Scott Radinsky came into coaching with an old-school approach. That was to be expected. His playing career spanned the 1986-2001 seasons, and he honed his craft under the likes of Moe Drabowsky, who came of age in the Eisenhower era. Analytics were in their infancy. Radinsky was hired by the Indians in 2005 — initially to tutor pitchers in the minors — on the strength of his nuts-and-bolts knowledge and his communication skills.

The 50-year-old went on to serve as Cleveland’s bullpen coach in 2010-2011, and then as their pitching coach in 2012. From there he moved on to the Dodgers organization, and he spent the last two years as the bullpen coach in Anaheim. Along the way, he’s learned to embrace analytics.

“The information wasn’t as eye-opening to me when I was first getting exposed to it,” admitted Radinsky, who now monitors TrackMan data throughout the season. “I wasn’t resistant; it just didn’t make complete sense to me. But over the years, because of how much better it’s being explained — and a lot of it seems more quantifiable — it makes perfect sense. I’ve completely bought in, which makes it easier for me to sell something to a player.”

Radinsky gave examples of that salesmanship — we’ll share specifics in the coming week — including convincing Blake Parker to up his breaking ball usage, and getting Justin Anderson to better utilize his fastball. In each case, the data provided by Anaheim’s analytics department was delivered to Radinsky in “an awesome” manner. Just as importantly, it didn’t arrive heavy-handed. Read the rest of this entry »

Ben Lindbergh and Jeff Sullivan banter about how teams project the outcomes of matchups between batters and pitchers, the perils of second-guessing well-informed managerial decisions, and why teams still make mistakes, then answer listener emails about start-to-start strikeout variance, limiting the number of pitchers used per game, a potential problem with pitcher-catcher headsets, the four Wander Francos, the MLB players with the most-ever teammates, and the legality of getting a running start when tagging up, plus a Stat Blast about a new way to think about how often the best batters fail.

Audio intro: The Posies, "I Guess You’re Right"
Audio outro: The Beths, "Not Running"

Link to Ben’s article about second-guessing
Link to Ben’s article about Kratz and catcher sounds
Link to list of players with most teammates

 iTunes Feed (Please rate and review us!)
 Sponsor Us on Patreon
 Facebook Group
 Effectively Wild Wiki
 Twitter Account
 Get Our Merch!
 Email Us: podcast@fangraphs.com

Podcast (effectively-wild): Play in new window | Download

Subscribe: RSS

Yogi Berra once said “if you see a fork in the road, take it.” While that may be typically less-than-helpful, the Nationals find themselves at a crossroads, with one of those big, franchise-altering decisions regarding their still-young star slugger, Bryce Harper, before them. 2018 may have muddied more than clarified the situation.

The Setup

To a large degree, the Nationals have had it easier in the regular season than any contender in baseball, with the possible exception of the Cleveland Indians. With the Atlanta Braves and Philadelphia Phillies rebuilding, the Miami Marlins doing their usual cry-pauper schtick, and the New York Mets being the Mets and Metsing up a few seasons, Washington entered every season since 2012 as the divisional favorite.

The 2017-2018 offseason was relatively quiet for Washington, with no follow-up trade like the one that brought Adam Eaton to the team. Nor was there a major free agent signing, though this was largely due to the fact that there were few significant free agents available last offseason and even fewer that fit the team’s needs. (Catcher was a position in obvious need of an upgrade, but there was nary a great free agent catcher to be found, and a trade for JT Realmuto failed to materialize.)

Sure, I liked Lorenzo Cain, but considering the team’s minor league talent, would that have been the most efficient signing? The Nationals did at least dip their toes into the Yu Darvish and Jake Arrieta markets, but given the disaster of a year Darvish had and with Arrieta being merely solid, it’s hard to say there was much in the way of regret there.

For a team that didn’t expect to have to worry about the Braves and Phillies — yet — and faced a luxury tax threshold beckoning and an uncertain future after the short-term, there’s a very good argument that this was the right way to play the offseason. If the team had dough they were absolutely dying to spend, putting it towards a future Harper contract, if the team went that way, made more sense.

While Washington has had above-average payrolls, it’s not a team that historically has dipped that deeply into the free agent market. They spent aggressively to bring in Max Scherzer (as they should have) but otherwise haven’t spent $50 million on a single free agent player since Jayson Werth.

The team was active, but low-key, picking up a number of role players like Matt Adams, Jeremy Hellickson, and Howie Kendrick. These constituted depth pieces for a contender rather than foundational talent.

Much was made about the team moving on from Dusty Baker, but similarly, I felt it was the right move at the time. Dusty’s challenge in 2016 and 2017 was to take a veteran team, keep them from murdering each other, and guide them along on cruise control. That’s Baker’s specialty. But a the team that had reached the possible end of the Bryce Harper era and now faced the challenges of transitioning to a new core, whether by retool or rebuild? That’s not something I was as keen on having Baker handle.

The Projection

ZiPS still saw the Nationals as the class of the NL East, but with an 89-73 record, they were the only projected division winner with a median win guess under 90 wins. The projections didn’t see this as the year that it was more likely than that the Braves or Phillies took a step forward, but it was still a 1-in-3 chance (32.4%) that a non-Marlin team toppled the team.

The Results

While the season started off strong with a sweep of the Cincinnati Reds, an 11-16 April left the Nationals spending a good chunk of the early part of the season in fourth place, behind the Phillies, Braves, and the surging Mets.

Things seemed to have righted themselves in that lusty month of May, but while Washington ending May in first place, with a 33-23 record, it had become clear that the Braves and Phillies had shown real improvement, not simply an early-year mirage.

The team was in first place and largely hadn’t even yet seen the full benefits of phenom Juan Soto in the lineup (43 PA through the end of May). The only player who wasn’t really hitting at that point was Michael A. Taylor, who was already on borrowed time with Adam Eaton’s return expected.

Then the team’s pitching largely collapsed. At the end of May, Washington’s 3.45 FIP was the second-best in baseball, behind only the Houston Astros. Over the rest of the season, it was 4.52, 24th in the majors. While Scherzer was more or less his usual self, the rest of the rotation combined for a 5.35 ERA.

By the time the trade deadline rolled around, there were a lot more arguments for the Nationals being sellers than buyers. While the team was theoretically still on the outskirts of both the Wild Card and NL East races, they were only hovering around .500.

The team wasn’t major seller until after the post-waiver deadline, only then moving players like Daniel Murphy and Gio Gonzalez who were unsigned past the end of the season.

The Dodgers claimed Bryce Harper on revocable waivers, but the Nationals never seriously discussed trade terms with Los Angeles. It was one of those instances in which you heard a lot of behind-the-scenes rumors. I wonder if we’ll ever get a full, true story about what happened. Did the Dodgers not make a serious offer, taking advantage of their disappointing win total at the time, hoping to keep Harper from a rival? After all, it wasn’t a Randy Myers situation where Washington would just say “fine, he’s yours” so there was little risk in a block.

Or were the Nats owners, primarily the Lerner family, simply not interested in trading Harper when push came to shove? I think it far more likely they were a roadblock to a possible trade than team president Mike Rizzo. Remember, Harper was in a different situation than Manny Machado was, where there was actually a good chance that the owners of his current team would re-sign him in free agency.

Washington ended the season in second place in the division, but that was due more to the Phillies deciding to stop winning games ever than to any impressive late-season surge from the Nationals.

What Comes Next?

The Bryce Harper question is of course the one that will dominate this offseason. Spending $300 million (and maybe more) on a player who has just one MVP-type season in his portfolio is a major risk. But Washington may feel they need to retain him just to keep pace with the Braves and Phillies, one of which has a far better farm system and the other of which possesses a deeper bank account.

Harper’s not the only pending financial decision, either. Anthony Rendon is a free agent after 2019 and it wouldn’t take a crazy-good year from Stephen Strasburg to make him think he could beat four years and $100 million after next season or three years and $75 million after 2020.

The good news is that whichever way the team goes, they do have impressive build-around talent in Soto, Victor Robles, and Trea Turner. But given their division, Washington may be in trouble if they resort to half-measures. In fact, if they want to spend $300 million, Manny Machado is likely a better fit on the roster than Harper, with the added bonus that they can stick it to their rival up the B-W Parkway.

Way-too-Early-Projection – Victor Robles

Ha, you thought this was going to be Juan Soto, didn’t you? Just picture a whole bunch of really big numbers. There, you have the Soto projection.

In essence, a Harper-less Nationals outfield would likely be best configured with Soto, Eaton, and Victor Robles. So with Robles the least established as a major leaguer right now, we’ll go with him, certainly no chopped liver as a consensus top-ten prospect coming into 2018.

Not the flashiest projection around, but ZiPS anticipates Robles to be a contributor in the majors very quickly. If Robles is your third-best outfielder, it makes the “pay Bryce Harper $35 million a year” case harder to make for the team.

It might come as a surprise to some to learn that Major League Baseball used to be a tax-exempt non-profit. It’s true: Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code allows for professional sports leagues to claim tax-exempt status. That didn’t make the teams tax-exempt; the rule applied to sports’ central offices. It is an understandably controversial part of the tax code. Legislators have attempted to eliminate that tax-exempt status. MLB eventually voluntarily surrendered its non-profit status in 2007, mostly so it didn’t have to report its executive compensation.

MLB might not be a non-profit anymore, but that doesn’t mean it likes paying taxes. Its latest attempt to keep the IRS at bay concerns one of the unforeseen side effects of the new tax law, which we’ve talked about before. In this instance, MLB teams are upset about a deduction the IRS says they’re ineligible for. As the Wall Street Journal’s Richard Rubin explains,

Team owners are fighting a proposed tax regulation that would deny baseball teams and other sports franchises a lucrative deduction they say they scored in last year’s tax law.

Congress intended that teams get the “full deduction,” MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred wrote in an Oct. 1 letter to the Treasury Department and IRS, attempting to draw a “stark contrast” between baseball teams that he said should get the break and others, such as investment bankers, who can’t.

The tax break at issue is the 20% deduction for pass-through businesses such as partnerships and S corporations that pay their income taxes through their owners’ individual returns. Congress designed the break as a companion to the rate cut for corporations, but it imposed limits that the government is now directing at team owners.

For those of you who either don’t know or don’t want to know what that last paragraph means, let me explain. The tax reform bill allowed certain types of enterprises called “pass-through” businesses – where the business pays its taxes via their owners’ tax returns – to have a tax deduction. Since many MLB teams are partnerships or other kinds of pass-through entities, they want to have this deduction too.

Now here’s the problem:

Congress included “athletics” on the list of businesses that couldn’t benefit from the new 20% deduction. Such exclusions in the law were meant to prevent people from turning labor income into business income. In athletics, that was intended, at least, to prevent a player from routing his salary through a limited liability company to get the business break.

And that has led Commissioner Rob Manfred to – no joke –argue Major League Baseball is not an athletics business in a letter to the IRS. Manfred wrote that “the activities of a major league professional athlete make up a de minimis amount of the total activities of all employees of a professional sports franchise.” He goes on to argue:

A professional sports club does not merely employ professional athletes, but rather employs hundreds of additional individuals who are responsible for conducting activities related to stadium operations, marketing, team operations, broadcasting and media, retail store operations, community engagement, and general and administrative functions. In fact, the substantial majority of time spent by a club’s employees does not relate to playing in the sporting contests presented by the club.

To MLB, a baseball team is in the business of receiving athletic services, not providing them. “The services being performed in connection with a sports franchise are those performed by the players, who are employed by the club—and in that regard, the club is receiving services, not performing them.” In other words, MLB is attempting to position itself as a league of marketing companies, rather than a sporting enterprise. Says MLB: “[The IRS’ interpretation of the law] incorrectly assumes that a professional sports club is . . . in the field of athletics merely because it employs athletes.” The problem is that this proves a bit too much. As Rubin explains:

…even if the performance of athletic services is only a small part of what a baseball team does, the IRS rule says that a business that is more than 5% athletic services is a service business and can’t get the tax break.

And that’s kind of the problem. MLB is trying to say it isn’t in the principle business of athletics because it employs primarily non-athletes. But this sort of thinking strikes me as a bit absurd. In the law, we look to the plain language of words when trying to determine the intent of the legislature. One way to do that is looking at a dictionary.Merriam-Webster defines “athletics” as “exercises, sports, or games engaged in by athletes“; by the plain language of the statute, Major League Baseball qualifies. Why? Because it is a business enterprise engaged in the marketing, presentation, and production of athletic events. MLB’s argument would be a bit like saying that Metro Goldwyn Mayer isn’t a movie company because it receives acting services and merely distributes movies that contain them. As a practical matter, MLB is more than a mere intermediary; it employs the athletes, facilitates the games, and markets them. It has no other product.

The other, more notable problem with MLB’s letter is how it frames itself and its teams. Here, it cites from a press release during the passage of the tax reform law.

“The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act includes specific safeguards to prevent tax avoidance and help ensure taxpayers of all income levels play by the rules under this new fairer, simpler tax system. Our legislation will ensure this much-needed tax relief goes to the local job creators it’s designed to help by distinguishing between the individual wage income of NBA All-Star Stephen Curry and the pass-through business income of Steve’s Bike Shop.” (Ways and Means release, November 2, 2017).

The boldface and underline were placed there by MLB. Now, there is, of course, a legal distinction they’re trying to make: Steve’s Bike Shop is a pass-through entity, while Stephen Curry isn’t. And yes, there is a certain legal merit to that position – but I find that particular example to be pretty disingenuous. MLB is comparing itself and its teams to Steve’s Bike Shop and distancing itself from Stephen Curry, who is the example of someone so rich he shouldn’t receive a tax cut. But at the same time, Steve’s Bike Shop doesn’t employ Stephen Curry, while MLB teams employ professional athletes like Stephen Curry. MLB is a national enterprise and its teams are hardly a local bike shop; they are by no means a small business, nor are they a “Main Street” job creator. To use professional athletes as an example of people who do not need the deduction, whilst arguing that its billionaire owners do, smacks of bad faith, and is something the MLBPA should perhaps take notice of.

Finally, it’s worth noting that MLB isn’t alone here. Entertainment content writers are also lobbying the IRS using a similar argument. Both spend much of their submissions talking about the intent of Congress in passing the law. That makes sense: effectuating legislative intent is generally the goal of statutory interpretation. At the same time, however, it’s not clear that Congress had any intent on this issue.

Mark Prater, who was the lead Senate staff author of the provision, said he doesn’t recall explicit conversations about whether pro teams would qualify.

Oops.

It would take some doing to have a more difficult postseason on either side of the ball, particularly at a pivotal time in one’s career, than Yasmani Grandal has had. As the Dodgers’ starting catcher during the regular season, the switch-hitting 29-year-old (who turns 30 on November 8) hit for power, showed typically excellent plate discipline, and stood out as one of the game’s best pitch-framers. Alas, he’s looked hapless this month, and between some bad breaks defensively and a deepening offensive slump, he’s lost his starting job for the second straight postseason. As a pending free agent, he could be headed for a rough winter, though he should get at least another shot to help the Dodgers overcome their two-games-to-none deficit in the World Series.

In his seventh season in the majors and fourth with the Dodgers, Grandal hit a solid .241/.349/.466 with 24 homers for a 125 wRC+. The last mark was the best of his career as a regular (he posted a 144 wRC+ in 226 PA as a rookie in 2012) and one point shy of the Marlins’ J.T. Realmuto, who was the the majors’ best among catchers. Admittedly, his season was streaky. Here’s how it looked by month, straight from our splits:

Holy fluctuating BABIPs! I haven’t shown his ISOs (SLG – AVG), but you can do the mental math; he swung from two straight months in the .160s to a July with a .364 ISO. About the only thing he did with consistency was knock the ball out of the park. He even had a month (June) where he drew just four walks. On a rolling average basis, however, Grandal wasn’t much streaker than he’d been in 2017, when he hit .247/.308/.459 for a more modest 102 wRC+. Here are his last three seasons by 15-game rolling wOBA (15-game Rolling wOBA is also the name of my new band):

 
That’s a bit of a rollercoaster ride, but not one that’s especially more dramatic than that of the similarly offensively productive Realmuto, who had a 107 wRC+ in 2017 and a 111 mark (to Grandal’s 116) in 2016:

 
Realmuto had just one calendar month in 2018 with a wRC+ lower than 100 (79 in August), but he also had a drastic first half/second half split (147 before the All-Star break, 99 after) whereas Grandal was somehow Mr. Consistency in that regard (124 and 126). Go figure.

By our version of catcher defense, which does not include pitch framing, Grandal was nine runs above average en route to 3.6 WAR, second among all catchers behind Realmuto’s 4.8. By Defensive Runs Saved, he ranked ninth out of 47 qualifiers with nine runs above average, including 10 above average in terms of framing (rSZ). By Baseball Prospectus’ numbers, he was an MLB-high 15.7 above average in framing and 17.7 runs above average overall, second to Jeff Mathis‘ 18.2. By BP’s other components of catcher defense, he was 0.8 runs above average in pitch blocking (preventing passed balls and wild pitches), ranking 22nd out of 82 catchers with at least 1,000 framing chances. (For reference, the top-to-bottom spread there was just 8.2 runs.) He was 0.1 runs above average in terms of throwing out baserunners, which either ranked 30th (as displayed on the page) or was in a 21-way virtual tie for 15th (there’s no second decimal place shown) in a category where the top-to-bottom spread is all of 1.9 runs.

By BP’s numbers, Grandal’s 2018 defense was his worst season out of his past four in total but just the second in that span in which he was average or better in framing, blocking, and throwing in the same season:

In other words, there were no particular red flags about his defense heading into the postseason. And yet in the small-sample spotlight, he had a nightmarish NLCS against the Brewers, after a relatively quiet Division Series in which he caught every inning against the Braves without either a wild pitch or a passed ball, and threw out the only stolen base attempt against him.

Grandal’s troubles began in the first inning of Game 1 of the NLCS, with Clayton Kershaw on the mound. With Lorenzo Cain on first, he lost a low slider to Christian Yelich:

The ball didn’t get far but it was enough to advance Cain, whom Kershaw eventually stranded. Two innings later, with one out, men on first and second and Jesus Aguilar at the plate, another Kershaw slider squirted past him, with both runners advancing.

Two pitches later, Aguilar hit a screaming liner that first baseman David Freese dove and caught, but home plate umpire Scott Barry ruled that Grandal had interfered with his swing, and Freese was awarded first base. Cain then scored on an Hernan Perez fly ball, which would have been an inning-ender had Aguilar’s lineout been allowed to stand; the throw home from center fielder Cody Bellinger clanked off Grandal’s glove, allowing both runners to advance and costing the catcher his second error of the inning (the catcher’s interference having been the first).

Thus Grandal became the first catcher in postseason history to complete the trifecta of an error, an interference, and a passed ball in a single inning. Though Kershaw limited the damage in those two innings to a pair of runs, they loomed large in what became a 6-5 loss.

Backup Austin Barnes caught Game 2, but Grandal returned to catch Walker Buehler in Game 3. With the Dodgers trailing 1-0 and Travis Shaw having smacked a two-out triple, the 24-year-old righty bounced a knuckle curve on the plate that Grandal couldn’t come up with, as Shaw scored.

With one out in the eighth, and Shaw facing Alex Wood with Ryan Braun on first base, Grandal simply failed to catch a 91.9 mph fastball that missed its mark; Braun advanced but did not score.

Grandal has caught just eight innings since; two apiece in NLCS Games 4 and 6, with the balance coming in the two World Series games after entering as a pinch-hitter. In that limited time, he’s been party to another couple of wild pitches. In the seventh inning of Game 6, he caught Kenta Maeda with the Dodgers down 5-2. When the Brewers put runners on second and third with two outs, the lead became 6-2 after Maeda bounced a slider near the front left-hand corner of the plate that ricocheted away from Grandal. Aguilar scored and Mike Moustakas took third. In Game 2 of the World Series, with the Dodgers down 4-2, Grandal blocked a Scott Alexander slider in the right-hand batter’s box; Mookie Betts, who was on second, sped to third but didn’t score.

All told, that’s three passed balls, three wild pitches, a catcher’s interference and an error catching a throw on Grandal’s watch. By the Win Probability Added calculations in our play logs, the eight plays add up to -0.245 WPA for the Dodgers’. About half of that came on wild pitches (0.107 on Shaw scoring, 0.026 on Aguilar scoring, 0.003 on Betts advancing) — plays where that the official scorer judged Grandal not to be the primary culprit — but that’s still gonna leave a mark.

Meanwhile, Grandal has hit .120/.241/.280 in 29 plate appearances, with four walks and 12 strikeouts; two of his three hits have gone for extra bases. After striking out three times in four PAs in Game 1 of the NLDS, he homered off Anibal Sanchez in Game 2, walked three times in four plate appearances in Game 3 (he was batting eighth) and went 0-for-5 with two strikeouts in Game 4. He went 1-for-4 with two strikeouts in Game 1 of the NLCS, his defensive game from hell, grounded into a bases-loaded double play as a pinch-hitter in Game 2, and went 1-for-4 with a fifth-inning double (off Jhoulys Chacin) and three strikeouts in Game 3, the last with one out and the bases loaded in the ninth. In his four subsequent pinch-hitting appearances, he’s 0-for-3 with a walk, which was drawn off Ryan Brasier to load the bases in the seventh inning of Game 1 of the World Series.

All told, Grandal has the sixth-lowest WPA of the postseason from an offensive standpoint, though he doesn’t even have the lowest mark on his team:

Meanwhile, Barnes is just 2-for-22 with -0.121 WPA int he postseason, that after hitting a disappointing .205/.329/.290 (77 wRC+) in 238 PA, down from .289/.408/.486 (142 wRC+) lasts year. A good framer (8.3 runs above average) and blocker (1.0 runs) but subpar thrower (-0.2 runs) according to BP’s metrics, he’s thrown out two out of five runners attempting to steal, but was unable to stop the changeup that Ryan Madson bounced in front of the plate on his first pitch upon entering the World Series opener, with both runners advancing and later scoring.

Grandal started 110 games behind the plate in 2018 and 113 in 2017, but this is the second straight October that he’s taken a back seat in the postseason. Last year, he went into a tailspin over the final two months of the season while understandably distracted by his wife’s high-risk pregnancy that culminated with the birth of his son on the eve of the World Series; Grandal traveled back and forth to his wife in Arizona on off days, sometimes making five-hour drives on back-to-back days. He started just twice in the postseason, going 0-for-8 with three walks while Barnes made 13 starts and hit .217/.288/.326 in 52 PA. Grandal now owns a dismal .099/.256/.197 line in 87 postseason plate appearances, all with the Dodgers. Among players with at least 75 postseason PA since 1969, only one has a lower batting average (Dan Wilson at .091) and only two have a lower slugging percentage (Wilson at .102 and Mike Bordick at .174).

As reported by the Orange County Register’s Bill Plunkett, Grandal credited the Brewers for holding him in check but blamed himself for “a horrendous job by continuing to not make an adjustment” at the plate. As for the defense, he struggled to accept the notion that he’s in some kind of slump:

“How much control do I have on a ball that hits the dirt? That’s the best way I can put it. … How many guys did I throw out during the two series? If you’re strictly basing a defensive slump off of three blocks that could have gone either way, three blocks that I talked to three, four other catchers about and they’ve all told me the same thing – if you go off of those three, then I guess you can say I’m in a slump.”

The catcher did say that after reviewing video of Game 1, he was too “flat-footed” in his setup, which affected his positioning in blocking a ball, but that he had fixed that issue. In his view, the bounces just haven’t gone his way:

“You’ve got one of the best defensive catchers in the game in [Gold Glove winner] Martin Maldonado and he’s blocking balls where they hit him dead on, the way it should be hitting, and the balls going other places. You’ve got [Brewers catcher] Erik Kratz, same thing in L.A. Ball hits him perfectly and it goes somewhere else. There’s nothing you can control as soon as that ball hits the dirt.”

Before Game 1 of the World Series, manager Dave Roberts said he anticipated starting Grandal at some point and was looking for the right matchup. With Barnes not hitting and with righty Rick Porcello on the mound, Game 3 would be a good spot. Grandal has been considerably stronger while batting from the left side of the plate, with a 120 wRC+ over the past three seasons and a 131 mark this year; he’s at 103 for 2016-2018 and 106 for this year from the right side. Via Statcast, he had a .447 wOBA against fastballs from righties this year, .365 for those 95 mph or faster (relevant for a potential Nathan Eovaldi start in Game 4).

As to what lies beyond this World Series, the assumption is that Grandal won’t be back in L.A., given that the Dodgers have, according to our own Kiley McDaniel, “two of the top three catching prospects in the game waiting in the upper levels” in Keibert Ruiz and Will Smith. They may need a stopgap to pair with Barnes in 2019, but don’t seem likely to make a multiyear commitment to Grandal, who will share top billing among the free agent catchers with Wilson Ramos.

Ramos has been slightly better hitter over the past three seasons (120 wRC+ to Grandal’s 116), albeit in about 300 fewer PA, but not nearly in Grandal’s class as a defender (79 runs above average to 6 via BP’s metrics, 39 to -11 via DRS). While the industry consensus is that Grandal may have cost himself money with his play this October, he’s 15 months younger and more durable than Ramos. He’s averaged 128 games per year to Ramos’ 104 over the past five seasons, and has had one knee surgery (2013) to Ramos’ two (2012 and 2016) — though he did also have A/C joint surgery in 2015.

We’ll have more to say on those two free agents — and all the others — after the World Series, of course. For now, we’ll see if Grandal can do anything to reverse the course of a very rough October.

Read the rest of this entry »

In our never-ending quest to put a FanGraphs logo on everything, mugs are the logical next step. So, here they are!

They come in both black and white to match your preferred aesthetic and, at 15 oz., are also on the large size. These have quickly become the go-to mugs in my own household, to the point where certain unnamed spouses have attempted to monopolize them.

They are available now for $25, which includes shipping and handling. Supplies are currently limited. Quite honestly, these may be the first and last mugs we make, so get them while you can!

Free agency begins five days after the end of the World Series. As in other recent offseasons, FanGraphs is once again facilitating this offseason a contract-crowdsourcing project, the idea being to harness the wisdom of the crowds to the end of better understanding the 2018-19 free-agent market.

Read the rest of this entry »

After the first two games of the World Series, the Red Sox are probably feeling pretty good. With two victories already to their credit, they need to win just two of their next five contests to win this year’s title. The odds are in their favor.

As they begin the the first of three games in Los Angeles, however, they have a decision to make regarding their lineup, owing to the absence of the designated hitter in a National League park. The issue comes up every year, but rarely does it present much difficulty to decision-makers. Most American League champions feature either feature a DH who isn’t worth playing elsewhere or an obvious weakness somewhere in the lineup.

That isn’t so much the case for J.D. Martinez and the Boston Red Sox, however.

Consider some examples from recent World Series. In 2014, Billy Butler DH’d for the Royals in Kansas City but only pinch-hit in San Francisco. Kendrys Morales played the same role for the 2015 edition of the Royals. Last year, it was the Astros’ Evan Gattis. Only Cleveland, during their series against the Cubs, was forced to take some unusual measures to include their usual DH in the lineup, placing Carlos Santana in the outfield. That said, Cleveland also lacked a surplus of great outfield options at the time.

The last legitimately good AL player forced from a lineup when the World Series headed to an NL park was probably Kevin Youkilis in 2007, when the presence of David Ortiz sent him to the bench. But the current version of the Red Sox will be forced to take similar steps in Los Angeles. Martinez was a six-win player this season, with a 170 wRC+ as Boston’s designated hitter, marking the best season by a DH since Ortiz’s 2007 campaign for the world champions. Martinez needs to go to an outfield corner, and even if he we assume that he had just bested (worsted?) the single-season low for UZR (-36 runs, set by Brad Hawpe in 2008), he still would have recorded nearly four wins this season. He needs to be in the lineup, right?

It would seem so, yes, but once Martinez goes into the outfield, one of the following scenarios needs to occur:

1. The Red Sox bench Jackie Bradley Jr.; or
2. they bench Andrew Benintendi; or
3. they play Mookie Betts at second base.

Mike Petriello made the case for the third option over at MLB.com. In that piece, he notes that the decision is easier in games Four and Five with a lefty on the mound, mentions the lack of potential opportunities for Betts at second base based on Red Sox pitching and Dodgers hitters, says the offensive numbers are a wash, and concludes thusly:

So if the lineup choices are a wash, this comes down to defense. Martinez is a sizable step down from Betts in right, but he’s got to be there if we want his bat in the lineup. Betts is likely a small step down from Bradley in center, probably a barely perceptible one, but that matters with Martinez in right. And at second, Holt is worse than Kinsler, but better than Betts. You could argue in either direction. Either way, Betts and Martinez must both play, and Bradley’s defense is more valuable than Holt’s.

Maybe putting Betts at second base is too radical for the World Series. Perhaps Cora will just keep it simple and bench Bradley, starting Holt or Kinsler at second base. It’s the easy way to go, and Red Sox fans know better than most how hard one poorly-timed defensive miscue can sting. But October is when the tough choices mean the most. Putting Betts at second is far from traditional. It just might be the right thing to do.

Petriello presents an interesting argument, but I’m not sure it is the correct one. Instead of separating offense and defense, let’s try to combine them. First, here are the player projections with a slight platoon adjustment for the lefties against a potential righty in Walker Buehler.

That’s what things look like when the players are all playing their normal positions. I’m leaving Martinez where he is, since the DH penalty is roughly equivalent to a -10 outfielder, a figure that seems about right. In the scenario where Betts goes to second base, we have to remove about a win off his value because of the change in defensive position. He’s a great outfielder, yes, but given his lack of recent play at second base, it’s probably not reasonable to expect even average defense from him, regardless of how many grounders he’s taken over the last few years. Putting that into the calculation, we see these numbers for the four outfield slots plus second base.

Maybe Betts is better at second base than we think. Maybe Martinez is worse in the outfield. What happens if we replace Bradley with Betts in center field and put Kinsler at second base.

Betts isn’t likely to lose any value in center field given his range and arm are just as good as Bradley Jr.’s, even by Statcast metrics. Whatever he would theoretically lose in terms of fielding runs from the move, he would gain back by means of the center-field positional adjustment.

Whatever the case, it appears as though the difference between the two alignments — if one exists — is just a few runs. And while that’s minuscule over the course of one game, logic dictates that, when the radical solution doesn’t come out any better in the numbers, it probably isn’t worth the downside risk. The argument holds whether Benintendi or Bradley Jr. is benched. Given that Bradley Jr. seems more likely to hit the bench against a lefty on Saturday and Sunday (if necessary), I think it raises the argument that it is Benintendi who should sit against Walker Buehler.

Given Benintendi’s spot in the batting order, it is fairly clear that Alex Cora feels it is his left fielder who hits lefties (and righties) better than Bradley Jr. The projections (with defense) put the two players as near equals. Against Buehler, that means Cora is simply choosing offense or defense in Los Angeles with the other a potential pinch hitter. Neither option is a bad choice, but since Bradley Jr. still projects competently on offense against a righty, choosing defense over offense — in light of Martinez’s presence in the field — it makes sense to go with Bradley Jr. over Benintendi. The Red Sox center fielder has been unlucky with the bat this season by xwOBA, and it is possible projections are underrating his ability.

The graph below shows all players with 500 plate appearances with their xwOBA and wOBA, per Baseball Savant. Those players above the line are underperforming their xwOBA, while those players below the line are overperforming it.

Most of the players who undershoot their wOBA based on their xWOBA are slow as seen by the table below.

It’s a bunch of really slow guys, a player who gets massively shifted in Joey Gallo, and then Marcell Ozuna and Bradley Jr. The Red Sox center fielder has hit a lot better than his batting line indicates. At least against a righty starter, he deserves to play. With the pitcher’s spot inithe lineup, Benintendi will still have an opportunity to impact the game off the bench. It certainly feels odd to advocate benching one of Boston’s best players in Andrew Benintendi, but I suppose that is one of those good problems to have.