcher Tom Murphy. The signing of Chapman bumps J.D. Davis — his college teammate at Cal State Fullerton, incidentally — out of the lineup and provides San Francisco a solid upgrade, particularly in the field, where he’ll be playing behind a staff with three projected starters (Logan Webb, Alex Cobb, and Hicks) who last year had groundball rates above 57%.

Davis hit .248/.325/.413 (104 wRC+) while playing 116 games at third base (105 of them starts), 15 at first base, and 14 at DH. Long saddled with a reputation as a below-average defender, he put in considerable work to improve, and in a career-high 915.2 innings at the hot corner produced a mixed bag of metrics (-11 DRS , 0.8 UZR, 4 RAA). With lefty-hitting LaMonte Wade and righty Wilmer Flores the most likely combination at first base and Soler taking the bulk of the playing time at DH, Davis doesn’t have a clear path to playing time and could be a trade candidate. President of baseball operations Farhan Zaidi acknowledged the team’s surplus of infielders, telling reporters, “We’ll explore different things. It’s certainly possible that a move or two happens before the end of camp.’’

Perhaps more notably, Zaidi refused to rule out another free agent addition and indicated that the team could go over the $237 million CBT threshold. (RosterResource places their payroll at $230.5 million for tax purposes.) With the team already waiting for Cobb and Robbie Ray to return from surgeries at some point during the season, and having just lost Tristan Beck to aneurysm surgery, sources told the San Francisco Chronicle that the Giants remain in the mix for Blake Snell, another Boras client.

As for Chapman, here’s his ZiPS percentile breakdown:

It’s not hard to envision Chapman putting in a strong enough season to opt out, but it is worth remembering that Oracle Park particularly tends to suppress right-handed power, which is Chapman’s calling card on offense. All of which is to say that next winter, he could suffer from a similar perception problem if his counting stats don’t rebound, and so to these eyes, he’s carrying a greater share of the risk than he otherwise might have. However much this gets spun as a win-win deal like that of Bellinger, this looks like a case where Boras and his client came up short.

A couple of weeks ago, I spent too much time staring at the back of the Target Field pitcher’s mound. Like, way, way too much time. I watched hundreds of video clips. I scoured pictures from image services, social media, and satellites. It could have been boring. It probably should have been boring, but I was looking for the answer to a question that I found interesting, and that was enough. At a certain point, I realized I had another interesting question on a subject that should have been even more boring. I’d been staring at the mound for so long that I started wondering about the spiky little mat that pitchers use to scrape the mud out of their spikes. Where did it come from? How long has it been there? Why haven’t I ever actually seen a pitcher use one? How is it possible that I’ve been watching baseball my entire life and never once thought about this thing before? It might be the only object on a baseball field whose name I don’t know. I must have spent more time looking at that white piece of plastic or rubber or whatever-the-hell-it-is than I’ve spent looking at anyone I love, and yet for the life of me, until two weeks ago I don’t think I’d ever spent one second thinking about it. So I started thinking about it.

That spiky little mat is called a cleat cleaner. Because teams often auction off game-used cleat cleaners, you can find some pretty good pictures of them. The ones that get sold are usually from memorable games, like no-hitters, playoff games, or really any game where the cleat cleaner was touched by Shohei Ohtani:

Read the rest of this entry »

Daulton Varsho’s last two seasons were directionally different than his first two seasons.The left-handed-hitting outfielder put up a pedestrian 37.8% pull rate in 2020-2021, and in 2022-2023 that number climbed to a lofty 52.6%. Apprised of the marked jump by colleague Davy Andrews prior to my recent visit to Toronto Blue Jays camp, I asked Varsho if it was spurred by a purposeful change of approach. He claimed that it wasn’t.

“I think it’s just how teams are pitching me,” said Varsho, whose pull rate in the two-year span was the highest among qualified hitters. “You don’t want to force the ball to any certain field — it has to sort of naturally happen — and I’ve been getting pounded in. You also have to figure out the changeup away and righties throwing sliders in. You don’t really want to force those to left-center or left field, because they end up being fly outs.”

Davy had also informed me that Varsho’s pull-side results have been far better than his opposite-field results, which came as anything but news to the 27-year-old Marshfield, Wisconsin native. My mentioning it elicited a matter-of-fact response.

“That’s where success happens,” said Varsho. “It’s where my swing is the most successful, and where I can do the most damage.”

It’s no secret that catching pitches out front and driving them in the air goes a long way toward producing power numbers, and not only has Varsho gone yard 47 times over the past two campaigns, just one of the blasts was to the opposite field. My asking if he’s made a concerted effort to lift the ball led to the following exchange: Read the rest of this entry »

Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley talk to FanGraphs writer Ben Clemens about the site’s ongoing efforts to model team depth and factor it into projections, then preview the 2024 Toronto Blue Jays (30:46) with The Athletic’s Kaitlyn McGrath, and the 2024 Cincinnati Reds (1:16:31) with The Athletic’s C. Trent Rosecrans.

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Link to Other Ben’s blog about depth
Link to Ben’s depth tables
Link to bullpen chaining explainer
Link to projection limitations
Link to Ben on odds calibration
Link to Ben on odds calibration 2
Link to “model talk” pods
Link to Jays offseason tracker
Link to Jays depth chart
Link to Stark on Ohtani’s flight
Link to Sheehan on Rogers Centre
Link to Kaitlyn on Varsho
Link to Statcast park factors
Link to OF OAA leaderboard
Link to OF DRS leaderboard
Link to Kaitlyn on Berríos
Link to 2019 FG cutter post
Link to cutter tweet
Link to Ben on new pitches
Link to Kaitlyn’s fan survey
Link to Mattingly beard
Link to Kaitlyn’s Athletic archive
Link to Reds offseason tracker
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Link to FG payrolls leaderboard
Link to 2023 Senzel article
Link to team SP projections
Link to team RP projections
Link to story about Reds bunting
Link to 2023 bunt hit leaders
Link to BP on Friedl
Link to bunting Stat Blast
Link to story about bench coaches
Link to Reds bench coach story
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Link to C. Trent’s Athletic archive

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Among other things, we at FanGraphs are known for our projections, especially at this time of year. We like to think that’s because our projection systems are good! But it’s worth remembering that projections always include uncertainly. ZiPS, for example, reflects a range of projected outcomes based on a million simulations of the coming season, with the first percentile representing the worst projected performance and the 99th percentile, the best. The numbers you see on our player pages reflect the 50th percentile projection — the median projected outcome — for each player.

For me, the fun begins when the projections are live, because I use them as a starting point to begin my own analysis using data points that are not folded into the player projections, such as video and bat tracking information. I like using these tools because they allow me to see whether a player has a foundation in place that could help him exceed his median projection. For this piece, I want to focus on players’ potential ceilings, which I will define as their 90th percentile projection, so that we can stay within the realm of possibility. (Theoretically, a player could hit 80 home runs this season, which would surely be his peak performance, but that is so extremely unlikely to happen that it is not worth considering here.) From the model’s perspective, all players’ 90th percentile outcomes are equally likely; my analysis is more subjective. I will use additional information to reinforce confidence that a player can indeed reach his ceiling.

The goal here was to look at players who have a lot of uncertainty in their projections, due to a volatile profile, an unproven track record, or both. From there, I settled on a group of three inherently risky players who have specific traits that I think should lead to an immediate improvement. With that said, let’s get started:

I’ve presented Adolis García’s 2023 performance to provide a comparison to his 2024 projections. Going into last season, García’s 50th percentile OPS+ and WAR were 103 and 2.0, respectively, meaning that his actual production greatly exceeded his median projection. In response to this, ZiPS is more confident in García entering this season, even as his profile remains volatile.

Is it possible for him to get even more out of his bat this season? I think so. In terms of plate discipline and swing decisions, García made a significant stride forward in 2023. However, his projections expect his BB/K ratio to regress from his .37 mark last season and be closer to his 2022 level of .22. Using Robert Orr’s SEAGER metric, which calculates a combination of selectivity and strategic aggression, García scored a 19.4% last year. That was in the 88th percentile of hitters, an improvement from being slightly above average in 2022.

García slightly improved his Hittable Pitch Take%, while simultaneously increasing his Selectivity% by nearly five percentage points. Yes, that helped him draw more walks than was expected of him, but it also allowed him to crush 39 homers. García is following an intuitive path to plate discipline improvement. After posting bottom decile whiff and chase rates in 2021 and 2022, he significantly cut down on his chasing last year. Now that he has proven to possess a better understanding of the strike zone, the next step is to stop whiffing as much. His mechanics are efficient, his plate coverage is good, and he has already shown a knack for improvement. That’s a darn good recipe for a player looking to get the most out of his skills.

García’s case is a bit simpler than the two players we’ll discuss next. Let’s move onto another talented outfielder:

I’m a Riley Greene believer. My expectations for him last year were higher than where his performance fell, but he also had two unlikely injuries that could explain his underwhelming season. In May, he had a stress fracture in his fibula that caused him to miss just over a month. Then, after looking fantastic in his return, he tore his UCL in his non-throwing arm. It was a bizarre bit of luck for a player looking to prove himself as a cornerstone piece in Detroit. His projections for 2024 reflect a wide net of uncertainty in his offensive profile, but also a high ceiling because he boasts great hitting skills and is only entering his age-23 season.

Greene hits the snot out of the ball. His xwOBACON of .477 was in the top 4% of the league. His ability to manipulate his posture to get to different pitch heights allows him to have great plate coverage. His average 40.4-degree Vertical Bat Angle (VBA) – the angle of the barrel relative to the ground at impact – is among the steepest in the majors, and he combines it with a path that always works up and through the baseball. As a result, he has an ideal launch-angle distribution and consistently flush batted-ball spin. Here are a few videos of him covering pitches all over the strike zone:

Velocity up? Check. Slow and away? Check. Back foot breaker? Check. His swing is so versatile because of how he changes his torso tilt while still maintaining upward angles on his swings. He is capable of getting to just about anything, which is why he was so good against breaking balls on the season, with with a .366 xwOBA against them that ranked 18th among 260 hitters who saw at least 400 such pitches in 2023. His proficient barrel and body variabilities are the exact skills I’m looking for when betting on a player to hit his ceiling, especially if the hitter impacts the ball like Greene does. With health and better controlled aggression, Greene will put himself in a great position to hit his 90th percentile outcome. A 151 OPS+ would be a major step up from the 117 he posted last year, but at times, he has already flashed that level of dominance. The final piece of the puzzle is consistency.

Now, let’s evaluate an exciting young catcher looking to prove his 2023 season was no fluke:

Bo Naylor hit his tail off last year to the tune of a 124 wRC+. In a Guardians lineup that didn’t have much beyond José Ramírez and older brother Josh Naylor, Bo emerged as one of the team’s top offensive contributors from the moment he cemented himself as the primary catcher. His great performance, albeit in limited time, is reflected in his ceiling, while his floor is based on his lack of a track record in the majors.

It’s a good sign whenever a young catcher has such a solid 50th percentile projection, though in Naylor’s case, the expectation is that his power will drop off. That is reasonable when you consider his .232 ISO last year would’ve been third among catchers with at least 300 plate appearances, despite the fact that his 30.8% hard-hit rate would’ve ranked 235th among the 258 qualified hitters, according to Baseball Savant. On top of that, Naylor outpaced his expected statistics by quite a wide margin. His .347 wOBA was considerably higher than his .309 xwOBA and his .379 xSLG was far off from his .470 mark. But wait a minute — we know that there is sometimes more to uncover when we see discrepancies like this. Is Naylor one of those cases?

Of the 406 players last year who had at least 100 batted balls, Naylor ranked 18th in Pulled FB% (sourced from Orr’s leaderboards again). If Naylor is one of the better players in the game at pulling fly balls consistently, then he should be able to outperform his expected statistics again in 2024. Does he have the swing mechanics and path to keep up this pace? Naylor, a left-handed batter, is typically hitting with the platoon advantage, making it easier for him to create the Horizontal Bat Angles (HBA) required to pull these pitches consistently. Matchups with righty pitchers are ideal for lefty hitters with pulled fly ball approaches. Here are a few clips that show him executing that swing on different pitches:

Naylor is going to be challenged to hit pitches away from his body to the pull side, but if he can keep that front side locked like he did in these swings, he may be able to keep up his pull side success despite the lack of raw power. In these swings, he showed that he can turn on 99 mph heat, but also that he can stay disciplined enough to wait on an 88 mph changeup. Given what we know about his patience and plate discipline, Naylor is the type of player who should be able to match his swing decisions with his swing strengths. That’s an important skill that could help him build upon his impressive debut.

Earlier this week, I took a projection-driven two-part look at the trouble spots on National League and American League contenders. The exercise — a sibling of my annual pre-trade deadline Replacement Level Killers series — primarily highlighted clubs in the middle of the table, based on our Playoff Odds, with many of the best teams, such as the Braves and Dodgers, going completely unmentioned.

In that regard, the exercise worked as I had intended, focusing on the teams and spots where a marginal addition from outside the organization or even a modest breakout from within it could have a sizable impact on their chances of making the postseason. To be considered contenders, teams needed Playoff Odds of at least 25%, and roughly speaking, all but one of those mentioned fell in the range of 80-85 wins. Under the 12-team playoff format, that certainly counts as contention once you consider that two of last year’s NL Wild Card teams, the Diamondbacks and Marlins, qualified with just 84 wins, nosing out the 83-win Cubs and the 82-win Padres and Reds. At each position, I highlighted the two lowest-ranked teams from within that subset, so long as they projected to produce less than 2.0 WAR, after an adjustment: I applied a 20% reduction to counter the general tendency to overestimate playing time at this point in the season. In other words instead of having a total of 1,000 WAR projected across the 30 teams, and 57% of that (570 WAR) allocated to position players, our Depth Chart values currently add up to about 682 WAR, an inflation of about 20%.

Because the mid-table teams almost invariably had some glaring weakness, seven teams escaped scrutiny. The Braves (98.5% odds), Dodgers (94.6%), and Cardinals (53.5%) — three of the NL’s top four teams by those odds, each favored to win their respective divisions — were absent from the Senior Circuit roundup, while the Yankees (75.6%), Rays (62.5%), Orioles (50.6%) and Rangers (36.3%) missed out on the fun in the Junior Circuit piece. Only one of the top four NL teams showed up with trouble spots (the Phillies at 58.5%), but the AL distribution was more haphazard, in that the Astros (86.8%), Twins (64.9%), Mariners (58.6%), and Blue Jays (47.4%) each had at least one representative within my roundup.

In response to the feedback I received, I thought it would be worthwhile to do one more roundup in this format, this time limiting it to those otherwise unexamined teams and going only one layer deep at each position. I couldn’t quite call this “The Weakest Spots Among the Powerhouses” or “… Among the Top Contenders,” hence the title. Note that not every position had a team fall below the threshold, though I do mention the lowest-ranked ones in passing for those spots. It’s worth keeping in mind the tendency for even the game’s top prospects to have fairly tepid projections based upon limited minor league data and a higher risk of being farmed out if they start slowly; those players don’t always hit the ground running. For team totals, I’ve cited the adjusted WARs, but where I reference individual player projections I’ve stuck to the published figures.

Catcher

Rays (21st, 1.9 adjusted WAR)

My AL roundup contained only the Red Sox catchers, and while I’m not sure what happened since I composed the list to move the Rays from right at the 2.0 minimum to below it, here we are. Since landing on last summer’s Replacement Level Killers list, they’ve basically turned over their tandem, with René Pinto and Alex Jackson replacing Christian Bethancourt and Francisco Mejía. The 27-year-old Pinto did the bulk of the catching in the second half, hitting .252/.267/.456 (98 wRC+) in 105 PA, with an eye-watering 34-to-2 strikeout-to-walk ratio. It’s true that he hits the ball hard, but the Rays seem to like him more for his defense than his offense — or, more specifically, his framing, which was 1.7 runs above average by our framing metric and two above by that of Statcast. Meanwhile, the latter system rated him at seven runs below average in blocking and one below in caught stealing.

The 28-year-old Jackson didn’t play in the majors last year, and he owns a .141/.243/.227 line and 48.1% strikeout rate in 185 PA in the majors, mostly from 2021. Nonetheless, he tore up Triple-A (.284/.347/.556 with 16 homers in 248 PA) with the Brewers and Rays’ affiliates before being sidelined by a shoulder injury. Defensively, he’s been a bit below average in framing but is otherwise average-ish. The 28-year-old Mejía, back in the organization on a minor league deal after a brief odyssey with the Angels, probably has his work cut out to regain a share of his old job. He hit just .227/.258/.400 (80 wRC+) last year and hasn’t come close to fulfilling the promise he showed at the plate in the minors.

First Base

Yankees (17th, 1.4 WAR)

Anthony Rizzo got off to a hot start in 2023, hitting for a 146 wRC+ through May 28, when he collided with Fernando Tatis Jr. and missed his next three games due to what the Yankees called a neck injury. Upon returning, he hit for just a 43 wRC+ over the next two months before the team shut him down with post-concussion symptoms; he didn’t play again, and finished at .244/.328/.378 (100 wRC+). The 34-year-old Rizzo is said to be healthy now, but he projects for just a .238/.332/.426 line, a 111 wRC+ — right at the major league average for first basemen last year — and 1.3 WAR, which won’t be a huge help to the Yankees lineup. The most likely backup is DJ LeMahieu, who’s slated to be the starting third baseman and who’s coming off his second 101 wRC+ in three years, though he did post a 129 wRC+ after the All-Star break compared to a 77 before, when he was still dealing with the effects of a right big toe injury. Oswaldo Cabrera, a switch-hitting utilityman who was very good in a late-2022 stint and terrible last year, is another alternative for first.

Second Base

Oddly enough — or perhaps fittingly, as we are talking about good clubs — none of these teams has a second base situation that falls below the threshold. Orioles second basemen project to rank 14th in the majors with an adjusted 2.4 WAR, the lowest mark from among this group, but that’s with 20-year-old Jackson Holliday, the no. 1 prospect on our Top 100 list, 25-year-old Jordan Westburg, and 29-year-old Ramón Urías projected to account for most of the playing time, with all projecting to be average or better — which particularly for Holliday would be no small achievement, even with his pedigree. Note that this is Baltimore’s only appearance within this exercise, even though the team has a lower projected value at the first base and DH slots than it does at second base; the O’s just don’t stand out relative to their competition’s weaknesses.

Shortstop

Braves (24th, 1.6 WAR)

The Braves project to be the majors’ top team, but they do have their weaknesses, and this is one. After letting Dansby Swanson depart as a free agent, they turned shortstop duties over to Orlando Arcia, who had spent five and a half seasons with diminishing returns in Milwaukee, plus another season and a half as a utilityman for Atlanta, playing a grand total of 24 innings at shortstop. The team nonetheless signed him to a three-year, $7.3 million extension — practically peanuts — and he handled the position reasonably well, hitting .264/.321/.420 (99 wRC+) with a career-high 2.3 WAR despite a mixed bag of defensive metrics. Given that he netted just 0.2 WAR from 2018–22, the projection systems are understandably skeptical he can sustain such production; if he can’t, who knows what kind of magic pixie dust the Braves can sprinkle on backups Luis Guillorme and David Fletcher to try and turn them into league-average regulars.

Third Base

Here’s another spot where none of these teams falls below the threshold, with the Dodgers (15th at 2.1 WAR) the lowest ranked. Neither Max Muncy’s fielding at third base nor his low batting averages are pretty, but he’s a disciplined hitter who can absolutely crush the ball and justify his spot in the lineup; last year, he matched his career high of 36 homers while netting 2.9 WAR. Chris Taylor and the freshly re-signed Enrique Hernández are around for those times when Muncy’s banged up or the team could use more defensive support.

Left Field

Dodgers (21st, 1.4 WAR)

This is the NL West juggernaut’s weakest spot, even after taking steps to address it. Newcomer Teoscar Hernández, who joined the fold on a one-year, $23.5 million deal, hits the ball very hard… when he makes contact. In 2023 he posted an average exit velocity of 91.3 mph (80th percentile), a 13.8% barrel rate (88th percentile), and a 49.4% hard-hit rate (90th percentile). The problem was that he struck out 31.1% of the time opposite a 5.6% walk rate, so he hit an uninspiring .258/.305/.435 (105 wRC+). To be fair, he did say he had trouble seeing the ball at the Mariners’ T-Mobile Park, where he slugged just .380, so it’s hardly out of the question that a change of scenery could drive a rebound for the 31-year-old slugger. The aforementioned Taylor and Enrique Hernández will see time here as well, but both are a few years removed from their best work. Taylor rebounded from a bad season and a slow first half to hit .237/.326/.420 (104 wRC+) but struck out 32.6% of the time himself, while Hernández perked up after returning to Los Angeles, posting a 59 wRC+ with the Red Sox and a 96 wRC+ with the Dodgers.

Center Field

One more where everybody is above the threshold, with the Rays (19th at 2.1 adjusted WAR) the lowest ranked among those here, based primarily on the projections’ skepticism that Jose Siri can repeat last year’s extreme performance. (See Davy Andrews’ piece on Tromps Per Womp.)

Right Field

Cardinals (14th, 1.8 WAR)

Given his plus-plus raw power, few people doubted Jordan Walker’s offensive ability, hence his no. 12 ranking on last year’s Top 100 Prospects list. At age 21, with no Triple-A experience, he made the Cardinals out of spring training and immediately reeled off a 12-game hitting streak. But when the league quickly adjusted, he struggled briefly and was sent to Memphis to work on his approach, particularly so he could elevate the ball with greater consistency. Even with a 46.9% groundball rate, he finished at a respectable .276/.342/.445 (116 wRC+), but his defense was another matter. Blocked by Nolan Arenado at third base, he moved to the outfield and was absolutely brutal according to the metrics (-16 DRS, -12 RAA, -11.8 UZR), and the visuals weren’t much better, even with the occasional impressive play. Thus he netted just 0.2 WAR. He does project to improve to 1.6 WAR, with Dylan Carlson getting time in right field as well — presumably when the Cardinals mercifully slot Walker at DH — and I’d bet that Walker far outhits the 116 wRC+ for which he’s projected.

Designated Hitter

Rangers (13th, 1.2 WAR)

With all but the Dodgers and Yankees projected to produce less than 2.0 WAR out of the DH spot (that’s after adjustment), this category is shooting fish in a barrel, and with the Cardinals and Rangers virtually tied, I’m focusing on the defending champions. This is hardly a bad situation, not only because Texas ranks among the upper half of the 30 teams, but also because about half the playing time projects to go to 22-year-old Wyatt Langford, who was chosen fourth in last year’s draft and rocketed through four levels to reach Triple-A, hitting .360/.480/.677 (190 wRC+) with 10 homers in 200 PA along the way. He just placed second only to Holliday on our Top 100 list as “perhaps the most complete hitter in the minors.” The problem is that he’s a 30-grade defender, with the speed for center field but a fringe-average arm and a poor feel for outfield play in general, at least at this stage; meanwhile, the outfield of Evan Carter, Leody Taveras, and Adolis García features strong defenders at all three spots. Langford could make the roster out of spring training, but it’s not a guarantee. With the possible exception of Corey Seager, who’s working his way back from January hernia surgery, no other Ranger projects to have much impact at this spot, hence the middling ranking.

Even with an extra day of February, we’re entering the month of March with several key free agents un-signed. Our no. 5, no. 6, and no. 7-ranked free agents — Blake Snell, Jordan Montgomery, and Matt Chapman — are all headed for a gap year. So are various other useful veterans, like Brandon Belt, J.D. Martinez, and Michael Lorenzen.

It’s not ideal. The teams want to have their rosters set, the players don’t want to miss camp if they can avoid it. It’s not great from a content creation/publicity perspective for either the league or the media. Myself included; when we called dibs on writing up the various big free agent signings last fall, I picked Snell and Monty, and I’ve been jumping out of my skin at every Slack notification I’ve gotten since. I haven’t slept in four months!

And the bigwigs at MLB are getting tetchy about it. Two weeks ago, commissioner Rob Manfred told reporters that the league had proposed a free agent signing period to the union in the last round of CBA talks, with the goal of creating “two weeks of flurried activity” that would dominate SportsCenter and settle everyone’s offseason quickly. Manfred’s argument is that concentrating the action would grab baseball much-needed publicity. Publicity leads to attention, and attention to money. Everyone wins. Yesterday, ESPN’s Alden Gonzalez released a reported feature on the idea, including the blindingly obvious reasons why the union left Manfred on read.

It’s a bird! It’s a plane! It’s a trial balloon! Read the rest of this entry »

Yesterday, I laid out a new method of quantifying depth that we’re looking into here at FanGraphs. It’s based on the idea that while our depth charts are a point estimate of how much each player will play, the real-life way things work is different. To mimic reality more closely, we’re experimenting with removing players from the depth charts algorithmically and rebuilding teams on the fly to see how they look without their best players. Yesterday’s article covers our methodology in great detail.

There’s one thing that I wanted to add to that article but couldn’t find the space for: more tables. There was one big giant table in there that showed each team’s winning percentage as we removed more and more players from their squad. But that’s just not a great way to look at anything – 300 numbers in a giant table is more information than our brains can easily process. I don’t have a lot of new information today, but I thought I’d slice that data up into more bite-sized chunks so you can look at it without your eyes glazing over. One quick note: All the tables in this article are sortable, so you can order them by whichever category you so desire. Read the rest of this entry »

Below is an analysis of the prospects in the farm system of the Los Angeles Dodgers. Scouting reports were compiled with information provided by industry sources as well as my own observations. This is the fourth year we’re delineating between two anticipated relief roles, the abbreviations for which you’ll see in the “position” column below: MIRP for multi-inning relief pitchers, and SIRP for single-inning relief pitchers. The ETAs listed generally correspond to the year a player has to be added to the 40-man roster to avoid being made eligible for the Rule 5 draft. Manual adjustments are made where they seem appropriate, but we use that as a rule of thumb.

A quick overview of what FV (Future Value) means can be found here. A much deeper overview can be found here.

All of the ranked prospects below also appear on The Board, a resource the site offers featuring sortable scouting information for every organization. It has more details (and updated TrackMan data from various sources) than this article and integrates every team’s list so readers can compare prospects across farm systems. It can be found here. Read the rest of this entry »

Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley banter about Shohei Ohtani’s surprise marriage announcement (5:15), and Portia of Ohtani fan account @shoheisaveus returns (18:13) to tell Ben how the news was received by the Shobae community. Then Ben and Meg Stat Blast (36:49) about the biggest year-to-year changes in WAR produced by different players who wore the same uniform number for the same team, preview the 2024 Philadelphia Phillies (44:20) with The Athletic’s Matt Gelb, and preview the 2024 Los Angeles Angels (1:21:51) with The Athletic’s Sam Blum.

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Link to thread on Cal’s stats
Link to anti-Streak take
Link to owner Cal article
Link to Ohtani’s Insta post
Link to Portia’s first appearance
Link to Ohtani comments
Link to Ichiro dog secrecy
Link to Matsui marriage
Link to Matsui wife drawing
Link to “Ohtani loss” tweet
Link to other Ohtani tweet
Link to John on Ed Sullivan
Link to Dozier tweet
Link to Stat Blast data
Link to Stat Blast song cover
Link to Kenny Jackelen’s Twitter
Link to Phillies offseason tracker
Link to Phillies depth chart
Link to Matt’s Athletic archive
Link to himbo article 1
Link to himbo article 2
Link to Harper offer report
Link to Harper extension article
Link to Matt on Realmuto
Link to Tango on Realmuto’s framing
Link to Eno on Dombrowski pens
Link to Laurila on Dombrowski pens
Link to Sam on Bryant
Link to Moreno report
Link to Angels offseason tracker
Link to Angels depth chart
Link to Sam on Percival
Link to Sam on Rendon
Link to EW on Rendon
Link to Sam’s Athletic archive
Link to Sam on broadcasts
Link to Sam on Schanuel
Link to FG top 100
Link to MLB top 100
Link to BP farm rankings
Link to Soto/Bradley report

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