Before Wednesday, the Atlanta Braves’ winter had been centered around fortifying their bullpen. That strategy made sense — Atlanta’s reliever WAR was just inside the bottom third of baseball last year, so keeping the most important pieces of that bullpen around and adding extra talent around them had to be a priority. The Braves wasted little time in signing Will Smith, arguably the best reliever on the market, to a three-year, $40-million deal, and retained midseason acquisition Chris Martin and 37-year-old Darren O’Day on short-term deals as well. Their focus on keeping the band together applied to other areas of the roster too, as they quickly re-signed catcher Tyler Flowers and outfielder Nick Markakis before bringing in another catcher in free agency by adding Travis d’Arnaud via a two-year, $16-million deal.

An area that had gone untouched was the starting rotation, but as of Wednesday afternoon, that is no longer the case. The Braves signed 35-year-old left-hander Cole Hamels to a one-year, $18-million contract, according to ESPN’s Jeff Passan.

Left-hander Cole Hamels and the Atlanta Braves are in agreement on a one-year, $18 million deal, sources tell ESPN.

— Jeff Passan (@JeffPassan) December 4, 2019

Right away, the addition of Hamels brings to mind the upgrade the Braves made to their rotation via free agency last offseason — er, sorry, last June. That’s when Atlanta finally became the team to sign Dallas Keuchel after his extended free agency period, bringing him in on a one-year deal worth $13 million. Keuchel, like Hamels, was a low-velocity veteran southpaw, and after a somewhat rocky first couple of starts, settled in quite nicely down the stretch, earning the chance to start Games 1 and 4 of the NLDS. Read the rest of this entry »

In their contribution to the recent flurry of league activity, the Tigers and Pirates quietly made a deal last Monday: Pittsburgh sent right-hander Dario Agrazal to Detroit in exchange for cash considerations.

While the trade didn’t make headlines, it may still provide insight into Detroit’s 2020 plans. Agrazal, who turns 25 in late December, debuted this season with Pittsburgh and appeared in 15 games, making 14 starts. His results were mixed: He posted a 4.91 ERA and a 5.90 FIP over 73.1 innings, striking out only 13% of opponents while walking 6%. Among pitchers who threw at least 70 innings, Agrazal had the third-lowest strikeout rate in the majors.

Upon first glance, pitching to contact seems like a poor strategy in today’s three-true-outcome game, and Agrazal may ultimately be no more than a spare arm in Motown; we’re guessing that he’ll start the season in Triple-A. Still, under the right circumstances, Agrazal has the ability to turn into more than organizational depth. Read the rest of this entry »

When the A’s acquired Jake Diekman for the first time back in July, they hoped that he might pair effectively with a then-recovering A.J. Puk in neutralizing left-handed hitters, who through that point in the season had hit Oakland relievers to the tune of a .305 wOBA — not terrible, but also behind Houston, Tampa Bay, Cleveland, and New York in the American League. They also hoped that 2019 would end up being the first year since 2006 in which the A’s won a postseason series.

Neither of those things happened. Diekman, who has allowed a .293 wOBA to left-handed hitters over the course of his career, allowed a .314 figure to the 47 lefties he faced for Oakland, walking seven and hitting one with a pitch. The A’s, meanwhile, lost the AL Wild Card game to the Rays, 5-1. Diekman faced one batter.

Still, all the potential the A’s saw in Diekman last summer is still there, and so too is Billy Beane’s thirst for a World Championship. If you thought that last week’s Jurickson Profar trade was evidence of a step back from that goal (which I do not), think again. Diekman alone isn’t enough to put the A’s over the top (frankly, three Diekmans wouldn’t be enough) but teams that plan to punt on a season don’t sign relievers to two-year, $7.5 million deals, as the A’s have just done. Read the rest of this entry »

The following article is part of Jay Jaffe’s ongoing look at the candidates on the BBWAA 2020 Hall of Fame ballot. Originally written for the 2017 election at SI.com, it has been updated to reflect recent voting results as well as additional research. For a detailed introduction to this year’s ballot, and other candidates in the series, use the tool above; an introduction to JAWS can be found here. For a tentative schedule and a chance to fill out a Hall of Fame ballot for our crowdsourcing project, see here. All WAR figures refer to the Baseball-Reference version unless otherwise indicated.

A savant in the batter’s box, Manny Ramirez could be an idiot just about everywhere else — sometimes amusingly, sometimes much less so. The Dominican-born slugger, who grew up in the Washington Heights neighborhood of upper Manhattan, stands as one of the greatest hitters of all time, a power-hitting right-handed slugger who spent the better part of his 19 seasons (1993–2011) terrorizing pitchers. A 12-time All-Star, Ramirez bashed 555 home runs and helped the Indians and the Red Sox reach two World Series apiece, adding a record 29 postseason homers along the way. He was the World Series MVP for Boston in 2004, when the club won its first championship in 86 years.

For all of his prowess with the bat, Ramirez’s lapses — Manny Being Manny — both on and off the field are legendary. There was the time in 1997 that he “stole” first base, returning to the bag after a successful steal of second because he thought Jim Thome had fouled off a pitch… the time in 2004 that he inexplicably cut off center fielder Johnny Damon’s relay throw from about 30 feet away, leading to an inside-the-park home run… the time in 2005 when he disappeared mid-inning to relieve himself inside Fenway Park’s Green Monster… the time in 2008 that he high-fived a fan mid-play between catching a fly ball and doubling a runner off first… and so much more. Read the rest of this entry »

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Designing a pitch can be an arduous but rewarding process for a pitcher. When you find two or more pitches that have the potential to work well together, it may be worthwhile to make some changes if, for example, one isn’t yielding positive results. It’s not always as simple as it sounds, and sometimes the option of not using the pitch at all ends up being the best choice.

For an older pitcher, this process tends to be harder, though not impossible. They’ve gone through the majority of their career throwing a pitch with certain mechanics or gripping the ball in a particular way. Changes to either of those can be uncomfortable, which may create a developmental roadblock. However, there may come a point when becoming a more dynamic pitcher is necessary, especially as the aging curve starts its downward trend.

At 31 years of age, the Rangers’ Mike Minor put together the best season of his eight-year career. He posted a 3.59 ERA, an almost 3-1 K/BB rate, allowed his lowest ever contact rate in the strike zone, and had career highs in strikeouts (200) as well as innings pitched (208.1).

It might be a stretch to expect Minor to repeat his 4.2 WAR season, but it’s not out of the question. He still possesses a decent fastball and has developed a really good changeup. Yet his curveball and slider both took steps back in 2019, so Minor should consider working on at least one of them prior to the 2020 season. Read the rest of this entry »

The 2020 ZiPS projection season starts Friday, and before it does, I wanted to offer a brief refresher of what ZiPS is and is not.

ZiPS is a computer projection system, initially developed by me from 2002-2004, and “officially” released in 2004. As technology and data availability have improved over the last 15 years, ZiPS has continually evolved. The current edition of ZiPS can’t even run on the Pentium 4 3.0 processor I used to develop the original version starting in 2002 (I checked). There are a lot more bells and whistles, but at its core, ZiPS engages in two fundamental tasks when making a projection: establishing a baseline for a player, and estimating what their future looks like using that baseline.

ZiPS uses multi-year statistics, with more recent seasons weighted more heavily; in the beginning, all the statistics received the same yearly weighting, but eventually, this became more varied based on additional research. Research is a big part of ZiPS and every year, I run literally hundreds of studies on various aspects of the system to determine their predictive value and better calibrate the player baselines. What started with the data available in 2002 has expanded considerably; basic hit, velocity, and pitch data began playing a larger role starting in 2013, and data derived from StatCast has been included in recent years as I got a handle on the predictive value and impact of those numbers on existing models. I believe in cautious, conservative design, so data is only included once I have confidence in improved accuracy; there are always builds of ZiPS that are still a couple of years away. Additional internal ZiPS tools like zBABIP, zHR, zBB, and zSO are used to better establish baseline expectations for players. These stats work similarly to the various flavors of “x” stats, with the z standing for something I’d wager you’ve already figured out!

When estimating a player’s future production, ZiPS compares their baseline performance, both in quality and shape, to the baseline of every player in its database at every point in their career. This database consists of every major leaguer since the Deadball era — the game was so different prior to then that I’ve found pre-Deadball comps make projections less accurate — and every minor league translation since what is now the late 1960s. Using cluster analysis techniques (Mahalanobis distance is one of my favorite tools), ZiPS assembles a cohort of fairly similar players across history for player comparisons, something you see in the most similar comps list. Non-statistical factors include age, position, handedness, and, to a lesser extent, height and weight compared to the average height and weight of the era (unfortunately, this data is not very good). ZiPS then generates a probable aging curve — both midpoint projections and range — on the fly for each player. Read the rest of this entry »

How much major league teams are willing to spend on player salaries in any given year can be a bit murky. Teams don’t want to show their hand and lose negotiating power with free agents, though we can usually figure out their number by the end of spring when the money has been spent. How much every team is likely to spend is more opaque. We know that, generally speaking, teams are making boatloads, but while the revenue across the sport has increased over the last few years, it hasn’t resulted in increased payrolls. Every team has lots of money — the budget constraints we hear front office types reference are, more often than not, self-imposed rather than the result of empty coffers — but some will spend more than others. Trying to pin down what teams will spend in 2020 at this point in the winter is difficult, but we can use last year’s payroll numbers as a guide to get a rough idea of what each is likely to do, and thus gauge which ones will commit to payroll increases and which are likely to embrace thrift.

To answer those questions, we can look to the contracts coming off the books at the end of 2019, but that number can be misleading. Raises to players with long-term contracts, as well as increased pay in arbitration can bite into some of the departed money. Let’s start with how much money every team has committed for 2020 as of right now, using estimates for arbitration figures and minimum salaried players. (All the data can be found in the Payroll section on our RosterResource pages.)

Read the rest of this entry »