You might not have noticed, but Rico Garcia has been one of the best relievers in baseball this season. Over 30 appearances, the 32-year-old Baltimore Orioles right-hander has a 1.29 ERA, a 3.25 FIP, and a 31% strikeout rate. Moreover, he has allowed just nine hits in 28 innings of work and boasts a record of 3-1 with four saves.
If you don’t follow the Orioles, you can be excused for not being familiar with Garcia. Claimed off waivers from the New York Mets last August, Garcia came into the current campaign having thrown just 70 big league innings since debuting in 2019, and he’d done so while pitching for seven different teams. Truly a journeyman, the 30th-round pick in the 2016 draft out of Hawaii Pacific University possessed a ledger that included one win, four losses, zero saves, and a 5.27 ERA.
What is behind his breakthrough? Based on conversations with both Garcia and Orioles pitching coach Drew French, that is a question without a simple answer. While the righty has never been better, it isn’t as though he has seen his velocity suddenly skyrocket, introduced a nasty new pitch, or discovered a secret formula. Read the rest of this entry »
Like many baseball nerds, I have been itching to get my sweaty hands on enough ABS challenge data to draw some really strong conclusions. Unfortunately, it’s early in the season and challenges happen so rarely that we don’t have much to go on just yet. But you know what they say about idle hands. I am impatient, and I have been devising devilish ways to dodge the damnable data deficit. I’d like to show you one of them. Today we’re bundling.
Here’s what I did. I went to Statcast’s framing leaderboard and I bundled catchers by their strengths and weaknesses at framing pitches in certain locations. Fortunately, catchers are easy to bundle, because they’re already predisposed toward scrunching themselves into tiny little balls. Finding catchers with similar tendencies allowed me to work in the aggregate, searching for patterns in a more robust dataset. I won’t bore you with my methodology, but it’s not much more advanced than scrolling the leaderboard looking for catchers whose framing runs number is red in one zone but blue in another zone. I ended up with four groups:
Catchers who are significantly better framers at the top of the zone than the bottom of the zone.
Catchers who are significantly better framers at the bottom of the zone than the top of the zone.
Catchers who are significantly better framers on their glove side than their arm side.
Catchers who are significantly better framers on their arm side than their glove side.
Each group had around 10 members, and there was some overlap. For example, Patrick Bailey is in the Top Framers and the Glove Side Framers. A few catchers were too good to be in any of the groups, like Brandon Valenzuela. A lot more catchers were too bad or average to be in any of them, like Tyler Stephenson. Feel free to skip this part, but just in case anybody’s curious, these are the four groups:
Once my catchers were nice and bundled, I calculated their success rate on challenges both in the location where they’re good at framing and the location where they’re bad. Then I compared those rates to the rates of the catchers who were their polar opposites. I also calculated the average location of the pitches they challenged, in order to get a sense of how different the pitches they challenged really were.
Before we get into the data, let’s think about some possible results and about how we might end up there. The first possibility is that the differences aren’t that big. Just because you’re better at framing in one spot doesn’t necessarily mean you’ll be better or worse at challenging there. This challenging stuff is so new that we’re not sure what’s what.
The second possibility is that catchers will be good at challenging in the spots where they’re good at framing. It’s certainly not inconceivable. Maybe you handle those pitches better because you see them better, or you’re better prepared for them, or you know that area of the zone well, so you have a better sense of where the edge is.
The last possibility is the opposite, that catchers will be better at challenging in spots where they’re worse at framing. I can think of a couple explanations for that. The first is that they’ll have juicier pitches to challenge. If you’re bad at framing, say, pitches at the top of the zone, you’re probably getting stuck with a lot of bad calls up there, which leaves you with better opportunities for challenges. We can also come at this from the other angle. Maybe when you’re good at framing in one spot, you feel like all pitches in that spot look really good, so you challenge too frequently. I found something similar when I looked at which parks have the best batter’s eyes. When hitters can see the ball well, their plate discipline doesn’t get better as you’d expect; they get more aggressive because more pitches look good to them.
So those are the possibilities. Let’s see what the data says. We’ll start with catchers who are better on one side of the plate. (Since all catchers throw right-handed, I’ll refer to the third base side of home plate, the inside corner to right-handed batters, as their glove side, and the first base side as their arm side.) The columns below show success rate, and they show the average horizontal location of the pitches challenged, measured in inches from the center of home plate.
Challenges on the Corners
Group
Glove Side Success%
Glove Side Plate X
Arm Side Success%
Arm Side Plate X
Glove Side Framers
59%
-9.6
63%
9.5
Arm Side Framers
69%
-9.3
53%
9.9
Well, the third possibility looks like the right one. Catchers run success rates that are 10 percentage points higher on the side where they’re bad at framing. They’re challenging pitches that are either 0.3 or 0.4 inches closer to the center of the plate.
Now let’s move to the top and bottom of the zone. The columns show success rate on challenges and the average height of the pitches in feet.
Challenges at the Top and Bottom
Group
Top Success%
Top Avg Height
Bottom Success%
Bottom Avg Height
Top Framers
51%
3.28
62%
1.58
Bottom Framers
63%
3.22
53%
1.57
Yup, it’s more of the same here. The catchers who are better at framing at one end of the zone are about 10 percentage points worse on challenges in that location. You might notice that the gaps are a bit bigger here, 12 percentage points and 0.7 inches at the top, but only nine percentage points and 0.2 inches at the bottom. If I had to guess, I’d say that’s because the top of the zone is more variable anyway. As I wrote a couple years ago, the knees of short and tall players are much closer in height than their shoulders.
As you can see, the overall success rates are just about identical, and once again, that holds true across the league. The league-wide success rates on challenges at the top and bottom of the zone are nearly identical, just a hair under 59%.
I know this is basic stuff and some of it is fairly intuitive, but I think it already gives us some actionable information. For example, you might also have noticed from the first table that success rates are generally higher on the glove side than the arm side. That actually holds across the entire league. So far this season, catchers are running success rates of 63% on the glove side and 59% on the arm side. Unless you’re a member of our special Glove Side Framers group, you should be more aggressive at challenging pitches to your glove side. That’s all I’ve got right now, but I’ll keep thinking of ways to slice the data.
Ben Lindbergh and Meg Rowley banter about the bunt’s rehabilitation and (17:49) the President publicly picking a side in MLB’s labor battle, then talk to two guests about falling in love with and learning about baseball as adults. First (32:35), beloved BBC presenter and The Guardian columnist Adrian Chiles breaks his baseball silence to expound on how he got bitten by the baseball bug, his long-distance Rays relationship, the loneliness of following baseball from afar, cross-sport comparisons, Chiles-like wonder, and what mystifies him as a fan. Second (1:21:39), Jade Van Kley joins to discuss her journey from registered nurse to baseball content creator, bingeing baseball history, finding an audience for baseball lore drops and video diaries of her first season as a fan, and what fascinates her about the sport.
In 2024, the White Sox set a single-season record by losing 121 games, and last year, they went 60-102 under rookie manager Will Venable — their third straight season with at least 100 losses. Yet now, more than a third of the way into the 2026 season, the White Sox are one of only five AL teams with a record of .500 or better. At 34-31, they currently occupy the second Wild Card spot and are just 1.5 games behind the Guardians in the AL Central race.
Our projection systems certainly didn’t see this turnaround coming, as the White Sox were forecast for a 67-95 record — worst in the AL by almost five full wins — with just a 1.1% chance of making the playoffs. In our preseason Positional Power Rankings, their starting pitching, all three outfield spots, and designated hitter all ranked among the majors’ bottom three. As of mid-April, the Sox appeared to be fulfilling their destiny of another forgettable season, having skidded to a 6-13 start while scoring just 3.16 runs per game and hitting a cringeworthy .195/.286/.316 (71 wRC+), worst in the majors across the board. Even newcomer Munetaka Murakami was hitting just .167/.346/.417 (111 wRC+) with five home runs and a 21.8% walk rate but not much else. However, since that point, the team has hit .260/.343/.451 (121 wRC+) with 73 homers, leading either the AL or the majors in all of those categories while going 28-18 (.609) for the league’s second-best record over that span, behind only the Yankees (29-17, .630). Unfortunately, the last eight of those games have been without Murakami, who suffered a Grade 2 hamstring strain running out an infield grounder on May 29 and landed on the injured list; more on him below.
While there’s a long way to go in the 2026 season, at their current pace the White Sox could post this century’s second-largest improvement in winning percentage among the teams that lost at least 108 games two years prior:
Largest Improvement Two Years After Losing at Least 108 Games
Brendan Gawlowski: As you all undoubtedly saw, I published the Giants list last week.
2:03
Brendan Gawlowski: Eric and James are working furiously on the Twins. I’m about 20 players into the Marlins system, that’s gonna be a long one. I see a path for us to have TB and Miami done next week and be finished with the whole kit and kaboodle but those are both deep systems so we’ll see.
2:03
Brendan Gawlowski: I’ve Isotopes/Rainiers fired up in the background
2:03
Brendan Gawlowski: Let’s go
2:04
Phillip Denny: What’s your 2/5 of the way through the season evaluation of the DePodesta regime in CO?
I don’t know how much attention Braxton Ashcraft wants in his life, but he must be either fuming at his lack of recognition or thrilled to be left alone. As much ink has been spilled on the Pirates this year, only some of it has gone to their starting rotation, as opposed to Konnor Griffin or the team’s new cadre of veteran bats. Of that fraction, Paul Skenes dominates the headlines, followed by the talented but frustrating Bubba Chandler, the newly returned Jared Jones, and the occasionally truantCarmen Mlodzinski.
But as of this writing, Ashcraft is in the top 10 in baseball in pitcher WAR, trailing Skenes by only a tenth of a win. And this on the heels of Saturday’s loss to the Braves, in which Ashcraft surrendered nine hits and six earned runs in five innings. I wouldn’t be especially worried; it’s only Ashcraft’s second bad start out of 13, and the Braves will do worse to better pitchers before the season’s out.
Ashcraft was a pretty big prospect: A second-round pick out of a Waco, Texas-area high school in 2018, and the no. 60 overall prospect heading into last season. And he pitched quite well as a rookie in 2025, with a 2.71 ERA and 2.78 FIP in 69 2/3 innings, split more or less evenly between the rotation and the bullpen. So it’s not like he came out of nowhere, but he would’ve been third-favorite for the role of Skenes’ sidekick if you’d asked around a year ago. Read the rest of this entry »
Well, it only took until my fifth Feature Focus to get to a site tool that I completely forgot we had! After Cristopher Sánchez’s fantastic (but scoreless-streak-ending) start last Wednesday, I saw this tweet from OnPattison’s Tim Kelly:
After his start tonight, Cristopher Sánchez leads all MLB starters in innings pitched (86 1/3), ERA (1.46), FIP (1.78) and WAR (3.6), per @fangraphs.
Thanks to Tim for using and citing FanGraphs, a great website that amazingly pays me to read your tweets and turn them into articles. Anyway, that post got me wondering: Where the heck was Tim getting that live WAR figure? I knew you could find live stats on the player pages — I look at those all the time. Fittingly, yesterday was another start day for Sánchez. Here’s the top of his player page 17 outs into that start:
But WAR isn’t on that little table, so where, pray tell, was Tim finding that number? Well, I did some digging and learned we’ve had live stats on our leaderboards since 2013, as introduced by David Appelman in what has to be the shortest post in FanGraphs history.
Our leaderboards are among our most viewed pages, and for good reason: They’re awesome. What might not be readily apparent (and certainly wasn’t to me) is that we’ve got some basic splits available in the dropdown on the right side of the page:
I’m a power user of our splits leaderboards and tend to default to those whenever I need a bespoke leaderboard that incorporates filters. That means I haven’t made full use of the Splits dropdown on the main leaderboard, which has some fun ready-made options (with more beyond what’s shown here):
And behold, there it is: “Live Stats – Today” and “Live Stats – Full Season.” The “Live Stats – Today” option only shows you stats from today’s action:
“Live Stats – Full Season” gives you today’s stats combined with the rest of the campaign — note how Sánchez’s innings total here matches the 92 from my screenshot of the Live Stats table on his player page:
The “Yesterday” option gives you a quick look at the prior day, in case you didn’t looked at live stats upon the conclusion of the day’s games and want to know who performed the best. Here are Sunday’s top hitters by WAR, as I compose this piece on Monday:
You can also use the Custom Date Range option to see stats for any individual day you’d like, or any set of days. The presets within that dropdown are there for ease of use, but you aren’t limited to those date ranges:
All of the date toggles and split options on the leaderboards are available to all FanGraphs users, but as usual, I’ll remind you that exporting to Excel is a Member-only feature. To become a FanGraphs Member, click here.
Jay Jaffe: Good afternoon, folks! Welcome to another edition of my weekly chat. It’s a lovely day here in Brooklyn, but no, I don’t have Knicks fever. After 31 years running along the spectrum from antipathy to apathy towards the team, I’m indifferent at best to their run to the NBA Finals while my wife and daughter (who’s never rooted for a men’s basketball team before) are swept up in it.
bkgeneral: Why don’t more teams sell earlier in the season? It seems you would get more for 100 games of use over say 75.
12:07
Jay Jaffe: I think there’s a lot going on early in the season, with front offices focusing on the amateur draft as well as on the rosters they spent the previous months building, and on the earliest wave of players who might help from within (perhaps related to service time shenanigans but not necessarily)
12:07
Jay Jaffe: After the draft and the All-Star break, it’s easier to focus on the realities of what they’ve put together and where they fit with regards to the playoff races
My great, big, bold prediction for FanGraphs this year was that Benintendi would hit 30 home runs. It’s now the second week of June, and he has six. If he keeps this pace, he’ll finish with 15. Somehow, I think that means I’m off by 100%.
My reasoning at the time was flawless, of course. Benintendi the last two seasons had quietly reinvented himself. He’d always hit the ball in the air, but rarely with oomf, and almost always to left or center field. He averaged just 12 home runs per 600 plate appearances over the first eight years of his career, with sometimes good, sometimes not-so-good results.
But he clubbed exactly 20 homers in each the last two seasons. How? He simply took his existing contact-in-the-air profile and changed its direction to the pull side. He wasn’t hitting the ball farther; he was simply aiming shallower. This is the thing to do in baseball right now, unless you’re the Rays. Read the rest of this entry »
In the summer of 1872, Martin Malone pitched three complete games in three days for the Brooklyn Eckfords of the National Association. In today’s game, a pitcher who threw three complete games in three days would be hailed as something of a miracle, but Malone’s accomplishment loses a bit of its luster when you consider the context of the era. According to the numbers in our database, starters went the distance 83% of the time that season. Another piece of context scrapes the rest of the shine off with a machete: Over his three games, Malone allowed 86 runs on 96 hits. You will not be shocked to learn that he went 0-3.
Nineteenth century record-keeping being what it is, those are Malone’s only three games in our database, and for several reasons, that’s not quite fair. First, those three games don’t represent anything like a complete picture of his total performance. Malone first suited up for the Eckfords five years earlier. “It is surprising that all of Malone’s vital statistics remain undiscovered,” wrote David Nemec in Major League Baseball Profiles, 1871-1900, “for he seems to have been an integral part of the Brooklyn baseball scene for more than a decade.”
Next, Malone’s pitching may not have turned out well, but he did go 5-for-16 with a walk, for a .313 batting average and 115 wRC+ at the plate. Last and most important, it’s hard to say how much credit Malone really deserves for all the runs he gave up. He only allowed one home run. He didn’t walk anybody and he didn’t strike anybody out. He did what so many pitchers have been implored to do over the course of baseball history: He let the offense put the ball in play and trusted the defense behind him. It was a catastrophic mistake. Read the rest of this entry »
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Jay Jaffe
