Effectively Wild Episode 1322: Read All About It

EWFI
Ben Lindbergh and Jeff Sullivan banter about Ben and Travis Sawchik finishing their new book, The MVP Machine, Willians Astudillo‘s MVP voting results, the Kyler Murray baseball/football decision and why it’s unusual for players in his situation to have leverage, Manny Machado rumors, and Yasmani Grandal‘s comments about the contract he didn’t sign, then answer listener emails about why baseball players don’t hold out and Rickey Henderson’s base-stealing today, plus Stat Blasts about the biggest gaps between best and second-best years and the giant New York Yankees.

Audio intro: The Decemberists, "Midlist Author"
Audio outro: Cake, "Open Book"

Link to preorder The MVP Machine
Link to Astudillo results
Link to Jeff’s Garcia post
Link to hitter height data
Link to Grant’s Little League WAR article
Link to article about baseball terms in Spanish

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Contract Crowdsourcing Again: Bryce Harper and Manny Machado

There’s a report out today about Manny Machado:

Manny Machado remains unsigned, but the Chicago White Sox have made at least one pitch to the superstar shortstop.

Multiple sources told ESPN’s Buster Olney that the White Sox have a seven-year, $175 million offer on the table for Machado.

I do think there’s something important to understand here. Machado hasn’t yet signed anywhere. The idea that he would sign for $175 million seems almost preposterous, but then again, he hasn’t signed for $175 million. If the reported terms are true, they do seem too small, but that’s how a negotiation is conducted. The player side asks for X, which is ultimately too high. The team side proposes Y, which is ultimately too low. If an agreement is reached, it’s for Z. We’re going to learn the most information when Machado actually has a new employer. Then, and only then, will we have a fuller understanding of what his market looked like. Said understanding still won’t be complete.

So Machado is still out there, available. Bryce Harper is also still out there, also available. Machado’s age is 26 and six months. Harper’s age is 26 and three months. There was thought that, through free agency, they might be able to reach some record contracts. Those contracts might still be out there in front of them. Increasingly, however, it feels like they might not be. Which is why this little post is going up.

Read the rest of this entry »


Let’s Fix MLB’s Salary Arbitration System: Introduction

Arbitration season is upon us. This winter, Mookie Betts‘ contract set a record for a second-time arbitration-eligible player after agreeing to a $20 million deal with the Boston Red Sox to avoid arbitration. NL Cy Young winner Jacob deGrom set some records of his own with his $17 million agreement with the Mets. But other players didn’t fare as well. Aaron Nola and the Phillies were over $2 million apart; a smaller but still significant gap exists between the Yankees and Luis Severino. We’ve talked before about the problems inherent in the current system of salary arbitration for major league baseball players. With a growing number of cases going to arbitrators, and with those cases proving to be seemingly quite contentious, I thought it would be useful to explore solutions to an increasingly thorny problem. This piece will serve as a refresher of the basics; we’ll offer some fixes in the days to come.

Often, analyses of MLB salary arbitration focus on the fact that the hearings typically only consider traditional, “old school” statistics.

Another quirk to the arbitration process is that it usually only factors in “baseball card statistics” rather than more sophisticated metrics. While teams signing free agents are typically up to speed on sabermetrics, the arbitration process does not account for them. Counting stats are important, as is playing time in general. Since labor lawyers typically sit on arbitration panels, the concept of “making it to work every day” is something that holds value.

That last sentence is something else important to focus on: salary arbitrators are typically randomly selected labor lawyers. And while some have a comprehensive knowledge of baseball, it isn’t their day job: arbitrators usually hear many different types of cases, with many different fact patterns. That means that a baseball salary arbitrator may well also arbitrate cases on entirely different matters.

Now, the 2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement does allow for the use of some publicly available advanced metrics.

Only publicly available statistics shall be admissible. For purposes of this provision, publicly available statistics shall include data available through subscription-only websites (e.g., Baseball Prospectus). Statistics and data generated through the use of performance technology, wearable technology, or “STATCAST”, whether publicly available or not, shall not be admissible.

But, often, salary arbitrators aren’t well versed in sabermetrics or advanced analytics. As a result, the statistics being used tend to be basic – very basic. In developing their arbitration projection model, Matt Swartz and MLB Trade Rumors noted as much.

Hitters are typically evaluated using batting average, home runs, runs batted in, stolen bases and plate appearances. There are some positional adjustments, but typically the added defensive value of a shortstop relative to a first baseman is not as important in arbitration hearings as it is on the free agent market. Hitters also can receive larger arbitration awards if they have unique accomplishments, such as winning an MVP award. Pitchers typically are evaluated using innings pitched and earned run average. Starting pitchers are rewarded for wins, and relievers are rewarded for saves and holds. Unique accomplishments, such as Cy Young Awards, matter for pitchers as well.

Still, despite its flaws, the arbitration system was, for some time, considered a great success. After all, while it’s generally accepted that free agency led to rising salaries for major league players, there’s at least some evidence that salary arbitration – the process by which players who are not yet free agents, but have at least three years’ service time, have their salaries determined – has also led to improved compensation. Over the last few years, however, salary arbitration has devolved from a system teams and players can leverage to obtain a negotiated contract into a viable means for teams to contest players’ salary demands in the hopes arbitrators side with teams’ lower salary figures.

The concept of “file-and-trial” – that of a team electing not to negotiate with players after arbitration figures are submitted and exchanged – has become so commonplace that Major League Baseball has a glossary entry defining and explaining it. This method has an effect on the strategies employed by players and their representatives, who find themselves at an obvious resource deficit compared to teams. As Craig Calcaterra detailed:

There is certainly an advantage to file-and-trial for a team. It makes the player and the agent work harder and earlier in order to be prepared to negotiate with the club before the file deadline. It also makes them work a lot harder to come up with a defensible filing number given that, rather than merely being an opening salvo in an extended negotiation, it’s something that they will certainly have to defend in open court. It’s also simple hardball. Teams have greater resources than the players and the agents and it’s less painful for them to pay for lawyers and hearing prep and to conduct the actual hearing. There’s risk to the team, of course — they might lose and pay more than a settlement would’ve cost — but teams are obviously concluding that the risk is worth it.

Ken Rosenthal wrote late last year that the MLBPA feared that every team would soon adopt the “file-and-trial” approach. And while that didn’t happen this offseason, the number of arbitration hearings continue to rise, and they are increasingly acrimonious, as Michael Baumann noted for The Ringer.

For years, it was generally accepted that it was undesirable for a team to let arbitration-eligible players actually go to a hearing over salary, since a hearing would force the team to bad-mouth a player; the morale costs outweighed the potential financial gain from holding a hard line. Last year, more arbitration cases went to a hearing than in any year since 1990.

Yankees executive Randy Levine famously ripped Dellin Betances‘ arbitration request of $5 million in the media, comparing Betances’ submission analogous to Levine calling himself an astronaut. Blue Jays righty Marcus Stroman took to Twitter to remark that “[t]he negative things that were said against me [in the hearing], by my own team, will never leave my mind.” The salary arbitration system, initially designed to encourage settlements between team and player, is now driving wedges between the parties, though it is worth noting that whether those wedges persist once players make free agency decisions isn’t a settled question.

What we can say is that the salary arbitration system isn’t working optimally: it doesn’t reflect what we actually know about baseball by excluding publicly available advanced metrics, and it’s further damaging player-team relationships. With this in mind, it’s no surprise that agents are starting to take a harder line on arbitration.

In a mission statement distributed among some players, Jeff Berry, who helps run the baseball division at CAA, outlined a number of steps he believes are necessary to rectify the imbalance of power in the relationship between MLB and the union. It was no surprise that his first target was arbitration. “[A]ttacking the arb system,” Berry wrote in the memo, which was obtained by ESPN’s Buster Olney, “is an ideal battleground for MLBPA/players/agents to take a unified stand and to feel empowered and proactive rather than victimized.”

There’s no doubt that the current arbitration model suffers from some deep structural problems. Over the course of the next few days, we’re going to take a look at how to fix them.


Curtis Granderson Revisits a 2007 Interview

When I interviewed him for Baseball Prospectus in March 2007, Curtis Granderson was a young outfielder coming off a promising first full season with the Detroit Tigers. He’s since made three All-Star teams, bashed 332 home runs, and accumulated 48.7 WAR. Still active at age 37, Granderson has had a very good career.

How much has his approach — and the game itself — changed since our bygone spring training conversation? Wanting to find out, I approached Granderson with an idea this past summer: what if I were to ask him the exact same set of questions I did more than 11 seasons ago?

Granderson was amenable. Standing by his locker, I pulled a copy of the old interview out of my back pocket and proceeded to revisit the past.

———

Q: Cutting down on your strikeouts has been a main focus for you this spring. What adjustments are you making?

Granderson: “I think we’re all facing that in today’s game. Strikeouts are at an all-time high. Part of it is the talent that pitchers have now. Speaking 11 years later, they throw harder. Guys have more movement. Guys are bigger, more physical, and there are more of them doing different things — they have different pitches.

“It’s a constant battle to keep your strikeouts down. How to do that? Hopefully not getting yourself in too many two-strike counts. There really isn’t too much more you can do, except that when you do get to two strikes, just continue to battle. Fight.” Read the rest of this entry »


Kiley McDaniel Chat – 1/16/19

12:18

Kiley McDaniel: Hello from ATL, just returned from Seattle and some delightful time with Eric and Meg including (huge shocker) great food and also Driveline Pro Day, which we’ll be writing up soon

12:18

Kiley McDaniel: Scout is wandering around the house trying to decide on which toy to play with while I’m at the computer

12:18

Andre: Does Kyle Wright or Ian Anderson have the stuff of a number one in the making?

12:19

Kiley McDaniel: We don’t see every #1 starter coming in advance, like Cliff Lee and maybe Jacob deGrom, but we see most of them coming (i.e. they were deemed to have ace upside before they did ace things). So, very unlikely for Wright/Anderson. Both have a chance to be a #2 but I would say #3 is what you’re realistically hoping for, which is a perennial 3 WAR player

12:21

Kiley McDaniel: If we say every pro pitcher has some non-zero chance of being an ace or every position player has some chance of putting up a 5 WAR season (call it 0.1%), Wright/Anderson are maybe 1-5%, so don’t plan on it, but they’re still elite in that they’re over 1% and that’s a very small population of pitchers.

12:21

Kiley McDaniel: And I’m eye-balling those numbers, but I think that rings true

Read the rest of this entry »


Twins, Angels Swap Very Different Fringe Prospects

There was a minor trade on Tuesday night as the Angels acquired recently DFA’d righty John Curtiss from Minnesota for 18-year-old Dominican infielder Daniel Ozoria.

The Curtiss addition is the latest of many examples of relief pitcher diffusion happening on the fringe of the Angels 40-man roster. Since November, the Angels have been part of eleven transactions involving relief pitchers, either via trade, waiver claim, or DFA. The likes of Austin Brice, Parker Bridwell, Luke Farrell, and Dillon Peters have been on and off the roster, sometimes more than once (Bridwell, who was DFA’d for Curtiss, has now been DFA’d three times since this offseason), as the Angels try to patch holes in their bullpen for free.

Curtiss, who is 25, has thrown an unsatisfying handful of innings during each of the last two seasons, totaling 15 big league frames. He throws hard, 92-96 with the occasional 7 or 8, and can really spin a power, mid-80s slider (he averaged 2600 rpm in 2018). His command backpedaled last season and is the biggest thing standing between Curtiss and a steady middle relief gig. Perhaps the change of scenery will be good for him.

Ozoria spent his second professional season as a 17-year-old in the AZL, and at times he looked like he could have used a second pass at the DSL. Listed at 5-foot-9, 135 pounds, Ozoria struggled with the pace and comparably mature athletes of Arizona. He does have interesting tools, though, and played hard throughout a tough summer on a team that was really struggling. He’s an above-average runner and athlete. Though not a polished, instinctive defender, he has good range and hands, and enough arm for the left side of the infield.

Because Ozoria so lacks present strength, he needs to take max-effort, full-body hacks just to swing the bat hard, and sometimes things can get out of control. His swing also has some length, but I’m not sure it matters as much for hitters this size, because their levers aren’t. Much of Ozoria’s offensive potential just depends on how much growing he has left to do. He’s small enough that I believe that were he a high school prospect, scouts would rather he go to college to get a better idea of how his body might mature than sign him now. The realistic upside is probably a utility infielder, and even that depends on significant growth that may not materialize, but Ozoria is so uncommonly young for a pro prospect that it’s fair to like the things he can already do and project heavily on the stuff he can’t. He will likely spend all of 2019 in Fort Myers and is probably four or five years away from the big leagues.


2019 ZiPS Projections – Kansas City Royals

After having typically appeared in the hallowed pages of Baseball Think Factory, Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections have now been released at FanGraphs for more than half a decade. The exercise continues this offseason. Below are the projections for the Kansas City Royals.

Batters

The Royals have an extremely bifurcated offense, with three players projected to be solidly above league-average in Adalberto Mondesi, Salvador Perez, and Whit Merrifield, and a fairly large gulf before the next tier of KC hitters. If the Royals were really going the full rebuild route, you’d see Perez and Merrifield — entering their age-29 and -30 seasons respectively — on other teams’ lists, but the Royals seem content to go the “sorta” rebuild route.

Given how thin their talent is, it’s hard to see them having much success going this route and as such, Perez and Merrifield are likely to be either in their declines or in other organizations by the time the performance matters. Winning 72 games instead of 64 in 2019 isn’t going to jumpstart anything.

I’m sure there will be some gnashed teeth about O’Hearn’s projection, given that he hit .262/.353/.597 in the majors in 170 plate appearances in 2018. He also had a .713 OPS in 406 PA in the Pacific Coast League, which is abysmal for an offensive prospect.

Pitchers

This group won’t be as bad as some people think in 2019, and it wouldn’t take a lot of breaks for the team to achieve their pointless Quest for 75 Wins, which is a little like bragging to your drinking buddies that you can deadlift 125 pounds. Danny Duffy isn’t a lost cause and Brad Keller was good enough in 2018 that it couldn’t all have been a fluke. ZiPS absolutely loves Richard Lovelady, but the rest of the bullpen is a big digital yawn. The Trevor Oaks projection isn’t exactly impressive, but I can’t remember the last time ZiPS didn’t actually hate a pitcher with as low a strikeout rate as he is projected to have.

Bench and Prospects

Troubling and not seen in full here is that ZiPS simply projects very few of the hitting prospects in the upper levels of the organization as good bets to be relevant by the time the Royals are good again. It’s essentially Adalberto Mondesi and Nicky Lopez. Khalil Lee and Emmanuel Rivera are the only two other offensive prospects on this list for whom ZiPS gives even an over/under of three WAR over their major league careers. Now, it’s not quite as bad as that considering a couple of the names I’m not yet projecting are Seuly Matias and Nick Pratto, but it’s certainly less than ideal for a team that really ought to be 2 1/2 years into a rebuild by now.

One pedantic note for 2019: for the WAR graphic, I’m using FanGraphs’ depth chart playing time, not the playing time ZiPS spits out, so there will be occasional differences in WAR totals.

Ballpark graphic courtesy Eephus League. Depth charts constructed by way of those listed here at site.

Batters – Counting Stats
Player B Age PO G AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB SO SB CS
Whit Merrifield R 30 2B 153 614 81 172 36 4 13 61 44 108 35 9
Adalberto Mondesi B 23 SS 118 437 62 114 22 6 18 58 20 118 39 7
Salvador Perez R 29 C 136 513 55 130 26 1 24 77 18 104 1 1
Nicky Lopez L 24 SS 127 511 60 133 15 5 6 40 43 61 12 6
Billy Hamilton R 28 CF 139 500 74 121 18 7 4 27 42 117 45 10
Alex Gordon L 35 LF 128 443 50 102 19 1 11 44 47 120 9 2
Xavier Fernandez R 23 C 88 318 34 79 17 1 6 30 18 56 3 3
Jorge Soler R 27 RF 90 307 38 76 15 0 13 37 40 107 3 1
Meibrys Viloria L 22 C 113 409 41 91 19 1 7 38 27 104 2 2
Emmanuel Rivera R 23 3B 120 466 50 120 23 5 7 49 23 92 3 6
Ryan O’Hearn L 25 1B 144 509 64 115 29 3 20 67 57 152 2 0
Jecksson Flores R 25 2B 126 460 47 110 22 3 5 37 22 92 16 6
Cheslor Cuthbert R 26 3B 109 377 41 91 18 1 11 40 30 84 1 1
Brian Goodwin L 28 CF 107 340 41 76 17 1 11 40 30 112 9 3
Cam Gallagher R 26 C 97 329 33 74 14 0 5 31 24 54 1 0
Donnie Dewees L 25 CF 132 518 54 119 22 7 7 45 30 111 15 6
Frank Schwindel R 27 1B 136 524 58 134 32 1 17 65 19 92 1 2
Jorge Bonifacio R 26 RF 110 401 51 93 19 2 12 43 38 124 1 1
Brett Phillips L 25 RF 124 439 52 88 15 6 12 46 43 186 10 3
Kelvin Gutierrez R 24 3B 118 460 48 107 16 5 7 39 28 125 12 4
Chris Owings R 27 SS 125 419 49 101 23 4 7 40 24 104 15 5
Kort Peterson L 25 RF 101 365 41 82 19 3 9 39 20 129 7 4
Nick Dini R 25 C 90 317 33 73 14 0 6 28 13 68 6 1
Bubba Starling R 26 CF 86 306 32 61 16 1 7 27 20 106 5 3
Hunter Dozier R 27 3B 135 499 58 113 29 2 15 51 41 160 4 3
Khalil Lee L 21 CF 113 426 51 90 19 4 10 43 46 164 14 13
Erick Mejia B 24 2B 134 530 57 123 22 6 5 42 35 128 22 12
Alex Liddi R 30 1B 107 406 48 89 19 3 17 53 25 146 5 2
Blake Perkins R 22 CF 131 514 63 104 21 2 5 33 64 162 20 11
Chris Owings R 27 RF 123 412 48 99 22 4 7 39 24 103 14 4
Brewer Hicklen R 23 LF 100 384 43 79 16 2 11 39 20 150 21 7
Corey Toups R 26 3B 103 374 42 76 17 2 7 31 33 140 12 3
Humberto Arteaga R 25 3B 125 465 41 108 15 2 4 32 16 88 5 6
Jack Lopez R 26 2B 110 399 38 86 11 2 7 30 15 113 11 6
Taylor Featherston R 29 2B 108 337 36 64 12 3 7 31 23 129 8 2
Ramon Torres B 26 2B 113 431 44 103 17 2 4 31 20 69 10 6
Sebastian Rivero R 20 C 76 287 27 62 12 0 5 24 11 77 0 1
Samir Duenez L 23 1B 112 429 49 98 20 2 12 50 32 113 6 1
Anderson Miller L 25 LF 115 437 43 97 18 3 8 39 27 120 9 5
MJ Melendez L 20 C 106 410 41 76 17 4 13 46 32 184 4 7
Parker Morin L 27 C 58 179 16 35 7 1 2 13 9 49 1 0
D.J. Burt R 23 2B 113 434 47 92 15 5 3 32 43 121 21 11
Terrance Gore R 28 CF 94 216 24 43 3 1 0 9 16 61 26 5
Nick Heath L 25 CF 84 303 30 59 8 2 2 18 27 112 22 9
Manny Olloque R 23 3B 92 332 32 69 14 2 6 30 15 121 4 4
Elier Hernandez R 24 RF 126 481 43 103 23 3 4 38 21 132 6 7

Batters – Rate Stats
Player BA OBP SLG OPS+ ISO BABIP RC/27 Def WAR No. 1 Comp
Whit Merrifield .280 .331 .415 105 .135 .323 5.5 6 3.4 Gene Alley
Adalberto Mondesi .261 .295 .462 105 .201 .319 5.6 2 2.7 Cristian Guzman
Salvador Perez .253 .289 .448 100 .195 .275 4.7 6 2.6 Ramon Hernandez
Nicky Lopez .260 .321 .344 85 .084 .286 4.0 4 1.5 Jeff Huson
Billy Hamilton .242 .300 .330 75 .088 .309 4.1 9 1.4 Freddy Guzman
Alex Gordon .230 .317 .352 85 .122 .292 4.0 10 1.1 Derek Bell
Xavier Fernandez .248 .291 .365 80 .116 .285 3.7 2 0.6 Richard Suomi
Jorge Soler .248 .340 .423 110 .176 .337 5.2 -5 0.6 Jeremy Giambi
Meibrys Viloria .222 .277 .325 66 .103 .282 3.1 6 0.5 John Mizerock
Emmanuel Rivera .258 .296 .373 84 .116 .308 3.8 2 0.5 Greg LaRocca
Ryan O’Hearn .226 .307 .413 97 .187 .282 4.5 -2 0.4 Eric Valent
Jecksson Flores .239 .279 .333 68 .093 .289 3.4 7 0.4 Kenny Perez
Cheslor Cuthbert .241 .299 .382 87 .141 .284 4.0 -3 0.3 Bobby Holley
Brian Goodwin .224 .288 .376 82 .153 .300 3.9 -1 0.3 Orsino Hill
Cam Gallagher .225 .279 .313 64 .088 .256 3.1 4 0.3 Drew Butera
Donnie Dewees .230 .276 .340 69 .110 .280 3.3 5 0.2 Joe Mathis
Frank Schwindel .256 .286 .418 91 .162 .282 4.3 1 0.1 Leo Hernandez
Jorge Bonifacio .232 .302 .379 87 .147 .306 4.0 0 0.1 Bill McCarthy
Brett Phillips .200 .275 .344 70 .144 .315 3.3 10 0.1 Brad Snyder
Kelvin Gutierrez .233 .279 .335 69 .102 .305 3.4 4 0.0 Edwin Rodriguez
Chris Owings .241 .283 .365 78 .124 .305 3.8 -5 -0.1 Thomas Manzella
Kort Peterson .225 .285 .367 79 .142 .322 3.6 3 -0.1 Brian Brady
Nick Dini .230 .274 .331 67 .101 .276 3.3 -2 -0.1 Omir Santos
Bubba Starling .199 .255 .327 59 .127 .280 2.8 4 -0.2 John Giudice
Hunter Dozier .226 .285 .383 83 .156 .302 3.8 -7 -0.2 Rey Palacios
Khalil Lee .211 .298 .345 78 .134 .317 3.2 -4 -0.3 Mel Hall
Erick Mejia .232 .281 .325 67 .092 .297 3.2 2 -0.4 Ramon Caraballo
Alex Liddi .219 .267 .406 82 .187 .296 3.8 0 -0.4 John Cotton
Blake Perkins .202 .294 .280 60 .078 .285 2.7 3 -0.6 Tony Miller
Chris Owings .240 .283 .364 78 .124 .305 3.8 -1 -0.6 Drew Anderson
Brewer Hicklen .206 .261 .344 66 .138 .305 3.2 3 -0.6 Wilkin Ramirez
Corey Toups .203 .275 .316 63 .112 .304 3.1 -2 -0.6 Sean Berry
Humberto Arteaga .232 .259 .299 54 .067 .279 2.6 9 -0.6 Jim Scranton
Jack Lopez .216 .250 .306 53 .090 .283 2.6 5 -0.7 Wade Robinson
Taylor Featherston .190 .251 .306 53 .116 .284 2.7 2 -0.7 Chris Petersen
Ramon Torres .239 .273 .316 63 .077 .277 3.0 1 -0.7 Dave Myers
Sebastian Rivero .216 .245 .310 52 .094 .278 2.5 -1 -0.7 Kurt Brown
Samir Duenez .228 .281 .368 78 .140 .283 3.7 -1 -0.8 Alex Hernandez
Anderson Miller .222 .269 .332 65 .110 .288 3.1 4 -0.9 Jonathan Johnson
MJ Melendez .185 .249 .341 61 .156 .296 2.6 -3 -0.9 Brandon Yarbrough
Parker Morin .196 .240 .279 43 .084 .258 2.3 -3 -1.0 Dave Ullery
D.J. Burt .212 .284 .290 60 .078 .287 2.8 -2 -1.1 Adam Davis
Terrance Gore .199 .264 .222 37 .023 .277 2.7 -4 -1.1 Craig Griffey
Nick Heath .195 .261 .254 44 .059 .302 2.4 0 -1.2 Jeff Conger
Manny Olloque .208 .245 .316 54 .108 .307 2.5 -2 -1.3 Mario Ramirez
Elier Hernandez .214 .254 .299 53 .085 .287 2.4 2 -2.1 Rick Bernardo

Pitchers – Counting Stats
Player T Age W L ERA G GS IP H ER HR BB SO
Jake Junis R 26 10 10 4.37 29 28 164.7 172 80 26 38 143
Brad Keller R 23 9 9 4.20 43 24 156.3 168 73 15 46 97
Danny Duffy L 30 10 9 4.37 26 26 148.3 151 72 19 51 129
Trevor Oaks R 26 9 9 4.41 25 24 136.7 158 67 13 38 72
Ben Lively R 27 7 8 4.35 25 21 120.0 128 58 14 38 88
Richard Lovelady L 23 4 3 3.52 54 0 71.7 68 28 4 26 59
Jesse Hahn R 29 5 5 4.52 18 17 87.7 92 44 8 38 60
Glenn Sparkman R 27 6 7 4.79 29 19 118.3 139 63 17 27 70
Sam McWilliams R 23 6 8 4.74 23 20 108.3 123 57 12 42 71
Arnaldo Hernandez R 23 7 8 4.95 26 22 120.0 137 66 16 41 69
Nate Karns R 31 3 3 4.57 14 12 69.0 69 35 10 29 65
Jonathan Dziedzic L 28 7 8 4.98 22 22 115.7 132 64 14 44 66
Jason Hammel R 36 7 9 4.83 30 20 123.0 140 66 18 35 91
Heath Fillmyer R 25 6 8 5.09 28 26 138.0 152 78 18 58 85
Brian Flynn L 29 4 4 4.19 42 1 68.7 72 32 6 27 44
Pedro Fernandez R 25 4 4 4.52 33 4 65.7 70 33 6 29 41
Ian Kennedy R 34 7 9 4.99 24 24 128.0 132 71 24 44 106
Jake Kalish L 27 4 5 4.93 30 11 95.0 108 52 12 31 57
Gabe Speier L 24 1 1 4.39 45 1 65.7 71 32 4 28 37
Jake Newberry R 24 4 4 4.33 56 0 62.3 63 30 6 29 46
Tim Hill L 29 2 2 4.33 57 0 54.0 55 26 6 21 45
Wily Peralta R 30 4 5 4.82 40 11 89.7 96 48 11 44 75
Jason Adam R 27 3 3 4.35 46 0 51.7 47 25 7 27 56
Kevin McCarthy R 27 4 5 4.56 64 0 73.0 81 37 9 24 44
Foster Griffin L 23 9 12 5.31 27 26 142.3 168 84 22 52 84
Eric Skoglund L 26 4 6 5.24 21 20 99.7 114 58 17 30 68
Josh Staumont R 25 5 7 5.18 35 14 92.0 84 53 9 80 97
Kyle Zimmer R 27 1 1 4.94 11 4 31.0 32 17 4 16 27
Kevin Lenik R 27 1 1 4.66 31 0 46.3 47 24 4 26 36
Sam Selman L 28 3 3 4.73 37 0 45.7 40 24 4 38 49
Jorge Lopez R 26 6 8 5.11 37 13 98.7 107 56 14 42 77
Scott Barlow R 25 5 8 5.31 25 25 120.3 124 71 20 68 118
Seth Maness R 30 2 2 4.64 33 0 42.7 51 22 6 8 23
Enny Romero L 28 2 3 4.91 44 0 44.0 45 24 6 22 41
Conner Greene R 24 5 6 5.40 36 15 95.0 100 57 6 80 61
Zach Lovvorn R 25 6 9 5.50 27 22 126.0 153 77 17 50 62
Walker Sheller R 24 3 4 5.01 40 0 55.7 63 31 6 25 30
Scott Blewett R 23 6 8 5.55 25 25 136.3 161 84 19 58 73
Michael Ynoa R 27 1 1 5.13 27 0 33.3 34 19 3 22 25
Grant Gavin R 23 1 2 5.05 36 0 51.7 52 29 6 32 46
Yunior Marte R 24 4 4 5.01 42 0 73.7 75 41 8 44 58
Brandon Maurer R 28 4 4 4.91 60 0 58.7 62 32 7 28 49
Blaine Boyer R 37 2 2 5.18 35 0 41.7 47 24 5 18 27
Chris Ellis R 26 4 7 5.62 20 15 81.7 92 51 14 41 64
Burch Smith R 29 3 4 5.58 32 7 69.3 74 43 11 38 60
Kyle Lohse R 40 5 9 5.62 23 18 112.0 132 70 21 35 67
Andres Machado R 26 4 6 5.82 33 13 85.0 100 55 14 40 56
Ofreidy Gomez R 23 6 10 5.82 27 21 123.7 148 80 18 65 67
Gerson Garabito R 23 5 8 6.12 24 24 114.7 131 78 19 72 70

Pitchers – Rate Stats
Player TBF K/9 BB/9 HR/9 BABIP ERA+ ERA- FIP WAR No. 1 Comp
Jake Junis 704 7.82 2.08 1.42 .301 98 102 4.38 2.0 Ed Lynch
Brad Keller 675 5.58 2.65 0.86 .299 99 101 4.14 1.9 Lindy McDaniel
Danny Duffy 642 7.83 3.09 1.15 .302 98 102 4.23 1.8 Kent Mercker
Trevor Oaks 602 4.74 2.50 0.86 .307 94 106 4.32 1.4 Jack Russell
Ben Lively 524 6.60 2.85 1.05 .302 96 104 4.33 1.3 Howie Fox
Richard Lovelady 308 7.41 3.27 0.50 .298 122 82 3.48 1.1 Pat Clements
Jesse Hahn 390 6.16 3.90 0.82 .300 95 105 4.40 0.9 Don Schwall
Glenn Sparkman 517 5.32 2.05 1.29 .307 90 111 4.67 0.9 John Doherty
Sam McWilliams 488 5.90 3.49 1.00 .312 88 114 4.64 0.8 Mark Cahill
Arnaldo Hernandez 535 5.18 3.08 1.20 .301 87 115 4.93 0.7 Michael Macdonald
Nate Karns 302 8.48 3.78 1.30 .301 94 106 4.50 0.7 Ryan Glynn
Jonathan Dziedzic 519 5.14 3.42 1.09 .303 86 116 4.88 0.7 Jimmy Anderson
Jason Hammel 540 6.66 2.56 1.32 .312 86 116 4.55 0.6 Mickey Weston
Heath Fillmyer 620 5.54 3.78 1.17 .296 85 118 5.03 0.6 Steve Falteisek
Brian Flynn 302 5.77 3.54 0.79 .297 103 97 4.32 0.6 Tom Burgmeier
Pedro Fernandez 295 5.62 3.97 0.82 .298 95 105 4.60 0.5 Jim McDonald
Ian Kennedy 556 7.45 3.09 1.69 .286 83 120 5.08 0.5 Dennis Springer
Jake Kalish 422 5.40 2.94 1.14 .304 87 115 4.76 0.5 Pat Clements
Gabe Speier 295 5.07 3.84 0.55 .302 98 102 4.28 0.4 Mike Cosgrove
Jake Newberry 277 6.64 4.19 0.87 .295 99 101 4.47 0.4 Hal Reniff
Tim Hill 237 7.50 3.50 1.00 .302 99 101 4.26 0.4 Todd Rizzo
Wily Peralta 405 7.53 4.42 1.10 .313 86 116 4.64 0.3 Blue Moon Odom
Jason Adam 230 9.75 4.70 1.22 .294 99 101 4.54 0.3 Bryce Florie
Kevin McCarthy 321 5.42 2.96 1.11 .299 94 106 4.66 0.3 Lew Burdette
Foster Griffin 643 5.31 3.29 1.39 .306 81 123 5.24 0.3 Jason Dickson
Eric Skoglund 441 6.14 2.71 1.54 .303 82 122 5.09 0.3 Eric Knott
Josh Staumont 440 9.49 7.83 0.88 .302 83 121 5.12 0.2 Chad Reineke
Kyle Zimmer 141 7.84 4.65 1.16 .304 87 115 4.83 0.1 Lou Kretlow
Kevin Lenik 211 6.99 5.05 0.78 .303 92 108 4.60 0.1 Ken Wright
Sam Selman 215 9.66 7.49 0.79 .298 91 110 4.84 0.1 Mike Kinnunen
Jorge Lopez 443 7.02 3.83 1.28 .305 82 123 4.86 0.1 Tim Crabtree
Scott Barlow 552 8.83 5.09 1.50 .307 79 127 5.22 0.1 Elvin Nina
Seth Maness 184 4.85 1.69 1.27 .308 90 111 4.53 0.1 Tony Arnold
Enny Romero 197 8.39 4.50 1.23 .307 88 114 4.63 0.0 Joey Long
Conner Greene 463 5.78 7.58 0.57 .303 80 126 5.40 0.0 Walt Masterson
Zach Lovvorn 577 4.43 3.57 1.21 .308 78 128 5.28 0.0 Mark Cahill
Walker Sheller 253 4.85 4.04 0.97 .302 86 117 4.98 -0.1 Bob Miller
Scott Blewett 625 4.82 3.83 1.25 .304 78 129 5.34 -0.1 Frank Castillo
Michael Ynoa 157 6.75 5.94 0.81 .301 84 119 5.16 -0.1 Ken Wright
Grant Gavin 238 8.01 5.57 1.05 .305 85 117 4.91 -0.1 Pete Sikaras
Yunior Marte 338 7.09 5.38 0.98 .299 86 116 4.94 -0.1 Joe Hudson
Brandon Maurer 264 7.52 4.30 1.07 .309 85 118 4.56 -0.1 Jose Segura
Blaine Boyer 188 5.83 3.89 1.08 .307 83 121 4.78 -0.1 Bob Scanlan
Chris Ellis 379 7.05 4.52 1.54 .308 76 132 5.57 -0.1 Mark Woodyard
Burch Smith 318 7.79 4.93 1.43 .306 75 134 5.26 -0.3 Marty McLeary
Kyle Lohse 498 5.38 2.81 1.69 .299 74 135 5.44 -0.4 Ed Riley
Andres Machado 393 5.93 4.24 1.48 .309 74 135 5.56 -0.4 Mark Woodyard
Ofreidy Gomez 582 4.88 4.73 1.31 .307 74 135 5.73 -0.5 Clint Sodowsky
Gerson Garabito 545 5.49 5.65 1.49 .297 70 142 6.15 -0.8 Jake Robbins

Disclaimer: ZiPS projections are computer-based projections of performance. Performances have not been allocated to predicted playing time in the majors — many of the players listed above are unlikely to play in the majors at all in 2019. ZiPS is projecting equivalent production — a .240 ZiPS projection may end up being .280 in AAA or .300 in AA, for example. Whether or not a player will play is one of many non-statistical factors one has to take into account when predicting the future.

Players are listed with their most recent teams, unless I have made a mistake. This is very possible, as a lot of minor-league signings go generally unreported in the offseason.

ZiPS’ projections are based on the American League having a 4.29 ERA and the National League having a 4.15 ERA.

Players who are expected to be out due to injury are still projected. More information is always better than less information, and a computer isn’t the tool that should project the injury status of, for example, a pitcher who has had Tommy John surgery.

Both hitters and pitchers are ranked by projected zWAR — which is to say, WAR values as calculated by me, Dan Szymborski, whose surname is spelled with a z. WAR values might differ slightly from those which appear in full release of ZiPS. Finally, I will advise anyone against — and might karate chop anyone guilty of — merely adding up WAR totals on a depth chart to produce projected team WAR.


A Dive into Hall of Fame Ballot Trends

Editor’s Note: As we approach the January 22 Hall of Fame announcement, we’ll be featuring a few pieces from Anthony Calamis and Adam Dore, members of Ryan Thibodaux’s excellent team that tracks public Hall of Fame ballot. This is the second such piece. Be sure to check out the ballot tracker, which is an indispensable tool for any Hall of Fame enthusiast.

To get the obvious point out of the way, the Cooperstown stage is going to be crowded at this year’s Baseball Hall of Fame induction ceremony on July 21. All signs point to the trio of Mariano Rivera, Roy Halladay, and Edgar Martinez earning induction and joining Lee Smith and Harold Baines — both of whom were elected to the Hall of Fame by the Today’s Game Committee this past December — in the 2019 Hall of Fame class. It is also possible that Mike Mussina will join them as well.

This year’s class will, in all likelihood, have the unique distinction of being the first class ever comprised of two or more first-ballot selections (Rivera and Halladay) to go along with one candidate (Martinez) who received at least 75% of the vote in his final year of eligibility. On two previous occasions, the BBWAA selected one first-timer and one other inductee whose eligibility window was set to expire: the 2017 induction class featured Ivan Rodriguez (first year on ballot, 76.0%) and Tim Raines (10th year, 86.0%), while the Class of 2009 consisted of Rickey Henderson (first year, 94.8%) and Jim Rice (15th year, 76.4%).

As of Tuesday morning, we have published 177 ballots in our Hall of Fame Ballot Tracker, and it is clear that Fred McGriff and Larry Walker have gained the most ground of any of the returning candidates since the last voting cycle. McGriff has picked up 34 votes so far from writers who did not include him on their ballots last year – against just two drops – while Walker has seen a net gain of 37 new votes as of this writing. McGriff is in his 10th and final year of BBWAA eligibility and will not get the call from Cooperstown next week. Walker, in his penultimate year on the ballot, had a case that appeared dead in the water, garnering just 21.9% of the vote in 2017, his seventh year on the ballot. Heck, his candidacy was probably written off by almost everyone, even with a 12.1% jump in 2018.

Net Gained Vote Leaderboard, 2009-Present
Rank Year Candidate Net +/-
(Public Ballots)
1 2018 Vladimir Guerrero +56
2 2016 Edgar Martinez +51
3 2017 Edgar Martinez +48
4 2018 Larry Walker +40
T5 2016 Alan Trammell* +39
T5 2016 Mike Mussina +39
T7 2019 Larry Walker +37
T7 2018 Edgar Martinez +37
T7 2017 Tim Raines* +37
10 2017 Jeff Bagwell +33
T11 2019 Fred McGriff* +32
T11 2016 Jeff Bagwell +32
T13 2018 Mike Mussina +31
T13 2016 Tim Raines +31
T13 2016 Curt Schilling +31
T16 2017 Barry Bonds +27
T16 2017 Roger Clemens +27
T18 2017 Mike Mussina +26
T18 2017 Trevor Hoffman +26
20 2016 Mike Piazza +23
*Final Chance on Ballot
Elected by BBWAA
SOURCE: Ryan Thibodaux

Just how far can Walker’s surge take him? Well, his current showing of 66.7% through 177 public and anonymous ballots is sure to falter, as ballots revealed early have historically been more favorable toward the vast majority of candidates than those revealed later or kept private. In order to determine the likelihood of the Canadian former slugger finishing with a portion of the vote high enough to set him up for a real possibility of 2020 enshrinement, I investigated how Walker fared on ballots of varying sizes last year.

Since 2017, I have kept a public spreadsheet detailing the trends in Hall of Fame ballots of varying vote quantities, and how each candidate fares when ballots are broken into five different size groups. The 10-player and 9-player ballots are categorized individually, while 7-8 vote and 5-6 vote ballots make up two separate groups; the remaining ballots, which consist of four or fewer votes, make up the fifth and final category. This sheet, made possible by Ryan Thibodaux’s work, breaks down each of the five size classifications into two additional groups: ballots including both Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens, and ballots that exclude one or both members of that duo.

For the sake of reducing space below, I’ve lumped ballot sizes into two basic groups: 10-player ballots and ballots which have fewer than the maximum 10 names checked.

On ballots with all 10 slots filled:

Ballots With All 10 Slots Filled
Candidate 2019 Pre (’19-’18 Diff) 2018 @177 2018 Pre 2018 Final 2018 Final – Pre Final – @177
Barry Bonds 88.2% 4.9% 85.8% 83.3% 83.2% -0.1% -2.6%
Roger Clemens 89.2% 5.2% 86.8% 84.0% 83.8% -0.2% -3.0%
Vladimir Guerrero —– —– 95.3% 95.1% 95.4% 0.3% 0.1%
Roy Halladay 97.1% —– —– —— —— —— —–
Todd Helton 20.6% —– —– —– —— —— —–
Trevor Hoffman —– —– 82.1% 83.3% 83.8% 0.5% 1.7%
Andruw Jones 13.7% 7.4% 3.8% 6.3% 6.4% 0.1% 2.6%
Chipper Jones —– —– 99.1% 99.3% 99.4% 0.1% 0.3%
Jeff Kent 18.6% 6.1% 10.4% 12.5% 13.9% 1.4% 3.5%
Edgar Martinez 98.0% 12.6% 86.8% 85.4% 86.1% 0.7% -0.7%
Fred McGriff 46.1% 25.3% 16.0% 20.8% 22.0% 1.2% 6.0%
Mike Mussina 93.1% 7.0% 86.8% 86.1% 85.0% -1.1% -1.8%
Andy Pettitte 7.8% —– —– —– —— —— —–
Manny Ramirez 33.3% 3.4% 35.8% 29.9% 31.8% 1.9% -4.0%
Mariano Rivera 100.0% —– —– —– —– —– —–
Scott Rolen 32.4% 15.0% 14.2% 17.4% 16.8% -0.6% 2.6%
Curt Schilling 83.3% 8.3% 78.3% 75.0% 71.7% -3.3% -6.6%
Gary Sheffield 14.7% 2.9% 9.4% 11.8% 13.3% 1.5% 3.9%
Sammy Sosa 14.7% -0.6% 17.9% 15.3% 13.9% -1.4% -4.0%
Jim Thome —– —– 94.3% 95.8% 94.8% -1.0% 0.5%
Omar Vizquel 39.2% 9.3% 27.4% 29.9% 30.1% 0.2% 2.7%
Billy Wagner 19.6% 5.7% 13.2% 13.9% 13.3% -0.6% 0.1%
Larry Walker 82.4% 30.3% 53.8% 52.1% 51.4% -0.7% -2.4%

And ballots on which fewer than 10 names are checked:

Ballots With Fewer Than 10 Slots Filled
Candidate 2019 Pre (’19-’18 Diff) 2018 @177 2018 Pre 2018 Final 2018 Final – Pre Final – @177
Barry Bonds 52.1% 14.2% 36.6% 37.9% 34.7% -3.1% -1.9%
Roger Clemens 52.1% 15.2% 35.2% 36.9% 34.0% -2.9% -1.2%
Vladimir Guerrero —– —– 93.0% 94.2% 93.1% -1.1% 0.1%
Roy Halladay 88.7% —– —– —– —– —– —–
Todd Helton 16.9% —– —– —– —– —– —–
Trevor Hoffman —– —– 71.8% 71.8% 72.9% 1.1% 1.1%
Andruw Jones 1.4% -2.5% 5.6% 3.9% 4.9% 1.0% -0.8%
Chipper Jones —– —– 97.2% 97.1% 96.5% -0.6% -0.7%
Jeff Kent 8.5% -6.1% 11.3% 14.6% 15.3% 0.7% 4.0%
Edgar Martinez 80.3% 14.3% 70.4% 66.0% 64.6% -1.4% -5.8%
Fred McGriff 23.9% 4.5% 18.3% 19.4% 20.8% 1.4% 2.5%
Mike Mussina 64.8% 17.2% 53.5% 47.6% 50.0% 2.4% -3.5%
Andy Pettitte 5.6% —– —– —– —– —– —–
Manny Ramirez 16.9% 5.3% 9.9% 11.7% 11.1% -0.5% 1.3%
Mariano Rivera 100.0% —– —– —– —– —– —–
Scott Rolen 4.2% 0.3% 4.2% 3.9% 6.3% 2.4% 2.0%
Curt Schilling 60.6% 20.8% 49.3% 39.8% 40.3% 0.5% -9.0%
Gary Sheffield 11.3% 1.6% 9.9% 9.7% 9.0% -0.7% -0.8%
Sammy Sosa 12.7% 8.8% 5.6% 3.9% 3.5% -0.4% -2.2%
Jim Thome —– —– 91.5% 89.3% 89.6% 0.3% -2.0%
Omar Vizquel 29.6% -9.3% 32.4% 38.8% 38.9% 0.1% 6.5%
Billy Wagner 9.9% 4.0% 5.6% 5.8% 7.6% 1.8% 2.0%
Larry Walker 45.1% 25.7% 16.9% 19.4% 20.8% 1.4% 3.9%

Four candidates have experienced an increase of at least 10% on 10-player ballots revealed prior to the announcement, with Omar Vizquel just off the pace. Walker is securely out in front of the pack, with a whopping 30% increase on such ballots from last year. Bear in mind that half of the 422 ballots cast in 2018 had awarded votes to 10 players. That Walker has appeared on over 80% of full ballots after receiving votes on just over half of them in 2018 is astounding. Having four names cleared from the ballot certainly opened up more opportunities for electors to cast a vote for Walker, as they may have done last year had the BBWAA allowed unlimited votes.

The even more jaw-dropping statistic is this: Walker’s vote share on sub-10 ballots has more than doubled since last cycle, up to 45.1%. Yes, that’s right. He appeared on just 19.4% of ballots that left at least one open spot last year, but has since seen that number skyrocket faster than the number of likes on a funny cat video gone viral. Walker has also gone 6-for-29 thus far on “Small Hall” ballots of six names or fewer. That might not sound like much, but that 20.7% is nearly identical to the 20.8% of all public sub-10 ballots that included his name. (For what it’s worth, Walker appeared on only two of the 44 publicized ballots that consisted of fewer than seven names last election cycle.)

What does all this mean for this year’s results? Consider the following: through the first 177 publicly revealed 2018 ballots, 53.8% of the 104 writers who checked 10 names cast a vote for Walker. That figure dropped down to 51.4% among all 317 public or anonymous ballots – including 173 full ballots – accounting for a rate decrease of 4.5% from the original vote share (I’m referring to the rate of change, which is different than simply the 2.4% decrease in percentage). Conversely, Walker only appeared on 16.9% of the 71 ballots that consisted of fewer than 10 names at the 177-vote mark, but that mark rose to 20.8% once all public ballots – 144 of which had fewer than the maximum number of slots filled – were uncovered. The rate of increase here was about +23%.

Let us make a few conservative assumptions:

1) The total number of ballots revealed in 2019 will be somewhere in the neighborhood of the 317 made public last year. Let’s say +/- 10 from that mark.
2) The previous year’s four-man induction class will lower the average number of candidates strongly considered by the voters, resulting in 10% fewer ballots with votes for 10 players. This would give a 45:55 ratio of full ballots against those selecting nine or fewer candidates.
3) Walker’s strong showing on full ballots thus far is inflated by early-exit-poll bias, and he will finish with a vote share that is just 90% of what it is currently on such ballots. Such a rate of decrease will get him 74.2% of the vote on public 2019 10-player ballots, just shy of election.
4) The 45.1% share Walker currently holds on smaller ballots will drop slightly by a net -2.0% (for an overall 43.1% vote share) despite increasing by 20% from this point last year and an overall change of +3.6%.
5) Points 2-4 factor in estimates for the portion of the voting body who chooses to keep their votes private.

Factoring in all of these assumptions, Walker would reel in a vote total of approximately 57.1%, which would represent a colossal increase of +23.0% in a single election cycle.

Last week, FanGraphs’ own Jay Jaffe explored the largest single-year gains in BBWAA voting history. In the event Walker does finish at exactly the aforementioned 57.1% figure, he would require an 18.0% increase in his final year of eligibility. Sounds steep, right? Perhaps, but gaining 18% in one year is far from unprecedented, and it would rank as just the 15th largest increase ever — tied with Ralph Kiner’s jump from 24.5% to 42.5% in 1967. It should be noted that a much more recent candidate, Vladimir Guerrero, jumped 21.2 percentage points, from 71.7% to 92.9%, in 2018.

Source: Ryan Thibodaux

Remember, I’m calling 57.1% of the vote for Walker a rather conservative estimate. There is certainly a chance he could come much closer or even exceed a three-fifths majority of the vote. In fact, the most recent model of Jason Sardell pegged 57% as the median estimate.

It certainly appears that we will have some drama on our hands in 10 months’ time when Walker hits the BBWAA ballot for the final time. A weaker ballot and the recent surges in vote totals for players late in their eligibility is sure to provide some additional excitement to the ballot tracking process next year. I would expect that every Walker fan will have run out of fingernails to bite come announcement day in 2020.

Even if Walker doesn’t get elected next year, he and fellow 2019 ballot-mate Fred McGriff might ultimately have a rather smooth road ahead of them. In the last two Eras Committee elections, we have seen three candidates who had gathered solid support during their tenure on the BBWAA ballot sail into Cooperstown upon their first introduction to one of these committees.

2018: Jack Morris, 14 of 16 votes, Modern Baseball
2018: Alan Trammell, 13 of 16 votes, Modern Baseball
2019: Lee Smith, 16 of 16 votes, Today’s Game

Each of these three former players received at least 40% of the BBWAA vote in at least one appearance on the ballot. Historically, many players who have received a relatively high vote share eventually made it to Cooperstown through some ideation of the committee structure. There are only 13 players – excluding those currently on the ballot – in Hall of Fame history who have accrued at least 30% of the overall Hall of Fame vote from the BBWAA who have not since been inducted to the Hall.

At least 30% of BBWAA Vote, Not In HOF
Player Best Vote % Yr Received Yr on Ballot Final Vote %
Gil Hodges 63.4% 1983 15 63.4%
Tony Oliva 47.3% 1988 7 36.2%
Roger Maris 43.1% 1988 15 43.1%
Steve Garvey 42.6% 1995 3 21.1%
Maury Wills 40.6% 1981 4 25.6%
Marty Marion 40.0% 1970 *9 33.4%
Harvey Kuenn 39.6% 1988 12 22.6%
Hank Gowdy 35.9% 1955 *14 14.1%
Phil Cavarretta 35.6% 1975 *12 35.6%
Johnny Sain 34.0% 1975 *10 34.0%
Allie Reynolds 33.6% 1968 *7 27.7%
Tommy John 31.7% 2009 15 31.7%
Luis Tiant 30.9% 1988 1 18.0%
SOURCE: Baseball-Reference

(Disclaimer: Yr on Ballot refers to how many appearances on the ballot the candidate had made at the time his highest vote percentage was received. The BBWAA voting process has evolved greatly from a time when elections were biennial and the 5% minimum threshold did not exist. Some players appeared on the ballot more than 15 times while others were cast off prior to reaching 15 appearances. The * denotes players who appeared on the ballot before several more recent rule changes were instituted. For more on the evolution of Hall of Fame voting, see Jay Jaffe’s The Cooperstown Casebook.)

Note that only six of these players have ever even reached 40.0% of the vote, and just 4 of the 13 exited the ballot with a vote share above 35%. With McGriff currently tracking at 36.2% through 177 ballots, is it likely that he joins this group, considering that he has been favored by private voters more so than public voters each year since the massive purge of the voting body prior to the 2016 election. It is conceivable that the Crime Dog crosses 40.0% of the vote this year, and probable that he – like Morris, Trammell, and Smith – is easily elected by the next Today’s Game Committee, which will meet in December of 2021 to determine which candidates should receive a bronze plaque the following July.

I will touch only briefly on Mussina here, as fellow member of the Tracker team Anthony Calamis thoroughly explored Mussina’s chances for FanGraphs recently. Mussina ranks fourth – behind the three near surefire inductees – in votes on full ballots, missing only seven out of 102 tallied thus far. Along with the three most likely inductees and Curt Schilling, Moose has also gotten the nod on more than 75% of 9-player ballots as well as the 7-or-8-vote group. He is the only candidate besides Rivera – who remains unanimous – to appear on all 19 of the 9-player ballots to date.

At first glance, it would appear as though Mussina’s luck runs out once we get to the true “Small Hall” ballots, which I will label as those containing six votes or fewer – he is just 9-for-30 on those. If we eliminate the “Tiny Hall” 0-4 player ballot category — votes on these ballots are most likely to be awarded to the candidates with the highest vote shares (there is only one public ballot that has named exactly four players) — on which ballots Mussina has been shut out, his vote total share is 39.1% (9 of 23) on remaining Small Hall ballots.

As Calamis mentioned, the average number of votes per ballot is sure to drop precipitously among private voters, who notoriously are far less likely to cast a vote for Bonds and Clemens. In my estimation, a large number of private ballots will fit into the Small Hall demographic. I also believe that the current breakdown of 5-or-6-player ballots – 11 including both Bonds and Clemens (on which Mussina has failed to earn a vote), 12 excluding them – will begin to shift greatly towards the latter as more votes are made public; my guess is that trend will also hold true among private voters. If this is true, Mussina has a chance to remain close to the 75% mark (9 of 12) he holds on such ballots because, as Calamis indicates, he was the second-ranked ballot holdover behind Martinez in terms of 2018 vote percentage. It remains to be seen whether the man known as Moose will have enough gas in the tank to cross the proverbial finish line this year, or if he will have to wait it out until 2020.

Several other players will be covered in greater detail in a subsequent piece next week, but for now I will leave you with a brief overview of some other interesting trends gathered from my Ballots by Quantity sheet.

Scott Rolen, who ranks 12th on the Tracker in overall vote percentage, has gathered votes on 33 of the first 102 full ballots – not a bad showing for a second-year candidate who barely eclipsed 10% of the overall vote when all was said and done last year. However, Rolen has the rather puzzling distinction of being a paltry 4-for-75 on any other ballots, a mark which only bests Andruw Jones’ among candidates likely to remain on the ballot in 2020. Similarly, Rolen was polling at just 3.9% on less-than-10 ballots on all 2018 pre-announcement ballots.

I was rather stunned to see the remarkable consistency of first-timer Todd Helton’s vote distribution. Excluding the stingiest group of Tiny Hall ballots from the mix, Helton’s vote percentage has ranged from a lower bound of 17.4% to an upper bound of 23.1% in each of the remaining four size categories through the first 177 revealed ballots. Naturally, he has benefited substantially more from ballots of the anti-Bonds and Clemens variety.

For a candidate who received just an 11.1% vote share in 2018, eight new supporters for Billy Wagner so far is a step in the right direction (he was also dropped from one ballot, but that ballot included 10 names and Wagner is almost certainly going to earn that vote back in the coming years). Closers historically have received a small boost among the un-published ballots, so the possibility exists that Billy The Kid’s final percentage can be a few ticks higher than where it stands currently. I have long believed that 2020 would be the year that things could really begin to take off for Wagner. He will finally be able to stand alone as the top relief pitcher on the ballot and out of the shadows of Smith, Trevor Hoffman, and Rivera. Wagner will also – at least in the opinion of this observer – have the distinction of being the greatest reliever outside of Cooperstown, period.

If Walker can total 15.5% in his sixth year of eligibility and we are – just three years later – discussing how he might actually have a chance at 75% in his final year, perhaps hope is on the horizon for Wagner, set to reach the 15.5% threshold two years earlier. Only time will tell.


Exactly Three Things About Avisail Garcia

A number of years ago, when I had reason to watch the Tigers, I got to see a bit of a young Avisail Garcia. From a young age, Garcia was referred to as “Mini Miggy,” that being a reference to regular Miggy, Miguel Cabrera. Garcia is from the same country as Cabrera, and he played for the same team as Cabrera, and he had a build and swing somewhat reminiscent of Cabrera. You probably know how it’s worked out to this point. Garcia was Mini Miggy in the same way so many small Dominican righties have been Mini Pedros. Cabrera will eventually end up in the Hall of Fame. Garcia was non-tendered by a bad baseball team at the age of 27.

But today is January 15, and these are trying days to be a baseball writer. The start of the season still feels ages away, and there’s only so much one can write about Bryce Harper and Manny Machado. And so, here we are. Garcia is finalizing a contract with the Rays, a one-year contract worth at least $3.5 million and at most $6 million. Garcia doesn’t seem ticketed for a starting role — he’ll probably bounce around, getting opportunities to hit against lefties. The better he does, the more he’ll play, but he’s joining a team with too many talented players for there to be a long leash. Just because Garcia will start the season in Tampa Bay doesn’t mean that’s where he’ll end it.

The Rays have wanted a right-handed hitter. I assume they wanted a better right-handed hitter. But this is the right-handed hitter I’ve been given a reason to write about right now. So if you’ll join me, I have three things I’d like to share with you. Three fun facts, if you will, three ways in which Garcia is unusual.

Read the rest of this entry »


Meg Rowley FanGraphs Chat – 1/15/18

2:01
Meg Rowley: Hello everyone, and welcome to the chat!

2:01
Meg Rowley: Apologies for the slight delay in getting started– I had to check in with some writing sorts.

2:01
Damian: Where do you think the big market teams will be once rising sea levels makes our major coastal cities uninhabitable?

2:02
Meg Rowley: What a happy, happy chat.

2:03
Meg Rowley: The answer here seems like Chicago, Denver, Seattle and St. Louis, (some of those obviously being quite large already) and also that we should take climate reports more seriously.

2:03
Jack : Would you prefer Harper or Machado for the same money/years?

Read the rest of this entry »